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New Zealand has the highest rate of youth suicide in the developed world. 
Young persons with ADHD and ASD, amongst other neurodevelopmental disorders, 
are at greater risk for depression, suicidal ideation, and suicide attempts than their 
typically developing peers. The early detection and treatment of neurodevelopmental 
disorders significantly improves the symptomatology and life outcomes of affected 
individuals. Gaining timely access to specialist mental health clinicians is difficult. 
This process is made more difficult for children who do not present with overt signs 
of severe and persistent psychological distress and therefore are not deemed to be 
‘high risk’, including the majority of children with ADHD and ASD. Consequently, 
the diagnosis of children with neurodevelopmental disorders is substantially delayed 
and/or the responsibility to identify and/or treat falls on clinicians (and non-clinicians) 
such as general practitioners, general paediatricians, nurses, and educators who may 
not have the background to have developed complex schemas in this domain.   
The aim of the present thesis was to develop and test decision support systems 
that employ different reduced-processing design principles. This was done to 
determine which principles were effective in assisting individuals who do not possess 
complex clinical schemas, to diagnose children with neurodevelopmental disorders, in 
the absence of training and practice with the systems. Several manipulations of 
decision support system interfaces were developed and tested across different 
populations of prospective diagnosticians. Across four studies, participants were 
randomly assigned one of several diagnostic-aids, which differed in their capacity to 
reduce-processing demands, to assist with clinical diagnosis in a simulated context.   
Study One: The researcher tested the efficacy of the DSM-5 and two alternate 
diagnostic-aids that employed one or two reduced-processing design principles that 
pertained to the arrangement (facilitated the simultaneous acquisition of information) 




neurodevelopmental disorders) of diagnostic information in assisting naïve 
diagnosticians to diagnose two patients in two separate filmed clinical interviews 
(both 20-minutes in length). Participants who used the tablet-based diagnostic-aid that 
employed two (but not one) reduced-processing principles achieved significantly 
greater diagnostic accuracy scores, with the vast majority of participants in this group 
correctly (and more efficiently) diagnosing both a seven-year-old with ADHD and a 
3-year-old with ASD. There were no significant differences in diagnostic accuracy or 
response latency between participants who used the DSM-5 and participants who used 
the diagnostic-aid that employed one reduced-processing principle (restricted, 
preconfigured content).  
 Study Two: The paradigm from Study One was adopted in Study Two to test 
the efficacy of the DSM-5 and the diagnostic-aid that employed two reduced-
processing design principles in assisting novice diagnosticians (Psychology Master’s 
students) to diagnose both ASD and ADHD. Participants who used the ‘reduced-
processing’ diagnostic-aid achieved significantly greater diagnostic accuracy scores 
compared to participants who used the DSM-5, with the vast majority of participants 
in the ‘reduced-processing’ diagnostic-aid group making two correct diagnoses.   
Study Three: The paradigm from Studies One and Two was adopted in Study 
Three to examine the extent to which the interactive mechanism of the ‘reduced-
processing’ diagnostic-aid to record categorised symptoms of perceived relevance to 
the patient, influenced diagnostic performance amongst naïve diagnosticians. Three 
versions of the ‘reduced-processing’ diagnostic-aid, which were identical in content 
volume and arrangement, were tested: An interface with an interactive mechanism to 
record categorised symptoms (the ‘Categorisation Interface’ that was used in Studies 
One and Two), an interface with an interactive mechanism to record uncategorised 




(‘Passive Interface’). Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ achieved 
significantly greater diagnostic accuracy scores (and lower response latencies for 
correct diagnoses of ASD) compared to participants who used the DSM-5, 
‘Highlighting Interface’, and ‘Passive Interface’, with the vast majority of participants 
in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group making two correct diagnoses. There were no 
significant differences in diagnostic accuracy or response latency between the DSM-
5, ‘Highlighting Interface’, and ‘Passive Interface’ groups. 
Study Four replicated and extended Study Three. The ASD scenario from the 
previous studies was adopted in Study Four to examine whether the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ needed to be used ‘during + after’ the clinical footage (as it was in Studies 
1-3), or if it could also be used ‘after’ the clinical footage to improve diagnostic 
accuracy. Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ immediately following 
the clinical footage were just as accurate (but significantly slower) in diagnosing ASD 
as participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ both during and immediately 
following viewing the footage. 
Conclusion: A decision support system that is structured to facilitate the 
simultaneous acquisition of a restricted set of preconfigured critical diagnostic 
features, with the additional capacity to record categorised symptoms of perceived 
relevance to the patient, was found to assist individuals who do not possess highly 
developed (or complex) clinical schemas to accurately and efficiently diagnose both 
ASD and ADHD, in the absence of training and practice with the system. This 
research has important practical implications for the early detection of 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
The early detection and treatment of neurodevelopmental disorders can 
significantly improve the symptomatology and life outcomes of affected individuals 
(Fernell, Eriksson & Gillberg, 2013; House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; 
Ministries of Health and Education, 2008; Loebach & Ayoubzadeh, 2017; Shaw et al. 
2012; Vivanti, Barbaro, Hudry, Dissanayake, & Prior, 2013). Neurodevelopmental 
disorders, such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD), are a class of psychological disorders that range in severity 
and impact negatively on the executive and cognitive functioning of affected 
individuals (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Danielson et al. (2018) 
estimate that 8.4% of children aged 2-17 years in the United States (US) have a 
current diagnosis of ADHD. This estimate was derived from parent-reported data 
from the 2016 National Survey of Children’s Health1 (N = 50,212). The primary 
features of ADHD are significant impairments in attention and excessive levels of 
activity and impulsivity, and it is the most commonly diagnosed neurodevelopmental 
disorder in children (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Perou et al. 2013). 
Kogan et al. (2018) estimate that 2.5% of children aged 3-17 years in the US have a 
current diagnosis of ASD. This estimate was derived from parent-reported data from 
the 2016 National Survey of Children’s Health (n = 50,212). ASD is characterised by 
restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour and interests, as well as persistent deficits 
in social communication and interactions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
Kogan et al. 2018). 
                                               
 
1 The National Survey of Children’s Health is a regularly occurring, cross-sectional survey 
conducted by the United States Department of Health to collect parent-reported data on their 





 Individuals with ADHD are significantly more likely to be incarcerated than the 
general population (Young, Moss, Sedgwick, Fridman & Hodgkins, 2015). 
Furthermore, young people with ADHD and ASD, amongst other 
neurodevelopmental disorders, are at greater risk for depression, suicidal ideation, and 
suicide attempts than their typically developing peers (Daviss, 2008; Mayes, Gorman, 
Hillwig-Garcia & Syed, 2013; Offord et al. 1989). A recent report on child 
development by the United Nations cited suicide as the leading cause of death among 
males and females aged 15-19 years in developed countries in 2012 (UNICEF Office 
of Research, 2017). New Zealand had the highest recorded rate of youth suicide (15-
24 years) out of 41 developed countries in 2016 with 15.6 suicides per 100,000 people 
(UNICEF Office of Research, 2017). The rate of youth suicide in New Zealand is 
approximately two and five times greater than the rate of youth suicide in the United 
States and Britain, respectively (UNICEF Office of Research, 2017). Early detection 
and the effective management and treatment of populations of children who are at 
higher risk of developing anti-social and self-harming behaviours, including children 
with ADHD and ASD, have been proposed as means of assisting in the mitigation of 
youth suicide and self-harm (House of Commons Health Committee, 2014).    
 
Accessing Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) in developed 
countries 
The 2014-15 House of Commons review of Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Services (CAMHS) in the United Kingdom documented the difficulties in gaining 
access to specialist mental health clinicians. The report noted that some CAMHS 
across Britain will not treat young people until they have attempted suicide at least 
once, indicating that, in some areas in Britain, access to specialist mental health 
assessments and services can only be obtained if an individual present’s with severe 





Commons Health Committee, 2014). The House of Commons Health Committee 
(2014) concluded that “…overall there is unacceptable variation” (p. 4) across Britain 
in children and adolescents gaining access to CAMHS services. Of particular concern 
to the Committee was the increasing demand for assessments and services provided 
by CAMHS at a time when Clinical Commissioning Groups2 reported having their 
budgets frozen or reduced (House of Commons Health Committee, 2014).  
Reports of critical under-resourcing in healthcare from Clinical Commissioning 
Groups have been associated with the implementation of policies promoting austerity 
at the start of the decade, which constrained public spending in the United Kingdom 
(including contractionary measures implemented in the National Health System) 
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; Kerasidou & Kingori, 2019). 
Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008, austerity (predominantly 
in the form of cuts to social spending in areas such as healthcare, education, and 
welfare) was frequently promoted by governments of different nation states, including 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other European countries as the only means 
of reducing unprecedented levels of national debt (Kerasidou & Kingori, 2019; 
Stuckler et al. 2017; Watkins et al. 2019). More recently, international institutions 
including the United Nations and International Monetary Fund, have described the 
austerity measures adopted by many developed countries in response to the GFC as a 
political choice, as opposed to an actual economic necessity (Kerasidou & Kingori, 
2019; Stuckler et al. 2017; United Nations OHCHR, 2013; Watkins et al. 2019). 
Although suicide is a leading cause of death among youth in developed countries, 
Katoaka, Zhang, & Wells (2002) estimate that 80% of children in North America 
between the ages of 6-17 years do not access mental health services (UNICEF Office 
                                               
 
2 Clinical Commission Groups are organizations in the NHS that arrange the delivery of NHS 





of Research, 2017). Kowalewski, McLennan, and McGrath (2011) conducted a web-
based survey pertaining to access and wait times for an initial assessment by child and 
adolescent mental health services (CAMHS)3 in Canada. The survey was sent to 379 
CAMHS agencies and 116 agencies responded. Correlations were run to examine the 
relationship between wait times and waiting list and CAMHS agency characteristics. 
Only 8.6% of CAMHS providers reported that there were no waiting lists for 
initial assessments, and less than a third of responding agencies reported being able to 
“mostly” or “always” meet the national standard wait time to access an initial 
psychiatric assessment, as set by the Canadian Psychiatric Association (Kowalewski 
et al. 2011). Children presenting with high levels of clinical severity had significantly 
lower wait times compared to children presenting with lower levels of clinical 
severity (Kowalewski et al. 2011). The researchers suggest that discrepancies that 
exist in the CAMHS triage system between children presenting with the highest level 
of clinical severity and children with lower levels of clinical severity, may be due to 
the former population being able to engage emergency services and by-pass standard 
“backed-up outpatient” channels of accessing CAMHS (Kowalewski et al. 2011, p. 
116).  
To the best of my knowledge, and consistent with data on wait times for 
psychiatric services in many other countries, there is no legislation in New Zealand 
that requires mandatory tracking, reporting, or publishing of wait times to access 
public psychiatric services, and therefore no reliable evidence-based estimates of wait 
times for these services (Loebach & Ayoubzadeh, 2017). Mandatory tracking, 
reporting, and publishing of wait times for non-psychiatric health services was 
                                               
 
3 CAMHS are providers of secondary or tertiary services (second tier or third tier health 
services for specialised assessment and treatment) in the domain of mental health in New 






implemented in 2005 in Ontario, Canada, leading to the generation of evidence-based 
data for public healthcare providers. The 2017 Ontario budget estimated that the 
provision of the data derived from this legislation for non-psychiatric health services 
saved a total of 322 million ‘patient waiting days’ from 2005-2017 (Loebach & 
Ayoubzadeh, 2017). Loebach and Ayoubzadeh (2017) suggest that similar wait list 
tracking policies should be applied to psychiatric services in order to provide sorely 
needed evidence-based data in this field. However, estimates for wait times for 
psychiatric services are generally derived from anecdotal reporting in New Zealand 
and internationally (House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; Loebach & 
Ayoubzadeh, 2017).  
A public health report on national suicide rates in 2007 indicated that the 
Wairarapa (a region in the lower North Island) had the highest rate of suicide in New 
Zealand between 2003-2005 (Ministry of Health, 2007). The researcher of the present 
thesis met with representatives from CAMHS providers in the lower North Island 
region, including the Wairarapa District Health Board (DHB), in order to obtain 
reports of wait-times for neurodevelopmental services in this region via personal 
communication in 2013 and 2014. Representatives from multiple CAMHS providers 
(including clinical psychologists) communicated to the researcher that CAMHS have 
separate pathways for patients with suspected neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g., 
ADHD and ASD) and patients with isolated mental health issues (e.g. anxiety and/or 
depression in the absence of a suspected co-morbid neurodevelopmental disorder). 
The waiting list for an initial assessment from a mental health expert (psychiatrist, 
clinical psychologist, developmental paediatrician) for a child with a suspected 





18 to 24 months in 2013-14 (WCDS representatives4, personal communication, 
December 4, 2013; WCAMHS representative5, personal communication, February 20, 
2014). The wait times for patients with suspected neurodevelopmental disorders were 
substantially longer relative to wait times for patients with suspected mental health 
condition(s) (WCDS representatives3, personal communication, December 4, 2013; 
WCAMHS representative4, personal communication, February 20, 2014).  
 Anecdotal reports of access to CAMHS in the lower North Island region of New 
Zealand (obtained via personal communication between the researcher and New 
CAMHS representatives) were generally consistent with published government 
reports on CAMHS in the UK and Canada (Canadian Association of Paediatric Health 
Centres, 2010; House of Commons Health Committee, 2014) and the findings of a 
survey on CAMHS wait times by Kowalewski et al. (2011). Mostly notably, access to 
CAMHS in the UK, Canada, and New Zealand appear to be substantially shorter for 
patients with overt presentations of persistent and significant levels of psychological 
distress, which are characteristic of psychosis and severe mood and anxiety disorders 
(classified as ‘mental health disorders’ for the purpose of CAMHS pathway allocation 
in New Zealand) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As previously mentioned, 
Kowalewski et al. (2011) found that presentations of high levels of clinical severity 
were significantly correlated with lower wait times in accessing CAMHS in Canada. 
The 2014-15 House of Commons review of CAMHS in the UK noted that 
gaining access to expert mental health clinicians may be more difficult for individuals 
with neurodevelopmental disorders, such as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2014). Children with suspected neurodevelopmental disorders do not 
                                               
 
4 Wellington Child Developmental Services (Puketiro Centre) representatives 





necessarily experience persistent and significant levels of psychological distress, or at 
least do not present with severe distress as the core symptomatology, and therefore, 
they may be classified as low risk and consequently experience increased wait times 
to receive an initial assessment from CAMHS (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; Kowalewski et al. 2011).  
Gaining access to specialist mental health clinicians can be a difficult process. 
This is especially true for children with psychiatric disorders who often do not present 
(and are not diagnosed on the basis of) overt signs of severe psychological distress, 
such as ADHD and ASD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2014; Kowalewski et al. 2011). Lengthy waiting times 
are in direct conflict with modes of best clinical psychological practice, which 
emphasise that the temporal gap between the age of onset of a disorder and the age of 
diagnosis should be minimal (Fernell, Eriksson & Gillberg, 2013; House of Commons 
Health Committee, 2014; Ministries of Health and Education, 2008; Shaw et al. 2012; 
Vivanti et al. 2013; Zwaigenbaum, Bryson, & Garon, 2013). The New Zealand 
Autism Spectrum Disorder Guideline recommends treatment and management by 
clinicians in primary care if neurodevelopmental patients cannot get timely access (or 
any access) to clinicians in the relevant secondary services (Ministries of Health and 
Education, 2008). 
In Canada, Cheung and Dewa (2007) used data from the ‘Canadian 
Community Health Survey: Mental Health and Well-Being’ to examine the type and 
frequency of mental healthcare providers being accessed by young persons aged 15-
24 years who had screened positively for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and/or 
suicidality in the preceding 12 months (n = 619). Overall, 40% of the adolescent 
sample (15-18-year-olds) had not accessed any mental healthcare services (Cheung & 





accessed by adolescents. Thirty percent of adolescent girls who screened positively 
for MDD and/or suicidality had accessed their general practitioner (primary health 
provider), and 21% and 16% had accessed a psychiatrist and a psychologist, 
respectively (specialist mental health providers) (Cheung & Dewa, 2007). In contrast, 
45% of adolescent boys who screened positively for MDD and/or suicidality had 
accessed a psychiatrist, 25% had accessed a psychologist, and 24% had accessed their 
general practitioner (Cheung & Dewa, 2007).  
Cheung and Dewa (2007) concluded that many at-risk adolescents were not 
receiving mental healthcare and suggested that adolescent boys may be receiving 
preferential access to specialist mental health services. The rate and type of access to 
mental health services amongst individuals with psychiatric disorders outlined in 
Cheung and Dewa (2007) are consistent with findings from the Ontario Child Health 
Study that were published almost 20 years earlier by Offord et al. (1989).  Offord et 
al. (1989) estimated that only one in six children (aged 4-16 years) with mental 
disorders were accessing mental health services. Furthermore, 59% of affected 
children received primary care services, whereas 24% received specialist mental 
health services (Offord et al. 1989).   
A national report released on access and wait-times for CAMHS led by the 
Canadian Association of Paediatric Health Centres, suggest that youth are more likely 
to access mental healthcare provided by general practitioners as opposed to specialist 
mental health physicians (Canadian Association of Paediatric Health Centres, 2010). 
The report further suggests that young persons’ may even prefer to receive mental 
health services provided by their general practitioner and/or school (Canadian 
Association of Paediatric Health Centres, 2010). Davidson and Manion (1996) 
examined youth perspectives (13-18 years) on mental health from the Canadian 





prefer to seek professional help from their general practitioner, whereas a quarter of 
respondents would prefer to seek professional help from either a psychiatrist, 
psychologist, or social worker (Davidson & Manion, 1996). When seeking 
information regarding mental illness, 48% of respondents would approach their 
general practitioner, 42% would approach their school, and 24% would approach 
specialist mental health providers (Davidson & Manion, 1996).  
Kerwick, Jones, Mann, and Goldberg (1997) highlight the problem of accessing 
specialist psychological services and the public’s reliance on less specialised services 
in the British National Health Service (NHS). The researchers suggest that while 
General Practitioners (GPs) are responsible for the diagnosis and management of the 
majority of mental health problems, most do not receive education and training in 
standardised psychiatric disease categories beyond the level of an undergraduate 
(Kerwick et al. 1997). Young, Klap, Sherbourne, and Wells (2001) reported a similar 
trend in the United States. Individuals who experienced symptoms for two common 
mental health disorders were unlikely to access specialist mental health services. The 
researchers surveyed 1636 adults with a probable depressive and/or anxiety disorder 
that had persisted for 12 months. The vast majority of those surveyed had visited their 
primary care practitioner at least once to discuss their symptoms. Less than a third of 
this cohort had visited a mental health specialist (Young et al. 2001). 
 
Overview of the role of clinical schemas among providers of mental health 
services 
 
Medical diagnosis is a categorisation task whereby clinicians engage in the non-
conscious extraction and association of presenting features with patient events stored 
in memory to varying levels of expertise (Charlin, Tardif & Boshuizen, 2000; Klein, 





optimal information processing strategies and demonstrated by consistent superior 
performance in domain-representative tasks (Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1991;  
Loveday, Wiggins, Harris, O’Hare & Smith, 2013a; Loveday, Wiggins, Searle, Festa 
& Schell, 2013b). Diagnosis is a critical aspect of a physician’s role and superior 
diagnostic accuracy is a criterion for expert performance in medicine (Croskerry, 
2009; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996, Nuland, 1994).  
Secondary mental healthcare providers, such as clinical psychologists, 
psychiatrists, and developmental paediatricians, specialise in diagnosis in the domain 
of mental health disorders. Specialists receive domain-specific education and training 
that is designed to enable them to more effectively extract and utilise 
psychopathological features relative to the general population and clinicians who do 
not specialise in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health disorders (Custers, 
2015). However, the responsibility to refer, diagnose, treat, and/or manage these 
disorders often falls upon easier-to-access clinicians and professionals who are not 
experts (or are not required to be experts) in psychopathology, such as general 
practitioners, paediatricians , counsellors and teachers (Canadian Association of 
Paediatric Health Centres, 2010; Cheung & Dewa, 2007; Davidson & Manion, 1996; 
Florenzano, 1991; House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; Kerasidou & 
Kingori, 2019; Kerwick et al. 1997; Kowalewski et al. 2011; Offord et al. 1989; 
Stuckler et al. 2017; Young et al. 2001). This may be problematic, as non-specialist 
personnel who work in mental health have not completed the type of mandatory 
training that specialist clinicians have, which in theory produce accurate and reliable 
representations of psychiatric categories in memory that enable specialists to rapidly 
discern critical diagnostic features from superfluous information (Croskerry, 2009; 





Paediatric psychiatrists and psychologists, and developmental paediatricians are 
clinicians who have obtained specialised qualifications and therefore are considered 
experts in a professional capacity6 in the domain of child and adolescent mental 
health. Domain experts possess complex conceptual structures of organised 
knowledge, known as schemas, which consist of associated references between 
environmental features and events (or ‘feature-event associations’) stored in long-
term memory (Sweller, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Superior problem solving 
in a complex domain is presumed to be aided by the acquisition of tens of thousands 
of complex domain-specific schemas (Sweller, 2003). The possession of complex 
schemas enable personnel to rapidly retrieve task critical information stored in long 
term memory with minimal effort (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996). The schemas of expert 
clinicians in child and adolescent mental health facilitate in the extraction, 
differentiation, and categorisation of complex psychopathological features of 
presenting patients (Charlin et al. 2000; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Florenzano, 
1991; Klein, 1989; Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993).  
 Complex schemas are acquired over time through deliberate practice (Ericsson, 
2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Johnson et al. 2014; 
Kellman & Massey, 2013; Landsdale, Underwood, & Davies, 2010). Deliberate 
Practice (DP) is the intentional repetition of a task to improve performance 
(Campitelli & Gobet, 2011; Ericsson, 2004). It is a necessary component for the 
development of expertise in professional domains, such as medicine (Campitelli & 
Gobet, 2011; Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1991). In the absence of appropriate 
schemas, individuals lack the capacity to effectively distinguish cues from redundant 
                                               
 
6	Professional definitions of expertise differ from definitions of expertise in the skill 
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features and diagnostic accuracy is adversely affected (Klein, 2011; Loveday et al. 
2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; Makary & Daniel, 2016; Perry, Wiggins, Childs, & 
Fogarty, 2012; Phillips, 2014).  
Dual process theory (DPT) emerged as a prominent theory for human reasoning 
in the late 1990s in psychology and is frequently adopted in medical education 
literature for theoretical accounts of clinical reasoning (Crosskerry, 2009; Crosskerry, 
Petrie, Reilly & Tait, 2014; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Loveday et 
al. 2013b; Pinnock & Welch, 2014; Sloman, 1996). There is debate over the 
legitimacy of specific details pertaining to dual process accounts of reasoning (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). This 
thesis will adopt the account of dual processing provided by Evans and Stanovich 
(2013) that provides a common language to discuss and compare the processing 
behind decisions that occur in a fast, seemingly automatic and effortless fashion, with 
the reasoning behind decisions that occur in a slower, seemingly more effortful and 
thoughtful fashion. 
The DPT outlines two theoretical qualitatively distinct types of reasoning: Type 
1 and Type 2 (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  Type 1 (or intuitive) processes are rapid 
and automatic, aided by the possession of complex schemas, and are associated with 
heuristics (cognitive shortcuts) (Croskerry et al. 2014; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Type 2 or analytical processes are slow and 
deliberative, and are correlated with measures of working memory capacity, 
deductive reasoning, and intelligence (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). 
The default-interventionist model of the Dual Process Theory (DPT) proposes that 
human reasoning defaults to “fast and frugal” Type 1 processes because they are less 
effortful and humans are considered to be cognitive misers (De Neys et al. 2013; 





& Engle 2001). When decisions are difficult, novel, and/or motivation is high, then 
slow and deliberative Type 2 processes override Type 1 processes (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kane et al. 2001; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Sweller, 2003) 
It is generally to be expected that clinicians will rely heavily on Type 1 
processes when formulating diagnoses due to operational constraints, such as time 
pressure and understaffing (Croskerry, 2009; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; 
Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). A clinician who possesses complex domain-specific schemas can 
generally rely on default Type 1 reasoning to make accurate and efficient decisions 
(Custer, 2015; Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). Effortful Type 2 
reasoning processes need to intervene among clinicians who does not possess 
complex domain-specific schemas in order to maintain diagnostic accuracy (Custers, 
2015; Keemiick et al. 2018).  
Systematic or organisational constraints often place professionals with less 
advanced domain-specific schemas in positions where they are required to formulate 
critical decisions under conditions of uncertainty (Croskerry, 2009; Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009). In theory, the diagnosis and management of child and adolescent mental 
health disorders are complex tasks that are reserved for expert clinicians who have 
undergone specialist training and possess complex domain-specific schemas. In 
practice, the diagnosis and/or management of child and adolescent mental health 
disorders frequently falls on clinicians or other professionals who are not required to 
possess complex schemas in the  domain of child and adolescent mental health 
disorders, such as general practitioners, general paediatricians, nurses, and teachers 
(Canadian Association of Paediatric Health Centres, 2010; Cheung & Dewa, 2007; 





Committee, 2014; Jesus et al. 2019; Kerasidou & Kingori, 2019; Kerwick et al. 1997; 
Kowalewski et al. 2011; Offord et al. 1989; Stuckler et al. 2017; Young et al. 2001). 
 
Finding ways to support the identification of neurodevelopmental disorders in 
the absence of complex schemas 
Research to date has not compared the efficacy of the DSM-57 with 
diagnostic-aids that employ ‘reduced-processing’ design principles to assist diagnoses 
of psychiatric disorders amongst naïve, novice, competent, or expert personnel in this 
domain. The aim of the present thesis was to develop and test decision support 
systems that employed different ‘reduced-processing’ design principles. This was 
done to determine which principles were effective in assisting individuals who do not 
possess complex clinical schemas (naïve and novice personnel) to diagnose children 
with neurodevelopmental disorders, in the absence of training and practice with the 
systems. This thesis provides a review of the literature on decision support systems in 
clinical settings, skill acquisition, and the efficacy of DSSs designed to reflect 
heuristic strategies that are employed by experts to reduce information processing 
demands during decision-making.  
On the basis of the literature reviewed in Chapters 2-4, the researcher 
developed a mobile DSS designed to reduce information processing demands to assist 
with the diagnosis of neurodevelopmental disorders. The efficacy of the DSS and the 
DSM-5 to assist naïve (Study One) and novice (Study Two) psychologists in 
diagnosing ASD and ADHD in simulated scenarios were tested. This is followed by a 
further review of the literature pertaining to information processing and working 
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memory, and Studies Three and Four, which tested the interactive mechanisms that 








Chapter 2: Decision support systems with predictive mechanisms in clinical 
settings 
 
Makary and Daniel (2016) advise that medical error should be listed as the third 
leading cause of death in the United States. ‘Medical error’ is defined as an 
unintended act of either omission or commission of execution or planning by a health 
practitioner that may or may not cause patient harm (Makary & Daniel, 2016). To Err 
is Human was a highly publicised report, released in 1999 by the Institute of Medicine 
of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States, which estimated that 
between 44,000-98,000 deaths occur annually as a result of medical error (Kohn, 
Corrigan & Donaldson, 1999). Although Kohn et al. (1999) is the most widely cited 
estimate of annual deaths caused by medical error, subsequent research suggests that 
the prevalence rate of morbidity is substantially higher (Classen et al. 2011; 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2010; Makary & Daniel, 2016). Classen 
et al. (2011) estimated that over 400,000 people die annually as a consequence of 
medical error in the United States. After analysing all of the published estimates since 
To Err is Human and extrapolating data to the rate of hospital admissions across the 
United States in 2013, Makary and Daniel (2016) estimate that medical error causes a 
mean rate of 251,454 deaths annually.  
Diagnostic error (missed, wrong and/or delayed diagnosis) is a subtype of 
medical error that is cited as a substantial contributing factor to the relatively high 
frequency of preventable morbidity and mortality rates in healthcare (Berner & 
Graber, 2008; Hautz et al. 2019). It is estimated that between 10-15% of medical 
diagnoses in non-perceptual (or ‘clinical’) specialties are erroneous (Berner & Graber, 
2008; Graber, 2013). Perceptual specialities such as radiology and pathology that 
involve making diagnoses from medical imaging techniques and deceased patients, 
respectively, are estimated to have a lower prevalence rate, between 2-5% (Berner & 




Graber, 2008). Berner and Graber (2008) suggest that error rates are higher in clinical 
specialties, such as emergency medicine, due to data gathering and synthesis by 
physicians that occurs in uncertain and time-constrained environments.  
A recent prospective study by Hautz et al. (2019) examined discrepancies 
between diagnoses made at the point of hospital admission through the emergency 
department and subsequent hospital discharge, for 755 consecutive patients. 
‘Diagnostic discrepancy’ was defined as a substantial deviation between the 
admission and discharge diagnoses, as determined by three emergency physicians 
with more than 10 years’ experience who were not involved in the diagnosis or 
treatment process of any patients. The emergency physicians made independent 
classifications of diagnoses with and without discrepancies and had moderate 
interrater agreement (Kappa = .54) (Hautz et al. 2019). Differences and consensus in 
judgements were then discussed and resolved amongst the three physicians. The 
judges were blinded to all data (notably patient mortality and length of hospital stay) 
except for diagnoses made on admission and discharge. 
Consistent with other estimates on the prevalence of diagnostic error, patient 
diagnosis at the point of discharge differed substantially from the initial diagnosis 
received on admission to hospital in 12.3% of cases (Berner & Graber, 2008; Graber, 
2013; Hautz et al. 2019). Generalized linear mixed-effects models were conducted to 
examine the effects of diagnostic discrepancy on patient mortality, as well as 
diagnostic discrepancy on length of hospital stay. Hautz et al. (2019) noted that 
diagnostic discrepancy (present or absent) was associated with statistically significant 
increases in patient mortality and length of hospital stay. The mortality rate of patients 
with a classification of diagnostic discrepancy was 8.6%, compared to a mortality rate 
of 3.78% for patients without diagnostic discrepancies (Hautz et al. 2019). The mean 
number of days spent in hospital for patients with a classification of diagnostic 




discrepancy was 10.29, compared to 6.90 days for patients without diagnostic 
discrepancies (Hautz et al. 2019).  
Clinical diagnosis is primarily a categorisation task whereby clinicians engage 
in the extraction and association of transient information in working memory with 
domain-specific schemas to varying levels of expertise (Brooks, Norman, & Allen 
1991; Charlin et al. 2000; Custers, 2015). The experience and knowledge of the 
individual in the related domain, and the difficulty of the task itself, influence this 
process (Custers, 2015; Ericsson, 2004). Errors in the field of decision-making are 
typically associated with Type 1 information processing (i.e., rapid, intuitive 
responses) (Baron, 2000; Berner & Graber, 2008; Croskerry, 2009; Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Traditional medical decision theorists considered Type 1 
processes to be largely irrational and un-scientific, and advised they were to be 
suppressed in order to avoid sub-optimal and erroneous clinical reasoning (Croskerry, 
2009; Crosskerry, Petrie, Reilly & Tait, 2014; Elstein, 1976). Physicians were further 
advised that good medical diagnoses were the product of slow and analytical Type 2 
cognitive processes (Croskerry, 2009; Crosskerry, Petrie, Reilly & Tait, 2014; Elstein, 
1976).  
Croskerry (2009) and Elstein (1976) suggest that traditional blanket 
recommendations to avoid default Type 1 cognitive processes in favour of more 
effortful Type 2 processes in clinical settings is an idealistic and simplistic (yet 
pervasive) view of clinical reasoning. Humans are theorised to be cognitive misers 
with a preference for the path of least resistance when expending cognitive effort. For 
this reason, Type 1 processes are commonly referred to as the default processes of 
reasoning (Berner & Graber, 2008; De Neys, Rossi, & Houde, 2013; Evans, 2008; 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Kane, Bleckley, Conway & Engle 2001). 
Beliefs or expectations that physicians do or should hold different preferences for 




expending cognitive effort compared to other human beings are unfounded and 
unhelpful in attempts to mitigate diagnostic error (Groopman, 2007). Medical 
practitioners frequently operate under circumstances and/or in environments that are 
not conducive to Type 2 information processing (Croskerry, 2005; Croskerry, 2009; 
Elstein, 1976); a situation framed by Elstein (1976) as a clinical-statistical 
polarization or more recently “clinical relevance vs. scientific rigour” (Croskerry, 
2005, p. R4). Practitioners are frequently forced to satisfice (employ a heuristic in 
which a decision that fulfils the minimum necessary requirements is selected) due to 
resource constraints, an overload of patients, and the unpredictable nature of clinical 
work itself (Croskerry, 2009). 
Adding to sub-optimal environmental factors, many hospital and on-call 
practitioners are frequently sleep deprived and fatigued at work (Friedman, Kornfeld, 
& Bigger, 1976; Marcus & Loughlin, 1996; Wali et al. 2013). Wali et al. (2013) 
examined the sleeping patterns and level of alertness scores (measures included the 
Stanford Sleepiness Scale and Profile of Mood States) of 88 junior physicians during 
on-call and off-call periods. Over two-thirds of participants were working 60-80 hours 
per week and the majority worked 4-6 on-call shifts over the span of a month. Over 
87% of participants slept 5 or fewer hours when they were on-call, and 91% reported 
that their sleep was interrupted. Scores from the Stanford Sleepiness Scale revealed 
that participants had significantly increased levels of sleepiness during the post on-
call period relative to the pre on-call period, leading Wali et al. (2013) to conclude 
that acute sleep loss from on-call shifts reduces the alertness of physicians and may 
result in sub-optimal information processing.  
For over five decades, computerised Decision Support Systems (DSSs) have 
been proposed as an approach to mitigate the prevalence of diagnostic error in 
healthcare by automating aspects of cognitively demanding tasks (specifically 




hypothesis generation), thereby freeing up the working memory capacity of 
practitioners (Belard et al. 2017; Berner & Lande, 2007; Croskerry et al. 2013; 
Danial-Saad, Kuflik, Weiss & Schreuer, 2015; Garg et al. 2005; Phillips, 2014; 
Newman-Toker & Pronovost, 2009; Riches et al. 2016; Shortliffe, 1976; Shortliffe & 
Cimino, 2006). Decision Support Systems (DSSs) are technological tools that are 
designed to reduce the demands on human reasoning processes and facilitate decision-
making (Harris & Wiggins, 2008; Morrison et al. 2010; Perry, Wiggins, Childs, 
Fogarty, 2013). DSSs can provide different levels of support for the user by 
automating aspects of a task to varying degrees.  
Wyatt and Spiegelhalter (1991) conducted early field trials of decision support 
systems for medical diagnoses. The authors define medical decision aids as “...active 
knowledge systems that use two or more items of patient data to generate case-
specific advice” and differentiate between passive and active knowledge-bases of 
decision-aids (Wyatt & Spiegelhalter, 1991, p. 3). In contrast, decision-aids with a 
‘passive’ knowledge-base do not provide the user with a mechanism to synthesise 
user input with the content of the knowledge-base, and therefore do not generate 
patient-specific recommendations (Wyatt & Spiegelhalter, 1991). In this case, 
practitioners have to synthesise data from a passive knowledge-base with raw 
observational data without technical assistance to reduce information processing 
demands. For example, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fifth Edition, in its traditional format (either paper-back or online), would be 
considered a medical decision support system with a passive, rather than active 
knowledge-base according to the definition advanced by Wyatt and Spiegelhalter 
(1991).  
Decision support systems that are applied in a clinical setting and that employ 
an active knowledge-base are commonly referred to as Clinical Decision Support 




Systems (previously ‘medical decision-aids’) (Belard et al. 2017; Martinez-Perez et 
al. 2014; Riches et al. 2016; Wyatt & Spiegelhalter, 1991). CDSSs typically consist of 
three main components: A knowledge-base, an inference engine, and a mechanism to 
relay informational outputs to the user (Berner & Lande, 2007; Martinez-Perez et al. 
2014).  
Inference engines are reasoning mechanisms containing algorithms that 
generate IF…THEN rules between a knowledge-base of stored, electronic medical 
information with clinician input relating to specific details pertaining to a presenting 
patient (Berner & Lande, 2007; Matinez-Perez et al. 2014). The clinician observes 
patient data and enters it into the CDSS (different CDSSs structure/direct clinician 
input in different ways). The inference engine synthesises patient data from the 
clinician with a knowledge-base of medical information before computing a range of 
diagnostic options (informational outputs) for the clinician to consider (Berner & 
Lande, 2007; Shortliffe, 1976; Danial-Saad et al. 2015; Matinez-Perez et al. 2014). 
Some CDSSs contain mathematical functions that synthesise observational input with 
stored diagnostic patterns from retrospective case-studies through machine learning, 
which provide the clinician with estimates of the probability that a presenting patient 
has a particular diagnosis/diagnoses (Matinez-Perez et al. 2014).  
Garg et al. (2005) conducted an extensive systematic review of 100 randomised 
and non-randomised trials that examined the impact of computer-based CDSSs on 
actual clinician performance and patient health outcomes, 10 of which trialled CDSSs 
in assisting diagnosis. CDSSs were classified as ‘beneficial’ if they improved at least 
half of the measured variables in the trial related to practitioner performance and/or 
patient outcomes (Garg et al. 2005). Garg et al. (2005) classified the majority (64%) 
of the CDSSs across a range of medical disciplines as beneficial in improving 
measures of health practitioner performance, such as diagnosis, adherence to 




guidelines/recommendations, and/or reduced time to administer appropriate 
pharmaceutical treatment (Garg et al. 2005).  
The effectiveness of CDSSs on measures of patient outcomes were inconsistent. 
Garg et al. (2005) suggest that measures of patient outcomes lacked statistical power, 
partly because the majority of the trialled CDSSs were not available for mainstream 
use and therefore, opportunities to assess patient outcomes were limited in 
comparison to assessments of practitioner performance with CDSSs. Several of the 
CDSSs that were designed to assist diagnosis were classified by Garg et al. (2005) as 
beneficial in improving practitioner performance are reviewed below.  
Cannon and Steven (2000) developed a CDSS that assisted clinicians with 
reminders, diagnosis, and the documentation of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). 
In evaluating the CDSS, they compared the effectiveness of a paper-based manual 
checklist system with the CDSS for screening and documenting MDD in a 
randomised control trial. Four senior clinicians in a Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) medical unit were randomly assigned to the CDSS or manual system to 
evaluate 78 patients who presented with a Major Depressive Episode and therefore, 
the potential for various diagnoses in the DSM-IV that include a Major Depressive 
Episode in their symptomatology, such as Bipolar, Schizophrenia, Major Depressive 
Disorder, and bereavement (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
The PTSD unit employed practice guidelines that required patients to be 
assessed for a mood disorder if they had visited outpatient clinics at least three times 
within one year. Cannon and Steven (2000) noted that there was a significantly higher 
assessment rate for MDD for eligible patients in the CDSS condition (86.5%) 
compared to the assessment rate in the manual condition (61%). Furthermore, the 
practice guidelines for an MDD diagnosis required clinicians to provide written 
evidence that at least one Major Depressive Episode had occurred and that alternate 




diagnoses that contain Major Depressive Episodes (e.g. schizophrenia) had been ruled 
out.  
Clinicians in the CDSS condition adhered to recording guidelines for an MDD 
diagnosis by providing complete documentation of the DSM-IV criteria for all of the 
affected patients (100%), compared with just 5.6% of affected patients in the manual 
condition (Cannon & Steven, 2000). In effect, documentation omission errors for 
MDD diagnoses were present in documents for all but 1 of the 18 patients in the 
manual condition and no documentation errors were present in the CDSS condition 
(Cannon & Steven, 2000). Consistent with comments made by Garg et al. (2005) in 
their systematic review of trials of 100 CDSSs, a limitation of Cannon and Steven 
(2000) was that patient outcomes were not measured.  
Bogusevicius, Maleckas, Pundzius and Skaudickas (2002) compared the 
accuracy and efficiency of a CDSS in diagnosing small bowel obstructions with the 
standard diagnostic procedure of contrast radiography in a prospective randomised 
trial of 80 patients. Contrast radiography involves the administration of a dye prior to 
conducting x-rays on a patient’s organs, which provides radiologists with a more 
comprehensive image on the relevant structure(s) relative to conventional x-rays. It is 
an accurate but lengthy method of diagnosis for small bowel obstruction and 
researchers and clinicians are seeking methods to reduce the time frame from 
presentation to diagnosis (Anderson & Humphrey, 1997; Bogusevicius et al. 2002).  
Bogusevicis et al. (2002) found that diagnoses made using both the CDSS and 
contrast radiography conditions were highly accurate, but diagnoses made in the 
CDSS condition were significantly faster than the contrast radiography condition with 
mean diagnostic times of one and 16 hours, respectively. The authors concluded that 
diagnoses aided by CDSSs have clinical value in maintaining high diagnostic 
accuracy whilst considerably reducing diagnostic time for small bowel obstructions, 




and therefore, have the potential to reduce institutional costs (Bogusevicis et al. 
2002).  
The effectiveness of a CDSS that computerised drug order entry was compared 
against traditional paper-written medication orders with no decision support in 
reducing medication error rates in an academic teaching hospital (Bates et al. 1999). 
Medication errors included any errors made by clinicians in the ordering, dispensing, 
or administering of medications (Bates et al. 1999). Error rates were measured across 
four 7-10-week periods (baseline, 1, 2, and 3), spanning four and a half years. Error 
rates amongst traditional paper orders were measured during the baseline period, 
followed by implementation of a rudimentary version of the CDSS in period 1, with 
advancements made in decision support features of the CDSS in periods 2 and 3. 
Advancements in decision support features included updated screening mechanisms 
for complex drug allergies and drug-drug interactions and electronic communication 
with the pharmacy in period 3 (orders in the baseline period were hand-written and 
hand delivered to the pharmacy and orders in periods 1 and 2 were printed and hand-
delivered).  
According to Bates et al. (1999) an 81% reduction in ‘non-missed dose’ 
medication errors (including overdose, underdose, and wrong dose form) was 
recorded across the duration of the study (from baseline to period 3). However, the 
‘missed dose’ error rate increased across the study. The authors suggest that ‘non-
missed dose’ medication errors are more likely to result in actual patient harm 
compared to ‘missed dose’ errors (Bates et al. 1999). Errors pertaining to the route of 
drug administration and dosing frequencies were significantly reduced across the 
study, and there was a 6.5% decrease in ‘non-intercepted serious’ medication errors 
from baseline to period 3 (Bates et al. 1999). Bates et al. (1999) concluded that 
CDSSs have the potential to both remediate pre-existing systemic errors and create 




new types of errors but that the net reduction of medication errors facilitated by the 
CDSS far outweighed the issue created by the CDSS in this case. Furthermore, the 
authors recommend that CDSSs that computerise manual paper-based health systems 
and provide decision support for practitioners should be widely disseminated to 
reduce net error rates, but that such systems require careful evaluation and consistent 
refinement (Bates et al.1999).  
A CDSS was developed by Pozen et al. (1984) to reduce the high rate of false-
positive cases for acute ischemic heart disease being admitted to coronary-care units 
(approximately half of 1.5 million cases were false-positives). The number of false 
negatives for acute ischemic heart disease at the time of the study was approximately 
5% (Pozen et al. 1984). The CDSS incorporated a knowledge base developed from 
ischemic diagnostic features and data on 2,801 patients admitted to six different 
emergency departments across 11 months. The developers restricted the inference 
engine to provide predictions based on seven, high-risk features from a list of 59 
clinical features associated with heart disease, which was available to emergency 
department practitioners. The CDSS was designed to complement practitioners’ 
judgments by calculating the estimated likelihood of a patient having acute ischemia 
on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0 within 20 seconds.  
Pozen et al. (1984) tested the CDSS in a prospective trial of 2,320 patients 
across six hospitals and found that admissions to coronary-care units for patients who 
did not receive a final diagnosis of acute ischemia (i.e. false-positive diagnosis) 
significantly reduced by 30% when the CDSS was incorporated into decision-making. 
Importantly, there was no significant difference between the experimental and control 
periods for coronary-care unit admission rates for the number of patients who did 
receive a final diagnosis of acute ischemia (false negatives) (Pozen et al. 1984) 




There is empirical evidence of the effectiveness of CDSSs in improving 
practitioner performance, including enhanced diagnostic screening and documentation 
of diagnoses (Cannon & Steven, 2000; Garg et al. 2005), reduction in the time 
between disease onset and diagnosis (Bogusevicis et al. 2002), a net reduction in 
medication error rates (Bates et al. 1999; Kaushal, Shojania & Bates, 2003), false 
positive diagnoses (Pozen et al. 1984), and improved prescription practices (Teich et 
al. 2000). There is also evidence to suggest that practitioners perceive CDSSs as 
useful, particularly in assisting with novel diagnoses (Bauer et al. 2002). To determine 
patterns of use of a CDSS called DXplain, Bauer et al. (2002) provided unlimited 
access to DXplain to 30 internal medicine residents in a hospital setting for 2 months. 
Eighteen of 30 residents used DXplain, of whom 83.3% perceived it as useful.  
 Despite evidence suggesting CDSSs provide actual and perceived benefits to 
healthcare practitioners in clinical settings, the implementation of information 
technology (IT) systems, including CDSSs, in healthcare continues to be slow, 
particularly compared to the implementation of IT systems in other industries (Belard 
et al. 2017; Garg et al. 2005; Kaushal et al. 2003; Riches et al. 2016). The Institute of 
Medicine’s To Err is Human (1999) referred to the discrepancy between the adoption 
of IT solutions to mitigate human error in healthcare compared to other complex 
industries (e.g. aviation) as the ‘digital divide’. Some researchers have estimated that 
approximately 75% of large-scale IT projects in healthcare fail (Littlejohns, Wyatt & 
Garvican, 2003; Wears & Berg, 2005; Willcocks & Lester, 1993). Berner and Graber 
(2008) refer to three CDSSs that have been discontinued for commercial use, 
including Medital, QMR, and Iliad.  
One of the most commonly cited barriers to the implementation of CDSSs to 
supplement decision-making in healthcare is resistance from healthcare practitioners 
(Belard et al. 2017; Berner & Graber, 2008; Littlejohns et al. 2003; Sittig, Wright, 




Osheroff, Middleton, Teich & Ash, 2008; Varonen et al. 2008). Rosenbloom et al. 
(2005) examined and tried to increase rates of use of infrequently accessed decision 
support materials that were embedded in a hospital’s Computerised Care Provider 
Order Entry (CPOE) system in an attempt to improve prescription practices and 
accurate drug administration by physicians. A prospective, randomized control trial 
was conducted to determine if adding visible context-sensitive links to decision 
support would increase the use of decision support materials from low baseline levels. 
Users were required to manually select links to access information.  The context-
sensitive links (intervention) increased the rate with which physicians manually 
accessed decision support materials (Rosenbloom et al. 2005). However, absolute 
rates of use to decision support in the intervention condition remained low, with 
participants only accessing the materials once every 16 days (Rosenbloom et al. 2005) 
Clinical settings are complex socio-technical environments in which human 
social elements (cultural and organisational norms, hierarchies, values, routines) and 
technological elements (equipment, procedures) are highly interdependent (Wears & 
Berg, 2005). Some researchers have commented that CDSS designers have focused 
too much on the technical element of complex systems with comparatively limited 
consideration given to the social elements and the dynamic relationship between the 
two (Baig et al. 2019; Berg, 2004; Littlejohns et al. 2003; Schobel et al. 2016; Teich 
et al. 2000; Wears & Berg, 2005). Berg (2004) suggest that usability may be impacted 
by a potential ‘mismatch’ between the uncertain nature of clinical work, which is 
interpretative, interruptive and reactive, and the rule-based, sequential design of 
CDSSs built on statistical modelling.  
Surgeon and bioethics scholar Sherwin B. Nuland described the diagnostic 
process as “…every doctor’s measure of his own abilities; it is the most important 
ingredient in his professional self-image” (Nuland, 1994, p. 248). Berner and Graber 




(2008) provide a systematic review of diagnostic error and conclude that CDSSs 
could be a strategy to mitigate error. Yet, the use of CDSSs by physicians is hindered 
because they disrupt workflow with the cumbersome task of data entry, followed by 
an effortful process of filtering through the likelihood of sometimes lengthy lists of 
diagnostic recommendations. CDSSs that generate diagnostic recommendations have 
been reported to compromise physicians’ perceived autonomy of the diagnostic 
process to an undesirable degree by practitioners (Baig et al. 2019; Belard et al. 2017; 
Mosier & Skitka, 1996; Varonen et al. 2008). For example, a focus group of primary 
and secondary care physicians reported ‘threat to clinical autonomy’ as a barrier to 
implementation of CDSSs amongst healthcare providers (Varonen et al. 2008).  
Teich et al. (2000) conducted a time series analysis to examine the effectiveness 
of a computer drug order entry system with added features of automatic decision 
support notifications, in altering physicians’ prescribing practices to better align with 
a hospital’s prescription guidelines. Decision support features included recommended 
drug use guidelines, suggested dosing regimens, and appropriate alternative and 
cheaper drugs. Decision support was automatically displayed to physicians 
immediately following the entry of a drug order. Following the hospital-wide 
implementation of the decision support intervention, errors in drug dosing 
(specifically doses that exceeded the maximum recommended dose) reduced 
significantly, and adherence to recommended ordering practices and the correct 
dosing frequencies significantly increased (Teich et al. 2000). Although the 
intervention was examined as a time-series analysis rather than a randomized trial, the 
automatic decision support system was considered successful in facilitating sustained, 
desired changes in the prescribing behaviours of its physicians and reducing costs 
(Teich et al. 2000). It was estimated that the system, with a cost of approximately 
$700,000 annually to implement and maintain, reduced hospital costs associated with 




inappropriate drug orders, laboratory and diagnostic tests, and the prevention of 
adverse events, by over $5 million annually (Teich et al. 2000).   
In contrast to other clinical decision support systems, notably Rosenbloom et al. 
(2005), the decision support materials examined by Teich et al. (2000) were 
automatically (rather than manually) activated via push notifications (i.e. targeted 
automated alerts) when physicians entered a drug order into the system. Therefore, 
data entry was restricted to the required, rote task of ordering drugs (Teich et al. 
2000). Physicians navigated automated decision support features with one or two key 
strokes (Teich et al. 2000). Physician feedback following the intervention indicated 
that users preferred the feature of automated alerts for decision support. However, 
they were less receptive to alerts that advised them to stop an intended action without 
presenting an alternative action (Teich et al. 2000). Teich et al. (2000) and Berner and 
Graber (2008) suggest that physicians are likely to ignore decision support features 
that advise a change in action if they are in the middle of a work-up strategy of 
diagnostic hypotheses and feel committed to a particular action(s). Teich et al. (2000) 
concluded that the intent of the decision support features was “not to have the system 
think for the physician, but rather for it to handle certain rote functions” (Teich et al. 
2000, p. 2746), thereby freeing up cognitive resources for the physician to concentrate 
on the most appropriate diagnosis and effective treatment plan, and communicating 
clearly with the patient. 
Legal issues regarding who (or what) is ultimately responsible for decision 
outcomes, and a lack of user engagement due to perceived and/or actual diffusion of 
responsibility are also barriers to the implementation of Decision Support Systems 
with varying degrees of automation across industries, including healthcare (Belard et 
al. 2017; Mosier & Skitka, 1996; Skitka, Mosier, & Burdick, 2000; Varonen et al. 
2008). Adverse medical outcomes that occurred as a result of incorrect diagnoses 




made using an institutionally-endorsed external or in-house CDSS that generated 
diagnostic recommendation would potentially complicate matters of liability and 
insurance for healthcare institutions, in comparison to incorrect diagnoses that were 
made in the absence of algorithmically predicted recommendations. Other notable 
barriers to implementation of not only CDSSs, but computerised systems in 
healthcare settings in general, include lack of trust of systems to actually facilitate 
processes and to adequately protect patient privacy (Baig et al. 2017). Non-digitalised 
patient data have the added protection of physical barriers to access. Large stores of 
digitalised patient data have the potential to be ‘hacked’ and accessed from anywhere 
in the world. This is true for all digitalised data. However, personal health data are 
arguably more sensitive than most other types of data.  
 
CDSS in an era of mobile health (mHealth) 
 The widespread dissemination of mobile devices such as tablets and 
smartphones in recent years has led the World Health Organisation to introduce the 
term mHealth (mobile health), which they define as “medical and public health 
practice supported by mobile devices, such as mobile phones, patient monitoring 
devices, personal digital assistants, and other wireless devices” (World Health 
Organisation, 2011, p. 6). Since Apple and Android opened their respective mobile 
application stores in 2008, their operating systems continue to make up the vast 
majority of the mobile application (and therefore mHealth) market (Baig et al. 2019; 
Martinez-Perez et al. 2014). The sheer ubiquitousness of ownership of mobile 
devices8 and prolific use of mobile applications (apps) globally could create an 
                                               
 
8 712.6 million smartphones were sold in 2012, and 165.9 million tablets were estimated to 
have been shipped in 2013 (Figures obtained by the International Data Corporation (2013) 
and cited in Martinez-Perez et al. (2014)). 	




environment/cultural shift in which mHealth CDSSs may be more readily integrated 
into clinical settings compared to attempts to implement systems at a time when 
sophisticated and reliable mobile devices were not widely available (Baig et al. 2019; 
Belard et al. 2017; Martinez-Perez et al. 2014; Sclafani, Tirrell & Franko, 2013). 
Martinez-Perez et al. (2014) found 111 commercially available mHealth 
applications (apps) for iOS and Android systems when combining the key search 
terms “clinical decision” and “medical decision” across a range of medical fields, 
with the majority pertaining to general medicine followed by drug-related 
information. Baig et al. (2019) conducted a review of 22 studies on mHealth apps 
designed for decision support and patient monitoring in hospital settings (i.e. 
secondary healthcare) from 2014-2016. The vast majority of mHealth app studies 
have examined design and accuracy in simulated clinical and non-clinical settings 
rather than clinical trials in hospital settings (Baig et al. 2019).  
Sclafani et al. (2013) conducted a survey of 2,942 tablet and non-tablet owning 
physicians on their perceptions of tablet use in clinical settings. Fifty-six percent of 
physicians reported that their hospital/clinic supported mHealth use at the time of the 
survey, and over 90% of both tablet and non-tablet owning physicians believed that 
their institutions should support the integration of tablets into clinical practice 
(Sclafani et al. 2013). Similarly, Adamson (2016) noted that junior doctors’ subjective 
feelings of productivity in conducting ward rounds increased when the hospital 
provided them with tablets that enabled access to electronic medical records.  
Baig et al. (2019) suggests that younger health practitioners (under 40 years) 
exhibit more favourable attitudes to mHealth, which could result in a faster uptake of 
assistive mobile technology in clinical settings. Similarly, Kuhn et al. (2015) reported 
that practitioners under 40 years of age exhibited more favourable attitudes and were 
more likely to have incorporated a clinically recommended application, which 




reportedly assists in the treatment of Prolonged Exposure Therapy for patients with 
PTSD, into practice more quickly than clinicians over 40. As a result, Kuhn et al. 
(2015) suggested that the dissemination of mHealth initiatives should be tailored to 
specific groups of end-users, such as those with later initial exposure and/or limited 
exposure to mobile devices.  
Baig et al. (2019) suggest that end-user acceptability remains an ongoing issue 
for CDSSs in an era of mHealth, particularly for sub-groups of practitioners, and 
provide recommendations around system design that could mitigate this issue. CDSSs 
should be mobile, have an easy to use graphical interface that incorporates colour 
cues to focus and converge information, and should restrict the number of steps 
required to complete a common task (Baig et al. 2019). However, inference engines 
containing algorithmic predictive-mechanisms are problematic on mobile devices as 
they consume large amounts of power and can rapidly drain the battery from the 
device, which could interrupt general workflow and reasoning processes (Baig, 
Gholam Hosseini, & Connolly, 2015).  
In summary, diagnostic error is a prevalent type of medical error that is 
associated with increased patient mortality and prolonged stays in hospital, and 
therefore, it is a public health issue that needs to be addressed (Berner & Graber 2008; 
Hautz et al. 2019; Makary & Daniel, 2016). Diagnostic errors are generally attributed 
to fast and intuitive Type 1 cognitive processes (Berner & Graber 2008). CDSSs with 
predictive-mechanisms have long been suggested as an approach to mitigate 
diagnostic error (Belard et al. 2017; Berner & Graber 2008; Wears & Berg, 2005). 
There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that CDSSs do improve practitioner 
performance. However, getting physicians to engage with technology intended to 
facilitate clinical reasoning is a notoriously difficult task. Globally ubiquitous mobile, 
hand-held devices provide an opportunity to incorporate clinical decision support into 




technological systems (phones, tablets, applications) that are already heavily utilised 
in many physicians’ personal lives (Baig et al. 2019; Belard et al. 2017; Martinez-
Perez et al. 2014). 
A number of researchers have reported that CDSSs can disrupt general 
workflow and interrupt physicians’ natural reasoning processes with undesirable 
technical issues (rapid flat batteries when used on mobile devices) and/or additional 
tasks for the physician to perform (data entry, interpretation of complex informational 
outputs) (Baig et al. 2015; Berg, 2004; Berner & Graber, 2008; Kostopoulou, 
Delaney, & Munro, 2008; Teich et al. 2000; Wears & Berg, 2005). Therefore, even 
the most technologically-advanced CDSSs with complex data analysis techniques will 
be redundant if they cannot provide the practitioner with ease of use (Baig et al. 2019; 
Schobel et al. 2016). 
 Teich et al. (2000) demonstrate that a decision support system was associated 
with desired changes to prescribing behaviour amongst physicians in a hospital 
setting. Decision support materials were added as a secondary feature to an existing 
computerised system that was implemented to digitise drug order entries by 
physicians. Decision support was activated automatically and immediately via push 
notifications once the physician performed a required rote task (electronic drug order 
entry for a patient) thereby providing minimal disruption to work flow and/or 
alterations to clinical reasoning processes.  
Researchers further suggest that issues of acceptance amongst physicians could 
be mitigated by designing systems that are intended to give practitioners perceived 
control over the diagnostic process (Baig et al. 2019; Lee et al. 2015; Varonen et al. 
2008). It could be argued that almost by design, mechanical-predictive systems that 
intend to emulate (or surpass) expert human judgement via algorithmic predictions 
(Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000), such as CDSSs, both disrupt the natural 




reasoning process and reduce physicians’ autonomy (and potentially perceived 
autonomy) in their capacity to generate diagnostic hypotheses, one of the most (if not 
the most) fundamental roles of a physician (Berg, 2004; Berner & Graber, 2008; 
Croskerry, 2009; Nuland, 1994). Systems should provide practitioners with a sense 
that their clinical experience and knowledge is what led them to their final decision 








Chapter 3: Skill acquisition 
 
Stage-models of skill acquisition are theoretical models that are designed to 
track the progression from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ applications of skill. Stage-models 
propose that skill is acquired through at least three progressive stages of development 
(Anderson, 1982; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Fitts 1964; 
Patel & Groen, 1991; Rasmussen 1982). Different authors adopt different terminology 
for theorised stages of skill acquisition9. However, there is a general consensus that 
each stage reflects distinct levels of performance and information processing 
strategies (Anderson, 1982; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Fitts, 1964; Rasmussen, 
1982). For the sake of continuity, the author will generally adopt terminology from 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) and Ericsson and Lehman (1996) who refer to novice, 
competent, and expert phases of skill acquisition to map on to the initial, middle, and 
final stages. 
Ericsson and Smith (1991) and Ericsson and Lehman (1996) adopt a 
performance-based classification of the development of expert skill acquisition, in 
which individuals are judged on their capacity to demonstrate reliable and consistent 
superior performance. The proposed ‘novice’ phase of skill acquisition is 
characterised by the conscious acquisition of learned, declarative knowledge and 
corresponding skills (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; 
Rasmussen, 1982). Individuals in the proposed initial stages of skill acquisition are 
                                               
 
9 The following models of skill acquisition propose at least three progressive stages (from 
initial to end): Fitts (1964) propose ‘cognitive’, ‘associative’, and ‘autonomous’ stages of skill 
acquisition. Anderson (1982) propose ‘declarative’, ‘knowledge-compilation’, and 
‘procedural’ stages of skill acquisition. Rasmussen (1982) propose ‘knowledge-based’, ‘rule-
based’, and ‘skill-based’ stages of skill acquisition. Ericsson and Lehmann (1996) propose 
‘novice’, ‘competent’, and ‘expert’ phases of skill acquisition. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) 
propose a five-stage model of skill acquisition: ‘novice’, ‘advanced beginner’, ‘competent’, 





distinct from experts, as novices do not demonstrate consistent superior performance 
in domain representative tasks (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996).  
The middle stage(s) of skill acquisition reflect a ‘smoothing out’ process in 
which conscious, declarative knowledge (and corresponding skills) becomes partly 
automated or is transitioning to procedural, non-conscious knowledge (Anderson, 
1982; Fitts, 1964; Rasmussen, 1982). In contrast to novices, individuals in the middle 
or ‘competent’ stages of skill acquisition may achieve superior performance on some 
domain representative tasks (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996). However, they lack the 
capacity to reliably or consistently reproduce superior performance relative to experts 
(Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Gray, 2004). Differences in the outcomes of the 
performance of individuals in the proposed middle stages of skill acquisition 
(typically determined through years of experience or accumulated hours of practice) 
are more variable than the performance outcomes of individuals in the extremities 
(i.e. the initial and final stages) of skill acquisition, particularly in professional 
domains such as medicine (Ericsson, 2004; Groves et al. 2003; Norman, Brooks, & 
Allen, 1989), and aviation (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). 
The final stage of skill acquisition is the ‘expert’ stage. Individuals in the expert 
stage differ from individuals in other stages as they demonstrate consistently superior 
performance on domain representative tasks (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Ericsson & 
Smith, 1991). Individuals in the final stage of skill acquisition (‘experts’) are 
theorised to possess learned knowledge and skills that have become automated (or 
nonconscious) through the engagement of extensive practice in which task 
performance was accompanied by accurate and rapid feedback (Anderson, 1982; 
Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Fitts, 1964).  
Development from the ‘novice’ through to ‘expert’ stage of skill acquisition 





domain-related experience (Coderre, Mandin, Harasym, & Fick, 2003; Ericsson, 
2004; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996). However, judging a practitioner’s expertise on the 
basis of ‘years of experience’ is not necessarily a reliable predictor of consistent 
superior performance in a domain (Bidwell, 1977; Bonner & Pennington, 1991; 
Doane, Pellegrino, & Klatzky, 1990; Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; 
Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl 1954; Shanteau & Stewart, 1992; 
Watson, Stimpson, Topping & Porock, 2002). Some individuals who have 
accumulated years of experience in a professional domain have been unable to 
demonstrate consistent superior performance, including pilots in simulated flight 
scenarios (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995), institutional stock brokers (Bidwell, 1977), 
clinicians (Grove et al. 2000; Meehl 1954), and auditors (Bonner & Pennington, 
1991).  
A meta-analysis of studies that compared clinical assessments made by 
mechanical prediction (i.e. computer systems designed to emulate expert judges via 
algorithmic predictions) with the human judgement of experienced clinicians, found 
that mechanical-prediction judgements were more accurate in 33%-47% of the studies 
(Grove et al. 2000). Highly experienced individuals have also failed to demonstrate 
consistent superior performance in domain-related tasks in controlled laboratory 
settings (Ericsson, 2004; Gray, 2004; Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; 
Shanteau, 1992). Therefore, the concept of demonstrated consistent superior 
performance in a domain (performance-based ‘expertise’) is distinct from the concept 
of assumed consistent superior performance based on the accumulation of years of 
experience in a domain.  
In addition to accumulated years of experience in a domain and performance-
based metrics, experts have been differentiated from non-experts in the information 





Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Johnson et al. 2014; Kellman & Massey, 2013; Loveday et 
al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; Miller, 1956; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). The 
information processing strategies employed by domain-experts are theorised to more 
effectively reduce cognitive load, which is defined as the information processing 
demands associated with the acquisition and interpretation of task related information 
(Hollands, Spivak, & Kramkowski, 2019), relative to non-experts (Groves, O’Rourke, 
& Alexander, 2003; Loveday et al. 2013a; 2013b; Norman et al. 1989). Experts 
appear to be able to utilise limited-capacity working memory more effectively (Chase 
& Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965; Norman et al. 1989), and are more likely to engage 
in the rapid and non-conscious discernment of complex patterns from superfluous 
information in the environment (referred to as pattern recognition) (Coderre et al. 
2003; Croskerry 2009; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Groves et 
al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2014; Klein, 1989; Kellman & Massey, 2013). Further, 
performance-based experts (i.e. individuals in a domain who demonstrate consistent 
superior performance) are more likely to acquire task information in a sequence based 
on perceived relevance and context in contrast to non-experts, who are more likely to 
acquire information in the sequential manner that it is presented (Loveday et al. 
2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995).  
De Groot (1965) studied the differences between chess masters and relatively 
weaker chess players to try to compare cognitive processes that set expert and non-
expert populations apart. De Groot (1965) reported that the masters and weaker 
players considered the same if not fewer possibilities of moves. Yet, the masters had 
an ability to quickly distinguish viable from nonviable moves that could advance 
them further in the game. The relatively weaker players extracted both viable and 
nonviable moves and would spend considerable time analysing the consequences of 





players in a recall task in which players had to reconstruct chess positions after 
viewing them for five seconds. The chess positions reflected ‘structured’ positions 
that were meaningful to the rules of the game or ‘unstructured’ positions that were 
randomly arranged with no meaning to the game. The masters were able to 
reconstruct ‘structured’ (and therefore meaningful) positions, but not ‘unstructured’ 
positions relative to the weaker players (de Groot, 1965). 
 De Groot’s (1965) findings suggest that chess masters do not have the capacity 
to hold more items in working memory compared to weaker players. If chess masters 
had the capacity to hold more items in working memory, then the masters would have 
demonstrated superior recall for both ‘structured’ and ‘unstructured’ stimuli. Rather, 
De Groot (1965) suggested that chess masters’ degree of experience with stimuli that 
produce meaningful outcomes was greater in comparison to weaker players and that 
this experience facilitated superior recall of ‘structured’ but not ‘unstructured’ stimuli 
amongst masters (de Groot, 1965).  
Chase and Simon (1973) replicated and extended the findings of de Groot (196) 
by examining the capacity of a chess master, a class-A player10 and a beginner, to 
recall chess positions that were briefly presented for five seconds. As the chess 
positions were only presented for five seconds, Chase and Simon (1973) inferred that 
the recall task would reflect the storage capacity of working memory. The chess 
positions that were recalled were ‘structured’ positions that were relevant to the rules 
of chess (referred to as chunks), or ‘unstructured’ positions that were randomly 
arranged with no meaning to the game. Consistent with de Groot (1965), the master 
demonstrated superior recall for meaningful chunks but not ‘unstructured’ positions 
relative to the class A and beginner players (Chase & Simon, 1973). All players 
                                               
 





exhibited the same limited capacity to recall seven (plus/minus two) bits of 
information (or chunks) in working memory, as outlined by Miller (1956), for 
unstructured positions. Chase and Simon (1973) attributed the master’s increased 
capacity to recall more (and larger) chunks to a larger reserve of more sophisticated 
chunks in long-term memory compared to non-masters.  
The superior capacity for experts to intentionally recall meaningful ‘structured’ 
stimuli but not meaningless ‘unstructured’ stimuli is robust and has been replicated in 
chess (Charness, 1991) and other domains including bridge (Charness, 1979), 
computer programming (Mckeithen, Reitman, Rueter, & Hirtle, 1981), American 
football (Garland & Barry, 1991), and basketball (Allard, Graham, & Paarsalu, 1980). 
Attempts to use intentional recall of structured stimuli as a distinguishing factor of 
expert from non-expert physicians in laboratory-based tasks in medicine have not 
been successful (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Norman, Brooks, & Allen, 1989; Patel & 
Groen, 1991). However, experienced physicians have demonstrated superior 
incidental (non-intentional) verbal recall compared to less experienced medical 
students (Norman et al. 1989).  
Norman et al. (1989) examined the capacity for recall from naïve personnel 
with no training in the medical procedure of interpreting patient laboratory data, and 
trainee and experienced physicians in an intentional memory task. All of the 
participants were asked to read, memorise, and verbally recall patient protocols 
containing laboratory data (structured information), and protocols containing random 
values (unstructured information). The results indicated a clear distinction in task 
performance between participants on the extremities of the spectrum of skill 
acquisition. Experienced physicians recalled significantly more items from patient 
protocols (structured), but not random protocols (unstructured), compared to naïve 





demonstrate an increased capacity to recall structured information compared to 
medical students (Norman et al. 1989).  
Norman et al. (1989) concluded that medicine may be too multi-faceted and 
complex for even expert physicians to engage in spontaneous recall in a standard 
intentional memory task. Therefore, Norman et al. (1989) conducted a second 
experiment to determine whether or not experienced physicians could be 
distinguished from medical students in their performance on a task to verbally recall 
memories that were acquired without intention (i.e. an incidental memory task). 
Experienced physicians and medical students were asked to solve six patient protocols 
while ‘thinking-aloud’.  
Participants were asked to recall critical items (values related to a patient’s 
diagnosis) and non-critical items at the end of four of the six protocols. The first two 
protocols were stand-alone problem formulation tasks that were conducted to imply to 
participants that the primary dependent variable was their diagnostic reasoning 
process for the protocols (rather than item recall). Following the completion of the 
problem formulation task for protocol three and subsequently, protocol four, 
participants were instructed to verbally recall values by remembering how they 
worked through their diagnosis (‘diagnose condition’). The ‘diagnose condition’ was 
intended to facilitate incidental memory (Norman et al. 1989). Following the 
completion of the problem formulation task for protocol five and then protocol six, 
participants were given explicit instructions to ignore their problem solution and focus 
solely on trying to verbally recall laboratory values (‘memorise condition’). The 
‘memorise condition’ was intended to facilitate intentional memory (Norman et al. 
1989).   
Experienced physicians and medical students recalled a similar number of items 





recalled significantly more items in the ‘diagnose condition’ (incidental memory) 
compared to medical students (Norman et al. 1989). Notably, experienced physicians 
recalled a substantially larger proportion of non-critical items in the ‘diagnose 
condition’ compared to medical students. Norman et al. (1989) theorised that greater 
accumulated clinical experience led the physicians to a probable diagnosis with 
relative ease, which released working memory resources, enabling them to rule out 
alternate and unusual diagnostic hypotheses and facilitate the recall of data that were 
both critical and irrelevant to the final diagnosis. In contrast, Norman et al. (1989) 
suggest that because medical students did not have the same degree of clinical 
experience on which to draw, their working memory may have been exhausted in 
trying to establish a probable diagnosis. Consequently, medical students did not have 
additional cognitive resources to attend to (and recall) data that were not critical to the 
final diagnosis (Norman et al. 1989).  
Compared to non-experts, domain experts are more likely to engage in the rapid 
and non-conscious discernment of complex patterns from superfluous information in 
the environment (referred to as pattern recognition) (Coderre et al. 2003; Croskerry, 
2009; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Groves et al. 2003; Johnson 
et al. 2014; Klein, 1989; Kellman & Massey, 2013). Pattern recognition is facilitated 
by the application of conceptual structures of organised knowledge referred to as 
schemas, which consist of associated references between environmental features and 
events (or ‘feature-event associations’) stored in long-term memory (Sweller, 2003; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Superior problem solving in a complex domain is 
presumed to be aided by the acquisition of tens of thousands of sophisticated domain-
specific schemas (Sweller, 2003). Ericsson and Lehman (1996) suggest that the 
possession of sophisticated schemas enables personnel to rapidly retrieve task critical 





Sophisticated schemas are acquired over time through deliberate practice (Ericsson, 
2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Johnson et al. 2014; 
Kellman & Massey, 2013; Landsdale, Underwood, & Davies, 2010).  
Barrows, Feightner, Neufeld, and Norman (1978) and Elstein, Schulman, and 
Sprafka, (1978) propose five steps in the clinical reasoning process. Steps one and 
two are the identification and interpretation of task-relevant information, respectively. 
Step three is the generation of likely diagnostic hypotheses, and physicians test and 
refine these hypotheses through the acquisition of additional data during step four. 
The fifth and final proposed step of clinical reasoning is the formulation of a 
diagnosis (Barrows et al. 1978; Elstein et al. 1978). Script theory in medical decision-
making proposes that disease categories exist as schemas (or ‘illness scripts’) of 
varying levels of sophistication in the long-term memory of physicians (Charlin, 
Boshuizen, Custers, & Feltovich, 2007; Keemink, Custers, van Dijk, & ten Cate, 
2018). Illness scripts comprise theoretical knowledge and clinical experience with 
diseases (Keemink et al. 2018). The application of sophisticated illness scripts is 
presumed to facilitate the clinical reasoning process by enabling expert physicians to 
associate transient information in working memory with reliable knowledge on 
disease categories stored in long-term memory, thereby assisting in the production of 
rapid medical diagnoses without a concurrent loss in accuracy11 (Elstein & Schwarz, 
2002; Johnson et al. 2014; Kellman & Massey, 2013; Rasmussen, 1983). 
Script theory suggests that competent and/or novice diagnosticians possess less 
sophisticated and unreliable illness scripts in long-term memory (relative to experts). 
Consequently, non-expert clinicians have a tendency to focus on the saliency and/or 
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commonality of features as opposed to their relevancy to the presenting disease 
(Elstein & Schwarz, 2002; Groves et al. 2003; Keemink et al. 2018; Loveday et al. 
2013b; Pinnock & Welch, 2014). Novice or competent diagnosticians who attempt to 
formulate a rapid diagnosis by associating transient features in the environment with 
illness scripts stored in long-term memory, are likely to compromise their diagnostic 
accuracy due to the application of less sophisticated scripts (Croskerry et al. 2014; 
Croskerry et al. 2013; Keemink et al. 2018; Loveday et al. 2013b; Pinnock & Welch, 
2014).  
Groves, Scott, and Alexander (2002) developed 10 paper-based Clinical 
Reasoning Problem (CRP) scenarios that were designed to measure aspects of the 
clinical reasoning process, as outlined by Barrows et al. (1978) and Elstein et al. 
1978), beyond the generation of diagnostic hypotheses, including the identification 
and interpretation of clinically relevant information. An example of a CRP scenario is 
provided in the appendix of Groves et al. (2002). Importantly, the accurate 
identification and interpretation of clinically-relevant information (referred to as 
‘critical features’ by the authors) is more important than generating correct diagnoses 
for the purposes of obtaining a high score on the CRP scenarios (Groves et al. 2002). 
 Groves et al. (2003) tested the diagnostic performance and frequency and type 
of errors made on the CRP scenarios that were developed by Groves et al. (2002), 
amongst second- and fourth- (final) year medical students (‘novices’) and General 
Practitioners (GPs) with an average of 21 years of clinical experience. Groves et al. 
(2003) examined participants’ identification and interpretation of  critical (task-
relevant) features and the generation of likely diagnoses. The types of reasoning 
errors that were measured included hypothesis, identification, and interpretation 
errors. The participants were asked to identify the most likely diagnosis, list 





somewhat, or very relevant). Participants were then asked to provide a second 
diagnosis on the basis that their initial diagnosis was incorrect and repeat the process 
of listing and weighting supporting and opposing features.  
Groves et al. (2003) found that the GPs were significantly more likely to 
generate correct diagnoses. However, the medical students were significantly less 
likely to fail to identify all ‘critical features’, and the second-year students were 
significantly less likely to misinterpret ‘critical features’ in comparison to the GPs 
(Groves et al. 2003). In comparison to the medical students, the experienced 
physicians demonstrated superior performance in one of the three aspects of the task 
(diagnosis), and inferior performance across the other two aspects of the task (feature 
identification, feature interpretation) (Groves et al. 2003). Although the GPs recorded 
a greater frequency of errors identifying and interpreting all of the critical features for 
the CRPs, they were still able to synthesise sufficient task-relevant information to 
produce superior diagnostic hypotheses (Groves et al. 2003). In contrast, the medical 
students appeared less able to translate their superior identification and classification 
of critical features into the correct diagnostic hypotheses. Groves et al. (2003) 
theorised that these results are evidence that the GPs had engaged in pattern 
recognition, which may have led them to erroneously discard and/or misinterpret all 
of the critical features associated with the scenarios (Groves et al. 2003). 
Individuals who demonstrate consistent superior performance in a domain (i.e. 
experts) are more likely to acquire task information in a sequence based on perceived 
relevance and context in contrast to their non-expert peers, who are more likely to 
acquire information in the sequence in which it is presented (Loveday et al. 2013a; 
Loveday et al. 2013b; Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). 
Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) examined the information acquisition strategies and 





expert) in navigating simulated adverse weather conditions. Importantly, pilots’ skill 
categories were determined by the number of flight hours accumulated as pilot in 
command (PIC) of cross-country flights, rather than the total number of flight hours 
accumulated. In this case, task-specific experience (i.e. experience as the pilot in 
charge during adverse weather conditions) was hypothesised to be a more reliable 
indicator of performance compared to general experience (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). 
The pilots completed six scenarios with access to standard flight information for each 
scenario that is generally available to New Zealand pilots during cross country flights.  
Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) were unable to distinguish ‘novice’ pilots from 
‘competent’ pilots on the basis of information acquisition strategies. However, there 
were statistically significant differences on measures of information acquisition 
strategies between ‘experienced’ and ‘inexperienced’ pilots on the basis of 
accumulated PIC hours, including the number and sequence of screens containing 
task-related information that were accessed (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). ‘Experienced’ 
PIC pilots accessed fewer information screens (for shorter periods of time), made 
fewer recursions (i.e. re-accessed previously acquired information fewer times), and 
were less likely to access information screens in the sequence dictated by the 
experimenters, compared to ‘inexperienced’ PIC pilots (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). 
There were no significant differences on measures of information acquisition 
strategies when pilots were classified as ‘experienced’ or ‘inexperienced’ on total 
number of accumulated flight hours (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). These results suggest 
that pilots with high levels of task-specific experience (i.e. experience in commanding 
flights through adverse weather events), engaged in more effective and efficient 
context-driven information acquisition strategies relative to pilots with low levels of 





Loveday et al. (2013a; 2013b) analysed the information processing strategies 
and diagnostic performance of diagnosticians with varying levels of experience in two 
domains: Power system control and paediatric intensive care. Discrepancies in 
performance on a series of computer-based feature extraction and utilisation tasks 
reliably distinguished levels of diagnostic ability amongst a sample of experienced 
and inexperienced power control system controllers, and experienced Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) staff (paediatricians and paediatric nurses) in the context 
of electric network faults and paediatric medicine, respectively. Performance-based 
clusters emerged amongst power control operators and PICU staff upon completion of 
four domain-related tasks that comprised ‘EXPERTise’; an assessment tool designed 
to examine cue-based reasoning (pattern recognition) by examining participants’ 
domain-specific knowledge, information acquisition processes, and capacity to 
identify and discriminate task relevant features.  
The sample of power control operators ranged from 0 to 40 years of experience 
and therefore consisted of both ‘inexperienced’ and ‘experienced’ participants 
(Loveday et al. 2013a). Power control operators fell into distinct, performance-based 
clusters that mapped three theorised stages of skill acquisition proposed by Anderson 
(1983) and Ericsson and Lehmann (1996): ‘Novice’, ‘competent’, and ‘expert’. Power 
control operators who fell into the ‘expert’ clusters were more likely to select the 
optimal response with greater frequency and speed in comparison to participants in 
the ‘competent’ and ‘novice’ clusters in the context of simulated electric network 
fault scenarios (Loveday et al. 2013a). The ‘competent’ cluster of power control 
operators selected the optimal response with greater frequency and speed in 
comparison to participants in the ‘novice’ cluster (Loveday et al. 2013a). The results 
also demonstrate that ‘fast’ decisions are not necessarily inferior decisions. In this 





The sample of PICU staff ranged from 3 to 36 years of experience and 
therefore, only comprised ‘experienced’ participants (Loveday et al. 2013b). There 
were no participants who could be classified as characterising the ‘novice’ (or initial) 
stage according to models of skill acquisition (Anderson, 1982; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
1980; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Fitts 1964; Loveday et al. 2013b; Rasmussen 
1982). PICU staff who characterised the ‘expert’ cluster selected the optimal response 
with greater frequency compared to participants in the ‘competent non-expert’ 
clusters in the context of simulated paediatric intensive care scenarios (Loveday et al. 
2013b).   
‘Expert’ power control operators and PICU staff were less likely to access 
information in the sequence in which it was presented (Loveday et al. 2013a; 2013b). 
In contrast, the ‘non-expert’ clusters were more likely to access information in the 
sequential order that it was presented (Loveday et al. 2013a; 2013b). Loveday et al. 
(2013a; 2013b) suggest that the ‘expert’ clusters across both experiments were more 
likely to access information in a sequence based on relevance and context due to 
refined feature-event associations stored in long-term memory, which facilitated cue-
based reasoning (Loveday et al. 2013a; 2013b).‘Non-experts’ may have had weaker 
feature-event associations on which to draw. Consequently, ‘non-experts’ were more 
reliant on (and influenced by) the external informational resource (Loveday et al. 
2013a; 2013b). Years of experience and performance outcomes in the power control 
and paediatric tasks were only weakly correlated amongst power operators and PICU 
staff, respectively (Loveday et al. 2013a; 2013b). These results suggest that some 
highly experienced professionals had failed to effectively extract the most task-
relevant features, which may have resulted in poorer diagnostic outcomes. 
Loveday et al. (2013a; 2013b) conclude that ‘experts’ across two professional 





and integrate task-relevant information compared to ‘competent’ and ‘novice’ 
diagnosticians. Furthermore, ‘expertise’ defined as accumulated years of experience 
in a domain (a common measure of ‘expertise’ in professional settings) was an 
unreliable indicator of superior task performance (Ericsson, 2004; Loveday et al. 
2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b).  
In summary, ‘years of experience’ in a domain is a frequently used but 
unreliable indicator of an individual’s stage of skill acquisition. Information 
processing strategies appear to be a more reliable distinguishing factor between those 
who demonstrate consistent and superior performance (genuine experts), and those 
who do not (non-experts). In particular, experts have demonstrated differences in the 
sequence that they acquire information (context-driven as opposed to sequential) and 
a capacity to more accurately and efficiently prioritise task-related information (Chase 
& Simon, 173; de Groot, 1965; Groves et al. 2003; Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et 
al. 2013b; Norman et al. 1989; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). It is suggested that the 
possession of sophisticated feature-event associations in long-term memory 
(developed through deliberate practice) automate typical aspects of a task, which 
reduce the demands on limited-capacity working memory, enabling experts to more 
thoroughly search for and if necessary, attend to, atypical information. Systems 
designed to improve decision-making by reducing information processing demands at 
the point of information acquisition may improve the performance of non-expert 
diagnosticians in clinical scenarios without the use of a predictive mechanism.  
 
 





Chapter 4: DSSs without predictive-mechanisms in non-clinical settings 
 
Wickens and Carswell (2006) propose that information processing occurs in 
three theoretical stages: (1) Information acquisition, (2) decision-making, and (3) 
action execution. In the first stage, an individual’s sensory system perceives 
information from the environment. Information is processed in working memory 
and/or integrated with pre-existing knowledge structures in long-term memory before 
the individual moves on to the decision-making stage (Wickens & Carswell, 2006). In 
the decision-making stage, the individual identifies and selects the optimal choice 
based on the information acquired (under conditions of uncertainty to varying 
degrees). Finally, the selected course of action is executed with the appropriate motor 
output (Wickens & Carswell, 2006).  
All Decision Support Systems (DSSs) are intended to reduce the information 
processing demands associated with a task. The term ‘reduced-processing’ in the 
context of decision support in the human factors literature is used to represent DSSs 
that are designed to match the skills of the user to the requirements of the task by 
reducing the cognitive demands of the task at the point of information acquisition (i.e. 
the data gathering phase of decision-making) to enhance working memory capacity 
and improve decision-making (Morrison et al. 2010; Perry et al. 2012; Perry, 
Wiggins, Childs, & Fogarty, 2013; Speier, 2006; Wickens & McCarley, 2008; 
Vicente, 1999b). ‘Reduced-processing’ DSSs are designed to facilitate accuracy by 
structuring the acquisition of information (Mosier & Skitka, 1996; Wickens & 
McCarley, 2008). This is frequently achieved by: (a) reducing the amount of 
information for the user to process (net and/or temporal reduction of information), 
and/or (b) structuring information to be acquired in a sequence that enables the 




comparative analysis of values associated with different decision options (Morrison et 
al. 2010; Mosier & Skitka, 1996; Wickens & McCarley, 2008).  
Genuine experts in a domain (defined by consistently superior performance) 
have been observed to employ more effective and efficient strategies in reducing 
information processing demands at the point of information acquisition, compared to 
individuals who do not demonstrate superior performance (i.e. non-experts) (Groves 
et al. 2003; Klein, 1989; Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; Wiggins & 
Bollwerk, 2006; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). As discussed in Chapter 3, experts have 
demonstrated a capacity to more effectively and efficiently acquire a reduced set of 
task critical features, and spend less time evaluating informational resources 
compared to non-experts (Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; Wiggins & 
Bollwerk, 2006; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). Performance-based experts acquire 
information in a sequence based on perceived relevance and context to the task, 
whereas non-experts are more likely to access information in a sequence dictated by 
the informational resource (Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; Wiggins & 
Bollwerk, 2006; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). Furthermore, Norman et al. (1989) 
proposed that physicians were able to incidentally recall more patient information, 
notably information that was not relevant to the final diagnosis, compared to medical 
students in a laboratory-based task, because physicians’ domain-related experience 
released working memory resources. 
Clinical settings are complex socio-technical environments in which human 
social elements (cognitive processes, cultural and organisational norms, hierarchies, 
values, routines) and technological elements (equipment, procedures) are highly 
interdependent (Wears & Berg, 2005). Some researchers in the domain of medical 
education have commented that designers of CDSSs place too much emphasis on 
sophisticated technical elements of computerised systems with comparatively little 




consideration given to the social elements, and the dynamic relationship between the 
two (Baig et al. 2019; Berg, 2004; Littlejohns et al. 2003; Schobel et al. 2016; Teich 
et al. 2000; Wears & Berg, 2005). As discussed in Chapter Two, Computerised 
decision support systems (CDSSs) that intend to facilitate clinical reasoning in 
healthcare are generally designed to emulate (or surpass) expert human judgement via 
sophisticated algorithmic predictions (Berg, 2004; Berner & Graber, 2008; Croskerry, 
2009; Grove et al. 2000; Nuland, 1994; Wyatt & Spiegelhalter, 1991). Alternatively, 
computerised decision support systems that intend to facilitate clinical reasoning in 
healthcare could be designed to assist humans to emulate expert information 
processing strategies at the point of information acquisition to reduce the cognitive 
demands of a task.  
Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) examined the impact of a heuristic-based 
approach to facilitate information acquisition amongst pilots. They developed three 
decision support interfaces intended to reflect different heuristic strategies reported to 
occur spontaneously in the absence of training in socio-technical environments, which 
reduce information processing demands (Gigerenzer 2000; Mosier & Skitka, 1996; 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1997). The three DSSs each incorporated a different 
heuristic strategy including the ‘frequency comparison’, ‘elimination by aspects’, and 
‘majority of confirming dimensions’ heuristics (refer to Table 4.1). 
 Decision-makers who employ the ‘frequency comparison’ heuristic evaluate 
all features (and corresponding values) for each option separately and proceed to 
select the option with the greatest number of values of perceived relevance to the task 
(Gigerenzer, 2000). This strategy facilitates the consideration of multiple diagnostic 
features in the context of a single option (referred to as ‘option-focused’ for the 
purpose of this thesis). Decision-makers who employ the ‘elimination by aspects’ 
heuristic determine the most relevant features for a task prior to comparing the values 




of a feature across all options (Tversky, 1972). This strategy facilitates the 
consideration of multiple options in the context of a single feature (referred to as 
‘feature-focused’ for the purpose of this thesis). Decision-makers who employ the 
‘majority of confirming dimensions’ heuristic apply equal weight to informational 
features and compare and contrast all of the features for decision options in pairs 
(Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). They proceed to select the decision option that appears 
superior on the greatest number of features (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). The three 
DSSs examined in Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) incorporated the ‘frequency 
comparison’, ‘elimination by aspects’, and ‘majority of confirming dimensions’ 
Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) tested whether the use of a DSS that reflected a 
specific heuristic strategy (‘frequency comparison’, ‘elimination by aspects’, and 
‘majority of confirming dimensions’) would influence decision-making among pilots 
with varying levels of experience (total experience and experience as the pilot in 
command) during four, simulated in-flight decision scenarios. In each scenario, 
participants were asked to select the most appropriate airport at which to land from a 
choice of three alternatives, having acquired flight-related information (intended 
route, current route, location of alternate airports), followed by 22 informational 
features pertaining to weather conditions (forecast and actual), the runway (length, 
direction, and condition), and the presence or absence of navigation aids for each 
alternate airport. Participants were assigned a different DSS for each of the first three 
scenarios. They were then able to choose their preferred DSS for the fourth and final 
scenario. 
Experience as the pilot in command determined the selection of optimal 
outcomes across scenarios in the absence of time constraints (Wiggins & Bollwerk, 
2006). Importantly, all pilots (irrespective of experience) demonstrated a preference 
for the DSS that reflected the ‘elimination by aspects’ heuristic (and facilitated 




feature-focused information acquisition), even though it produced the slowest 
responses due to its added step of ranking features of perceived relevance to the task 
(Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006). Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) suggest that the DSS that 
reflected the ‘elimination by aspects’ heuristic, which facilitated a ‘feature-focused’ 
approach to information acquisition, may have been the preferred DSS as it afforded 
participants greater control over the sequence of information acquisition. Wiggins and 
Bollwerk (2006) further suggest that designers of DSSs should accommodate human 
operators’ demonstrated preference for systems that afford users a high degree of 
control over the presentation and acquisition of information in socio-technical 
environments.  
Harris and Wiggins (2008) extended the outcomes reported by Wiggins and 
Bollwerk (2006) by examining the role of individual differences in preferences for 
DSSs, specifically whether participants who prefer to complete subtasks 
simultaneously (known as polychronic users) would differ in interface choice 
compared to participants who prefer to complete subtasks sequentially (known as 
monochronic users). Harris and Wiggins (2008) hypothesised that monochronic and 
border-line polychronic participants would prefer interfaces that encouraged the 
sequential acquisition of information (‘frequency comparison’ or ‘majority of 
confirming dimensions’), whereas polychronic participants would prefer the interface 
that facilitated the simultaneous acquisition of information (‘elimination by aspects’). 
Following the completion of the same four flight scenarios from Wiggins and 
Bolwlerk (2006), participants completed the individual version of the Inventory of 
Polychronic Values (IPV), a 10-item Likert-type scale developed by Bluedorn, 
Kalliath, Strube, and Martin (1999) used to determine levels of polychronicity.   
Consistent with Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006), Harris and Wiggins (2008) noted that 
the majority of participants (58.1%) demonstrated a statistically significant preference 




for the DSS that reflected the ‘elimination by aspects’ heuristic’. This result suggests 
that an interface that facilitates the simultaneous comparison of information is 
preferred even amongst individuals with a disposition to complete subtasks 
sequentially (i.e. monochronic users).  
Morrison et al. (2010) further investigated aspects of reduced-processing 
interface design that influence user preference and task performance. The computer-
based decision support interfaces employed by Morrison et al. (2010) reflected 
different heuristic strategies12 employed at the point of information acquisition. The 
interfaces were tested amongst operators who were not yet qualified in the domain of 
forensic crime scene investigation (i.e., trainee crime-scene investigators). The 
interfaces contained information pertaining to three choice options and participants 
were asked to select the optimal option by comparing the associative values of each 
option with respect to a set of diagnostic features. The interfaces differed in the 
number of options that operators could consider simultaneously (one, two, or ‘all’), 
and the level of control afforded to operators over the sequence that features could be 









                                               
 
12 ‘Frequency by comparison’, ‘Majority of confirming dimensions’, ‘Elimination by aspects’, 
‘Satisficing’ 





Table 4.1: The properties of the four interfaces from Morrison et al. (2010).  
 
All four of the interfaces, which were designed to reflect heuristic strategies that 
reduce processing demands at the point of information acquisition, facilitated decision 
accuracy amongst trainees in simulated forensic diagnostic scenarios (Morrison et al. 
2010). The ‘all options, full control’ interface was designed to reflect the ‘elimination 
by aspects’ heuristic strategy by enabling users to access all features and to 
simultaneously compare feature-values across all choice options. The ‘all options, full 
control’ interface was the least efficient but the most preferred interface amongst 
trainee operators (Morrison et al. 2010). These results were consistent with operator 
preference for the ‘Elimination by aspects’ heuristic strategy amongst pilots during 
simulated in-flight decision tasks (Harris & Wiggins, 2008; Wiggins & Bollwerk, 
2006).  
The ‘all options, full control’ interface of Morrison et al. (2010) was considered 
to afford users ‘full control’ over the sequence of information acquisition compared 
with the ‘moderate’ and ‘limited’ control interfaces, as it enabled participants to 
simultaneously compare the values associated with a single diagnostic feature 
(referred to as ‘feature-values’) across all three choice options in a sequence of their 




choosing for all features. The ‘all options, full control’ interface presumably reduced 
processing demands by removing the requirement to retain and compare feature-
values in working memory (Morrison et al. 2010). The authors concluded that, 
although the ‘all options, full control’ interface resulted in the slowest diagnostic 
response times, the trainee operators preferred this interface as it afforded a high 
degree of control over the presentation and acquisition of information relative to the 
‘moderate’ and ‘limited’ control interfaces (Morrison et al. 2010).  
Perry et al. (2012) tested two ‘feature-focused’13 DSSs (‘Intuitive’ and ‘Quasi-
analytical'), which facilitated the simultaneous comparison of feature-values across 
choice options, and an ‘option-focused’14 DSS (‘Analytical’) that facilitated the 
consideration of multiple diagnostic features in the context of a single option, 
amongst operators with a range of experience in the context of simulated firefighting 
scenarios. Perry et al. (2012) asked experienced and inexperienced (but qualified) 
firefighters to use three different interfaces (‘Analytical’, ‘Quasi-analytical’, and 
‘Intuitive’) to determine the most appropriate option for entry across three simulated 
burning-building scenarios.  
The ‘Analytical’ interface facilitated the sequential acquisition of information 
pertaining to a single entry-point (of a potential seven). The number of entry-points 
and features to evaluate were not restricted (refer to Figure 4.1). 
 
                                               
 
13 For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘feature-focused’ refers to a strategy/ interface that 
facilitates the consideration of multiple decision options in the context of a single feature. 
14 For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘option-focused’ (or ‘disorder-focused’) refers to a 
strategy/ interface that facilitates the consideration of multiple diagnostic features in the 
context of a single decision option. 
	






Figure 4.1. A screen-shot of the ‘Analytical’ interface that intended to facilitate 
‘option-focused’ information acquisition (Perry et al. 2012). One value (“6.36 
metres”) pertaining to one point of entry (Front Door) for the feature “Distance from 
Seat of Fire” is displayed. Participants were unable to simultaneously compare the 
values from other entry-points pertaining to this feature, and therefore, were required 
to retain this value in working memory.  
 
The ‘Quasi-analytical’ and ‘Intuitive’ interfaces both: (a) Restricted the points 
of entry to consider from seven to three (thereby reducing the amount of content to 
consider), and (b) facilitated ‘feature-focused’ information acquisition by enabling the 
simultaneous comparison of values from multiple entry-points for each feature (refer 
to Figures 4.2 and 4.3). The ‘Intuitive’ interface further reduced the amount of 
content to consider by restricting the number of accessible features during the task 
(from eight features to three) (refer to Figure 4.3). The three features that comprised 
the ‘Intuitive’ interface were self-selected by participants according to their perceived 
2.2. Design
The study comprised a 2!2!(3) mixed measures experimental
design incorporating the two levels of incident command experience
(experienced ICs vs. less-experienced ICs); two levels of time con-
straint (no time constraint vs. 3 min); and three levels of DSS inter-
face (Analytical vs. Quasi-analytical vs. Intuitive) as independent
variables. The dependent variables comprised the amount of informa-
tion accessed; the pattern of information acquisition; the number of
re-acquisitions of previously accessed information (feature recur-
sions); the time taken to formulate a decision; and decision accuracy.
2.3. Stimuli
2.3.1. Fire-!ghting scenarios
The participants were presented with three, written scenario de-
scriptions derived through consultation with Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs) all of whom had obtained the rank of Inspector with a mean
of 24.4 (SD=5.32) total years experience as a !re !ghter, and a
mean of 7.5 (SD=4.51) years of command experience. Each of the
three scenarios tasked participants with identifying the most appro-
priate point of entry to a burning building to rescue a victim trapped
internally. Each scenario description consisted of a three sentence
paragraph which contained information regarding the time of day,
the type of building, and con!rmation that a person was trapped in-
side. The presentation order of scenarios and the assignment to DSS
interfaces were both counterbalanced.
To determine the appropriateness of participants' point of entry deci-
sions, SMEswere presentedwithwritten descriptions of each of the three
scenarios, as well as corresponding tables that presented feature values
for each of the seven decision options. The SMEs were asked to review
the information and rank each of the decision options from one, the
most appropriate option, to seven, the least appropriate. The mean rank-
ing for each decision option was then calculated and each of these rank-
ings was scored from one to seven, with a score of one assigned to the
lowest ranked decision, and a score of seven assigned to the highest
ranked decision. The reliability of each of the SMEs responses was com-
puted usingKendall's coef!cient of concordancewhich revealed amoder-
ately high level of inter-rater agreement, Kendall's W=.70.
2.3.2. DSS interfaces
Three DSS interfaces were developed based on those used in pre-
vious research [18, 32]. Each interface was designed to encourage the
use of a distinct decision strategy that differed in the level of cognitive
processing required to make a decision. The interfaces used in the
current study consisted of what have been referred to as Analytical,
Quasi-analytical, and Intuitive DSS interfaces.
The Analytical interface depicted a "oor-plan featuring the loca-
tion of seven points of entry to a building. Participants could select
a point of entry which then displayed a list of eight features in a
drop-down menu that could be used to investigate the appropriate-
ness of the point of entry. In the case of the Analytical interface, only
one feature could be accessed at a time and only the features pertain-
ing to a selected decision option could be displayed. Therefore, the
Analytical interface encouraged alternative-wise information acquisi-
tion which is associated with the frequency decision strategy in
which options are ranked on the basis of the frequency of ‘good’
and ‘poor’ features [1]. Essentially, this requires information to be
held in working memory to make comparisons across the seven deci-
sion options. An example of the Analytical DSS interface is provided in
Fig. 1.
In contrast to theAnalytical interface, theQuasi-analytical and Intuitive
interfaces restricted the cognitive processing demands on the decision-
making process by limiting to three, the decision options that were avail-
able to evaluate. The Intuitive andQuasi-analytical interfaces also reduced
the requirement to retain information inworkingmemory by integrating
the information presented across the three options [6]. Consequently, the
Quasi-analytical and Intuitive interfaces could be appropriately consid-
ered reduced processing interfaces.
The Quasi-analytical DSS interface required participants to !rst
rank-order each feature from the most appropriate to the least appro-
priate, given the context of the decision. Each participant's feature
ranking determined the order in which features were presented in
the interface, with the highest-ranked feature available at the top of
the drop-down menu and the lowest-ranked feature at the bottom.
Clicking a feature would simultaneously present the feature values
for all three points of entry, thereby encouraging the use of an
attribute-wise search strategy consistent with the elimination by as-
pects decision strategy [30]. An example of the Quasi-analytical DSS
interface is provided in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1. Example of the populatedAnalyticalDSS interface. Decision options are shownon the left as entry points on the "oor plan. Featureswere presented in the drop-downmenuon the right.
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relevance to the scenario, prior to the commencement of the scenario. Participants 
could not access information pertaining to the other five features during the task.  
 
Figure 4.2. The ‘Quasi-analytical’ interface restricted the number of entry 
points to consider and facilitated ‘feature-focused’ information acquisition for eight 
features (Perry et al. 2012). Two values (“Walls cracking”, “None”, “Walls 
cracking”) pertaining to three points of entry (Front Door, Rear Door, Right Door) for 
the feature ‘Structural Damage’ are displayed. Participants were not required to retain 
these three feature-values in working memory when evaluating ‘Structural Damage’. 
 
The Intuitive interface further reduced the amount of information
available for processing by limiting the acquisition of information to
three features. Participants were required initially, to select three fea-
tures that they could access during the decision-making phase. Con-
sistent with the Quasi-analytical interface, clicking a feature would
present the feature values simultaneously for all three available
points of entry. The Intuitive interface encouraged the use of a deci-
sion strategy that is based on the consideration of limited informa-
tion, such as the satis!cing strategy [25]. An example of the Intuitive
DSS interface is provided in Fig. 3.
2.3.3. Features
The eight features that were used to populate the DSS inter-
faces were derived from cognitive interviews conducted with !ve
SMEs. Using an adaptation to the O'Hare, Wiggins, Williams, and
Wong [19] interview protocol, participants were asked a series of
cognitive probes in which they responded with reference to a ret-
rospective incident that they recalled from their own experience.
The features were then extracted by searching for evidence to sug-
gest that participants had made a decision on the basis of the rec-
ognition of particular features. The features that were identi!ed
were then validated through the administration of a spontaneous
response questionnaire to a larger sample of !re-!ghting person-
nel. Eight features were identi!ed and validated from the cognitive
interviews, including structural damage; the distance from the vic-
tim; the level of heat; the distance from the seat of the !re; ob-
structions to the entry; smoke; entry construction; and the fuel
load.
Fig. 2. Example of the populated Quasi-analytical DSS interface. Decision options are shown on the left as entry points on the "oor plan. Features are presented in the drop-down
menu on the right.
Fig. 3. Example of the populated IntuitiveDSS interface. Decision options are shown on the left as entry points on the "oor plan. Features are presented in the drop-downmenu on the right.
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Figure 4.3. The ‘Intuitive’ interface restricted the number of entry points and 
diagnostic features to consider during the task, which facilitated ‘feature-focused’ 
information acquisition (Perry et al. 2012). Three values (‘52.25 metres’, ‘39.60 
metres’, and ‘55.00 metres’) pertaining to three points of entry (Front Loading Dock, 
Front Door, Left Window) for the feature ‘Distance from Victim’ are displayed. Using 
this interface, there was no requirement for participants to retain the three values in 
working memory when evaluating the feature ‘Distance from [the] Victim’. 
 
The experienced Incident Commanders (ICs) were significantly faster and more 
accurate across all three decision scenarios compared to inexperienced ICs. The 
‘Intuitive’ interface (refer to Figure 4.3) reduced response latency for both 
experienced and inexperienced ICs (Perry et al. 2012) and importantly, maintained 
accuracy for experienced ICs. The type of interface was not associated with response 
accuracy (Perry et al. 2012).  
Performance associated with the ‘Intuitive’ interface (self-configured, ‘feature-
focused’) indicated that experienced ICs consistently selected the same three features 
The Intuitive interface further reduced the amount of information
available for processing by limiting the acquisition of information to
three features. Participants were required initially, to select three fea-
tures that they could access during the decision-making phase. Con-
sistent with the Quasi-analytical interface, clicking a feature would
present the feature values simultaneously for all three available
points of entry. The Intuitive interface encouraged the use of a deci-
sion strategy that is based on the consideration of limited informa-
tion, such as the satis!cing strategy [25]. An example of the Intuitive
DSS interface is provided in Fig. 3.
2.3.3. Features
The eight features that were used to populate the DSS inter-
faces were derived from cognitive interviews conducted with !ve
SMEs. Using an adaptation to the O'Hare, Wiggins, Williams, and
Wong [19] interview protocol, participants were asked a series of
cognitive probes in which they responded with reference to a ret-
rospective incident that they recalled from their own experience.
The features were then extracted by searching for evidence to sug-
gest that participants had made a decision on the basis of the rec-
ognition of particular features. The features that were identi!ed
were then validated through the administration of a spontaneous
response questionnaire to a larger sample of !re-!ghting person-
nel. Eight features were identi!ed and validated from the cognitive
interviews, including structural damage; the distance from the vic-
tim; the level of heat; the distance from the seat of the !re; ob-
structions to the entry; smoke; entry construction; and the fuel
load.
Fig. 2. Example of the populated Quasi-analytical DSS interface. Decision options are shown on the left as entry points on the "oor plan. Features are presented in the drop-down
menu on the right.
Fig. 3. Example of the populated IntuitiveDSS interface. Decision options are shown on the left as entry points on the "oor plan. Features are presented in the drop-downmenu on the right.
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prior to the commencement of the task, whereas less-experienced ICs were more 
variable in feature selection (Perry et al. 2012). Perry et al. (2012) suggested that 
inexperienced ICs produced variable and potentially sub-optimal self-configured 
interfaces compared to the experienced ICs, which may have prevented them from 
responding with the same degree of accuracy with the ‘Intuitive’ interface.  
Perry et al. (2013) tested amongst naïve firefighters in two simulated 
firefighting scenarios, the effects of ‘feature-focused’ interfaces that were self-
configured by participants or preconfigured by a group of Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs). Participants diagnosed the most appropriate entry point (from three options) 
to rescue a victim trapped in a burning building. Consistent with the responses to the 
‘Intuitive’ interfaces employed by Perry et al. (2012), the self-configured and 
preconfigured interfaces restricted the number of entry points and features that 
participants could consider during the task. The interfaces reduced-processing 
demands by: (a) Restricting the amount of information to be considered (‘restricted 
content’), and (b) facilitating the simultaneous comparison of values from multiple 
entry-points for each feature (‘feature-focused’) (refer to Figure 4.4).  
The self-configured interface incorporated three features from a set of eight15 
that participants ranked on the basis of their perceived significance to the scenario, 
prior to the commencement of the scenario. The preconfigured interface included 
three features16 from a set of eight that a group of firefighters (SMEs) had ranked on 
the basis of their perceived significance to the scenario, prior to the experiment (refer 
to Figure 4.1). The preconfigured interface removed the requirement for participants 
to determine high value features from low value features. 
                                               
 
15 Structural damage, distance from the victim, the level of heat, smoke, obstructions to the 
entry, the distance from the seat of the fire, fuel load, the entry construction. 
16 Structural damage, distance from the victim, and heat. 





Figure 4.4. The preconfigured ‘restricted content, feature-focused’ interface. The 
SMEs ranked ‘Structural Damage’, ‘Distance from Victim’, and ‘Heat’ as the three 
most important features to evaluate for the scenarios from a set of eight features 
(Perry et al. 2013). Three values (‘23.06 metres’, ‘6.84 metres’, ‘6.84 metres’) 
pertaining to each point of entry (Rear Door, Rear Window, Left Window) for the 
feature ‘Distance from Victim’ are displayed. The nature of the interface meant that it 
obviated the need for participants to retain these values in working memory when 
evaluating ‘Distance from Victim’. 
 
Participants completed six practice scenarios prior to the commencement of two 
test scenarios (training condition) or they completed a total of two test scenarios (no 
training condition). Participants in the training condition were provided with feedback 
regarding the most appropriate to the least appropriate entry point for each of the six 
practice scenarios (as determined by SMEs).  
Decision accuracy scores in the test scenarios were significantly higher amongst 
participants who used the preconfigured interface and received training compared to 
participants who used the self-configured interface and received training (Perry et al. 
538  June 2013 - Human Factors
Figure 1. Example of the quasi-analytical interface. Participants could access all eight cues (listed to the right 
of the figure). In the self-configuration condition, participants first ranked the cues in order of importance 
for making a decision. These rankings determined the order that cues were presented in the menus. In the 
preconfiguration condition, the cues were presented in order from the most important to the least important 
and were not controlled by participants.
Figure 2. Example of the intuitive interface. The cues available to participants (listed to the right of the 
figure) were limited to three. In the self-configuration condition, participants selected the three cues that they 
considered most significant for the decision-making process. In the preconfiguration condition, participants 
could access only the three most critical cues derived from subject matter experts.
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2013). The accuracy scores between participants in the training and no-training 
conditions did not differ significantly, indicating that the mere provision of practice 
exercises with performance feedback prior to the test scenarios did not improve 
accuracy scores (Perry et al. 2013). Perry et al. (2013) suggested that a preconfigured 
interface that: (a) reduces the requirement to determine low value data from high 
value data by restricting the amount of information to be considered (‘restricted, 
preconfigured content’); and (b) facilitates the simultaneous comparison of values 
from multiple choice options associated with a feature (‘feature-focused’), has the 
potential to improve decision accuracy and efficiency, in the absence of complex 
schemas. 
In summary, the reviewed series of DSS studies suggest that interfaces that 
facilitate a ‘feature-focused’ approach to information acquisition (e.g. DSSs that 
reflect the ‘elimination by aspects’ heuristic) afford operators a high degree of control 
over the sequence of information acquisition (independent of experience) and reduce 
processing demands by enabling the simultaneous comparison of feature-values 
(thereby removing the requirement to hold and process feature-values in working 
memory) (Harris & Wiggins, 2008; Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006; Morrison et al. 2010; 
Perry et al. 2012; Perry et al. 2013). Importantly, ‘feature-focused’ DSSs facilitated 
the diagnostic accuracy of trainee Crime Scene Investigators (Morrison et al. 2010), 
and were the preferred interfaces of qualified pilots and trainee Crime Scene 
Investigators (Harris & Wiggins, 2008; Morrison et al. 2010; Wiggins & Bollwerk, 
2006). 
 Perry et al. (2012) demonstrated that a self-configured, restricted content, 
‘feature-focused’ DSS could maintain accuracy and improve diagnostic efficiency 
amongst experienced Incident Commanders in the context of firefighting due to their 
capacity to discriminate significant cues for the scenario from less relevant features. 




Perry et al. (2012) suggested the self-configured restricted content, ‘feature-focused’ 
DSSs of inexperienced ICs led them to respond quickly but their comparatively 
reduced capacity to distinguish significant cues from less relevant features resulted in 
sub-optimal self-configured interfaces and consequently, less accurate responses. 
Perry et al. (2013) demonstrated that naïve operators’ response accuracy and latency 
with a restricted content, ‘feature-focused’ DSS could be improved if Subject Matter 
Experts preconfigured the interface for them prior to the commencement of the task.   
 In the present thesis, four experiments were conducted to address the research 
question: Can a preconfigured, ‘feature-focused’ DSS (with restricted content relative 
to the DSM-5) improve the response accuracy and latency of naïve and novice 
diagnosticians in identifying neurodevelopmental disorders in the absence of practice 
with the DSS? If the diagnostic accuracy of operators who do not possess complex 
schemas of psychiatric categories (which are observable categories) could be 
improved with an intuitive technological system that affords users a high degree of 
control over the sequence of information acquisition, it would have significant 
practical implications for professionals involved in the diagnostic process and 
management of neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. General Practitioners, paediatric 
nurses, and educators).  
 Study One was designed to test three diagnostic-aids that reflected none, one, 
or two of the DSS design principles employed by Perry et al. (2013), which were 
intended to reduce processing demands at the point of information acquisition, 
including: (1) a restricted set of diagnostic features (relative to the DSM-5) that were 
preconfigured by two clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders 
(‘preconfigured’); and (2) a display that facilitated the simultaneous comparison of 
multiple values across a single feature (‘feature-focused’). Participants’ diagnostic 
accuracy and latency were examined across two diagnostic scenarios, including the 




passive observation of a three-year-old boy with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
and a seven-year-old boy with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 
Participants’ accuracy and latency were compared amongst naïve diagnosticians 
(undergraduate students) who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid, 
a ‘preconfigured, option (disorder)-focused’ diagnostic-aid, the DSM-5 (‘full content, 
disorder-focused’ diagnostic-aid), and participants who formulated diagnoses in the 
absence of a diagnostic-aid. 
Study Two tested two diagnostic-aids that reflected none or two of the DSS 
design principles employed by Perry et al. (2013), which were designed to reduce 
processing demands at the point of information acquisition, including: (1) a restricted 
set of diagnostic features (relative to the DSM-5) that were preconfigured by two 
clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders (‘preconfigured’); and (2) a 
display that facilitated the simultaneous comparison of multiple values across a single 
feature (‘feature-focused’). Participants’ diagnostic accuracy and latency were 
examined across two diagnostic scenarios, including the passive observation of a 
three-year-old with ASD and a seven-year-old with ADHD. Diagnostic accuracy and 
latency were compared amongst presumed novice diagnosticians (postgraduate 
students enrolled in a Master of Psychology) who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ diagnostic-aid and the DSM-5 (‘full-content, disorder-focused’ diagnostic-
aid).  
Studies Three and Four were designed to test the interactive mechanisms that 
underpin the ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid. Three ‘preconfigured, 
feature-focused’ diagnostic-aids that were identical in all aspects except for the 
interactive capacity to record categorised or uncategorised symptoms (features), were 
tested in Study Three amongst naïve diagnosticians. Participants’ diagnostic accuracy 
and latency were examined across two diagnostic scenarios, including the passive 




observation of a three-year-old with ASD and a seven-year-old with ADHD. The 
diagnostic accuracy and latency of participants who used one of three ‘preconfigured, 
feature-focused’ interfaces were compared against participants who used the DSM-5 
(‘full content, disorder-focused’).  
Study Four replicated and extended Study Three by examining two different 
points of information acquisition in which a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
diagnostic-aid with the capacity to record categorised symptoms could be used by 







Chapter 5: Developing and testing a DSS without a predictive-mechanism in a 
simulated clinical setting with naïve diagnosticians 
Study One 
The aim of Study One was to test whether a preconfigured diagnostic-aid that 
restricted access to a reduced set (relative to the DSM-5) of task-relevant diagnostic 
features (as determined by two clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental 
disorders) could improve the accuracy and efficiency of diagnoses of 
Neurodevelopmental disorders17, independent of experience, from passive 
observations of simulated clinical scenarios. Levels of diagnostic accuracy (0, 1, or 2 
correct diagnoses across two scenarios) were compared across three diagnostic-aid 
groups (DSM-5, ‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Content Control’, no diagnostic-aid 
(‘Unaided’)) that differed in their capacity to reduce processing demands at the point 
of information acquisition. Specifically, the diagnostic-aids differed in the type of 
content to be processed overall (‘preconfigured’ vs. ‘full’), and the arrangement of 
content (‘disorder (option)-focused’ vs. ‘feature-focused’).  
 
Overview of diagnostic-aids and diagnostic-aid properties 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-
5) is a classification system of psychiatric disorders. One of the primary purposes of 
the DSM-5 is to define psychiatric categories in a comprehensive and precise form. 
Therefore, it is referred to as a ‘full content’ diagnostic-aid for the purposes of this 
study as the manual contains the full set of diagnostic features and supporting 
information for all existing psychiatric disorders. The DSM-5 is intended to facilitate 
                                               
 
17 Neurodevelopmental disorders are a subcategory of psychiatric disorders in which the 





the acquisition of diagnostic features pertaining to a single disorder category 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
The ‘Categorisation interface’ was a diagnostic-aid built for the purposes of the 
present study. The ‘Categorisation Interface’ employed two reduced-processing 
design principles that were adapted from Perry et al. (2012; 2013) including: (a) a 
restricted set of diagnostic features (relative to the DSM-5) that were preconfigured 
by two clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders; and (b) the 
acquisition of features in a sequence that enabled the simultaneous comparison of 
feature-values across multiple diagnostic categories (Morrison et al. 2010; Mosier & 
Skitka, 1996; Wickens & McCarley, 2008). ‘Feature-values’, in the context of the 
present study, refers to the different manifestations (values) of symptoms (features) 
associated with different disorders (options).  
The ‘Content Control’ was a diagnostic-aid built for the purposes of the present 
study. The ‘Content Control’ employed one reduced-processing design principle that 
was adapted from Perry et al. (2012; 2013): A restricted set of diagnostic features 
(relative to the DSM-5) that were preconfigured by two clinicians who specialise in 
neurodevelopmental disorders. The ‘Content Control’ facilitated the acquisition of 
multiple diagnostic features pertaining to a single disorder category. Therefore, the 
‘Content Control’ is referred to as ‘disorder-focused’ for the purposes of the present 
study. 
Full vs. preconfigured content: The DSM-5 contains the full set of diagnostic 
criteria together with supporting information for all existing psychological diagnostic 
categories (‘full content’). The supporting information for each category includes (but 
is not limited to) the number of symptoms required to warrant a diagnosis, common 
co-morbid disorders and instructions on differential diagnosis, prevalence rates, and 





Psychiatric Association, 2013).  The ‘Categorisation Interface’ and the ‘Content 
Control’ diagnostic-aids contained a restricted set of preconfigured diagnostic features 
pertaining to four diagnostic categories with overlapping diagnostic features (ASD, 
OCD, IDD, and ADHD). A Paediatric Clinical Psychologist and a General 
Practitioner who specialises in neurodevelopmental disorders18, with 17- and 30-
years’ experience with childhood psychological disorders respectively, determined the 
content of the ‘Categorisation Interface’. The consulting clinicians selected a 
restricted set of 16 diagnostic features from the DSM-5 that were relevant to one or 
more of the potential disorder categories (ASD, OCD, IDD, ADHD), which they both 
utilise frequently in their initial consultations of children with suspected 
psychological disorders (refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2).  
Disorder-focused vs. feature-focused:  The physical manual of the DSM-5 is 
arranged so that each disorder has its own chapter, thereby facilitating the acquisition 
of all of the symptoms pertaining to a single disorder at a given point in time 
(‘disorder-focused’). The ‘Content Control’ was also arranged in a ‘disorder-focused’ 
format. The ‘Categorisation Interface’ facilitated the simultaneous comparison of 
values from multiple disorder categories for each feature (‘feature-focused’) 
 
  
                                               
 
18 The GP is the representative for disabilities for the Royal College of New Zealand GPs, is 
on the mental health advisory committee for the Primary Health Organisation in Wellington, 
is in a special GP interest and research group for ADHD that works in liaison with CAMHS 
in Wellington, is a fellowship examiner for the Royal College of NZ GPs, and has received a 





Table 5.1: Definitions of the properties (content type and arrangement) of the 



















Diagnostic-aids used in Study One 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-
5): There are two global standardised, diagnostic classification systems that define 
and code mental disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Phillips, 2014; 
Content type Arrangement of content 
‘Full content’ 
 
The full and comprehensive set of 
diagnostic features, feature-values, 
and supporting information for each 
disorder (full content). 
‘Disorder-focused’ 
 
Facilitated the processing of multiple 




A restricted (relative to the DSM-
5) set of 16 diagnostic features and 
corresponding feature-values that 
were preconfigured by two 




Facilitated the processing of a single 




Content type Arrangement of 
content 
DSM-5 (physical manual) Full content Disorder-focused 
Content Control Preconfigured content Disorder-focused 





World Health Organisation, 2019)19. Firstly, the DSM-5 is produced by the American 
Psychiatric Association. The entire classification system for psychological disorders, 
as defined by the American Psychiatric Association, is contained within a 947-page 
manual. The second global classification system of psychological disorders is the 
International Classification of Diseases, 11th revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-
11CM). The ICD-11CM is produced by the World Health Organisation.  
The diagnostic categories in both systems currently lack reliable biomarkers and 
therefore, unlike many diseases in other medical domains, psychiatric disorders exist 
as observational categories (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Phillips, 2014; 
Stephan & Mathys, 2014; Venigalla et al. 2017; World Health Organisation, 2019). 
Clinicians cannot utilise laboratory tests, X-rays, electroencephalograms (EEGs), or 
biopsies to assist in diagnosing psychiatric categories (Phillips, 2014; Stephan & 
Mathys, 2014; Venigalla et al. 2017). Therefore, the standard mode of diagnosis for 
psychiatric disorders involves the judgment of clinicians who have ideally trained 
extensively with one or both of these classification systems, including Psychiatrists, 
Clinical Psychologists, and Developmental Paediatricians. However, initial 
psychological assessments, diagnoses, and/or referrals are often made by clinicians 
who have not received specialised training with either classification system (Canadian 
Association of Paediatric Health Centres, 2010; Cheung & Dewa, 2007; Davidson & 
Manion, 1996; Florenzano, 1991; House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; 
Kerasidou & Kingori, 2019; Kerwick et al. 1997; Kowalewski et al. 2011; Offord et 
al. 1989; Stuckler et al. 2017; Young et al. 2001).  
                                               
 
19 The disorder categories in both systems are fundamentally similar. For example, a clinician 
would diagnose the same patient with ASD whether she followed the criteria for the DSM-5 





The DSM-5 is the mostly widely used classification system for psychological 
disorders in Australasia, and therefore, the physical manual was used as a diagnostic-
aid in Study One. The DSM-5 contains the full set of diagnostic criteria together with 
supporting information for all existing psychological diagnostic categories. The 
supporting information for each category includes (but is not limited to) the number 
of symptoms required to warrant a diagnosis, common co-morbid disorders and 
instructions on differential diagnosis, prevalence rates, and demographic differences 
such as gender and cultural differences (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
The manual is arranged so that each disorder has its own chapter, thereby facilitating 
the acquisition of all of the symptoms pertaining to a single disorder at a given point 
in time (‘disorder-focused’). Four of the DSM-5 chapters were relevant for the current 
study as participants selected a single or co-morbid presentation of four disorders20 
from a list of 11 different diagnostic options (refer to Appendix A). The ASD, OCD, 
IDD, and ADHD chapters contained 9.5, 8.5, 8, and 6.5 pages respectively (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
 
Categorisation Interface:  
An interactive diagnostic-aid was created for the purposes of the present study 
that employed two reduced-processing design principles that were utilised by 
interfaces in Perry et al. (2012; 2013) (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’). The tablet-
based diagnostic-aid (referred to as the ‘Categorisation Interface’) was coded in C++ 
in Xcode for iOS. The ‘Categorisation Interface’ was designed to reduce processing 
demands by: (a) Restricting and structuring the information to be considered 
(‘preconfigured content’), and (b) facilitating the simultaneous comparison of values 
                                               
 
20 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), 





from multiple categories for each feature (‘feature-focused’). The interface comprised 
two key segments that facilitated ‘feature-focused’ processing.  
Structure of the ‘Categorisation Interface’: The first segment of the interface 
was a single screen sectioned into a four-by-four grid. The 16 preconfigured features 
were located in the first segment of the interface (refer to Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1. Screenshot of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’. The 
16 diagnostic features were selected by two clinicians who specialise in 
neurodevelopmental disorders on the basis of their perceived usefulness for an initial 
consultation of a child presenting with development and/or behavioural issues.  
 
The disorder categories that were relevant to the task (ASD, OCD, IDD, 
ADHD) were incorporated in a column that contained four features that were 
prominent to each category. Information for four different disorder categories was 
provided as this number was consistent with Elstein (2009)’s “magic number” 





Nine features were present in multiple disorder categories. Colour-coded symbols 
were adopted to rapidly convey to the user the different categories in which a feature 
was present. Each disorder category was designated a colour and symbol21. For 
example, the diagnostic feature ‘Frequent and persistent patterns of inattention’ is 
prominent in ADHD but can also be present in two other categories (ASD and OCD) 
(refer to Figure 5.2). Therefore, there were three symbols directly below ‘Inattention’ 
to indicate that it has ‘values’ associated with three different categories (ADHD, 
ASD, OCD).  
If a feature was selected by the user, they were directed to the second segment 
of the interface. Consistent with the ‘feature-focused’ interfaces adopted in Perry et 
al. (2012; 2013) (refer to Figures 4.4, 4.2, and 4.3), the second segment of the 
interface allowed users to simultaneously compare the values of up to three categories 
for a single feature (refer to Figure 5.2). The values in the second segment are 
frequently referred to as ‘feature-values’ for the purposes of the present study. The 
feature-values were descriptions of the presentation of a feature from each disorder 
category. The feature-values for ‘Inattention’ are displayed in Figure 5.2 as an 
example.  
The ‘Categorisation Interface’ restricted user access to just two segments and 
utilised colours and symbols to converge complex information on psychopathology. 
These design principles are consistent with Baig et al. (2019)’s recommendations that 
mobile health applications should both restrict the number of segments required to 
complete a task and incorporate colour cues to converge information (refer to pages 
32-34 of the present thesis for a more thorough discussion on the design of mobile 
health applications). 
                                               
 









Figure 5.2. Screenshot of the corresponding values for the feature ‘frequent & 
persistent patterns of inattention’ in the second segment of the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ (image below). This screen was accessed by selecting the button outlined in 






If a user selected a feature-value in the second segment of the interface, then the 
corresponding feature in the first segment was highlighted. The colour that the feature 
highlighted was dependent on the feature-value selected. For example, if the user 
selected a value associated with OCD, then the feature would be highlighted purple as 





Figure 5.3. Screenshots of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
following the selection of the ASD (blue), ADHD (red), and OCD (purple) values for 
‘frequent & persistent patterns of inattention’ 
  
The reduced-processing principle of preconfigured restricted content was 
employed by the ‘Categorisation Interface’ as its content was reduced relative to the 
content of the four relevant chapters from the DSM-5 for ASD, OCD, IDD, and 
ADHD. However, it should be noted that there were a higher number of diagnostic 





to consider than was the case in Perry et al. (2012; 2013). The ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ had an additional function that automatically collected the selected features 
and corresponding feature-values and compiled them into an automated PDF, with the 
option for the user to input additional notes for each selected feature (refer to 
Appendix C). Similar to the successful computer system reviewed in Teich et al. 
(2000), which provided automated decision support when physicians entered drug 
orders for patients, the purpose of the additional function of the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ was to automate the required rote task of writing mental health referrals that 
primary physicians must do when referring patients to secondary mental health 
services. The aim of this thesis was to test the efficacy and reliability of the decision 
support function of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and not the referral function. 
However, in terms of potential acceptance by users of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ in 
an applied clinical context, the decision support function of the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ tested in the present thesis (like the system reviewed by Teich et al. (2000)) 
would likely be secondary to its automated referral function. The referral function of 
the ‘Categorisation Interface’ will only be addressed in the Practical Implications 
subsection of the General Discussion of this thesis.  
 ‘Content Control’: A diagnostic-aid that contained a restricted set of diagnostic 
features that were preconfigured by the consulting clinicians was created for the 
purposes of the present study. This diagnostic-aid was a paper-based A4 sized manual 
and is referred to as the ‘Content Control’ as it contained identical content to that of 
the ‘Categorisation Interface’. The ‘Content Control’ was designed to encourage users 
to consider multiple symptoms in the context of a single disorder (‘disorder-focused’), 
consistent with the DSM-5. The ASD chapter was 2.5 pages, whilst the OCD, IDD, 





In summary, two of the reduced-processing principles employed by interfaces in 
Perry et al. (2012; 2013) were examined in Study One, including: (1) a restricted set of 
preconfigured features, and (2) the arrangement of preconfigured features to facilitate 
the simultaneous comparison of feature-values (or ‘feature-focused’ information 
acquisition). These principles were examined in the context of the identification of the 
correct disorder categories of two children who had been diagnosed independently with 
neurodevelopmental disorders (ASD and ADHD).   
Three diagnostic-aids were used in Study One (refer to Table 5.2). The 
diagnostic-aids differed in the amount and type of content available (full content vs. 
restricted preconfigured content), and the arrangement of content (‘feature-focused’ vs. 
‘disorder-focused’). The DSM-5, ‘Content Control’, and ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
employed zero, one, or two of the reduced-processing principles adapted from Perry et 
al. (2012; 2013), respectively (refer to Table 5.2).  
The following hypotheses were formulated to examine whether a diagnostic-aid 
that employed two reduced-processing principles (a restricted set of features 
(preconfigured by clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders) that 
allowed for the simultaneous comparison of feature-values) would improve naïve 
diagnosticians’ decision accuracy and response latency compared to the DSM-5 ('full 
content, disorder-focused’). 
1. Participants who used a diagnostic-aid that employed two reduced-
processing design principles (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) would 
achieve a greater accuracy score (diagnose both ASD and ADHD 
correctly) compared to participants who made diagnoses unaided or 
who used a diagnostic-aid that employed one reduced-processing 






2. Participants who used a diagnostic-aid that employed two reduced-
processing design principles (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) would 
be faster at diagnosing ASD and ADHD compared to participants who 
used a diagnostic-aid that employed one reduced-processing principle 









This research complied with the American Psychological Association Code of 
Ethics and was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Otago 
and Macquarie University. Informed consent was obtained from each participant. The 
participants consisted of 64 undergraduate students (53 female, 11 male) who 
participated in the study voluntarily for course credit or for a $25 cash reimbursement. 
They ranged in age from 18 to 25 years, with a mean age of 19 (SD = 1.39). 
Undergraduates were enrolled in one or more first or second year psychology 
paper(s). Data were collected in the Laboratories of the Otago and Macquarie 
Psychology Departments over a three-month period. Undergraduate students were 
selected to determine the effects of diagnostic-aids that employed zero, one, or two 
reduced-processing principles amongst a population with underdeveloped or non-
existent illness scripts for neurodevelopmental disorders.  
 
Design 
The experiment comprised a one-way, between-subjects design with diagnostic-
aid group (‘Categorisation Interface’, DSM-5, ‘Content Control’, Unaided) as the 
between-subjects factor. The dependent variables comprised response accuracy (0, 1, 
or 2 correct diagnoses) and response latency. 
Instruments 
Clinical scenarios: Two filmed clinical scenarios were used to examine the 
effectiveness of the diagnostic-aids. The first scenario featured a three-year-old boy 
who was diagnosed with ASD by a team of clinical psychologists, while the second 





team of clinical psychologists22. A diagnosis of ASD or ADHD is necessitated by the 
presence of a specified number of symptoms that have persisted for a defined period 
of time at clinical levels of severity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
However, there are variations in the presentation of each of these disorders, as a 
person does not have to exhibit every listed symptom of a disorder to be diagnosed 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The two subjects of the clinical scenarios 
used in the present thesis did not possess sufficient clinically significant features from 
another disorder category to warrant a co-morbid diagnosis by clinical experts23.  The 
footage for both scenarios was observed and approved as representative of 
presentations of ASD and ADHD by a Clinical Psychologist who was not involved in 
the researcher’s thesis (including the development of the clinical scenarios, the 
diagnostic-aids, or the supervision of the researcher). 
ASD scenario: The three-year old boy with ASD is first-generation Brazilian-
New Zealand; that is, his parents moved to New Zealand from Brazil shortly before 
he was born. English is the second language of both parents. The discrepancy between 
the child’s intellectual and adaptive functioning skills is large. His intellectual skills, 
such as memory capacity, numeracy and reading skills, are noticeably further 
advanced than his same-aged peers. However, it is even more salient the child is 
substantially lagging in the progression of certain developmental milestones, such as 
speech, social interaction, and motor co-ordination. For example, at the time of 
filming he could count to 100 in five different languages and knew up to his 20 times 
                                               
 
22 The video subjects had an ASD or ADHD diagnosis at the time of filming (the ASD 
scenario was filmed in 2014 and the ADHD scenario was filmed in 2016) and both have a 
current diagnosis of ASD or ADHD (2019).		 
23 Neither the ASD or ADHD patient were diagnosed with a co-morbid disorder category. The 
patient with ASD had a single diagnosis of ASD and the patient with ADHD had a single 
diagnosis of ADHD at the time of filming. Both patients have the same current diagnoses as 





tables, yet he could not use a spoon to feed himself. As depicted in the footage, the 
child asks his mother to spell and draw an ellipse and becomes distressed when she 
does not know what an ellipse is. The mother states that the child frequently asks her 
to draw complex shapes and write words that she has not heard of, and he reprimands 
her when she makes mistakes. The mother further states that the child’s kindergarten 
teachers have to assist him with some motor capabilities that his same-aged peers do 
not struggle with, such as climbing a small set of steps.  
ADHD scenario: The ethnicity of the child with ADHD is Chinese-Indian New 
Zealand. The child was born in New Zealand, his mother was born in India, and his 
father was born to Chinese parents in New Zealand. English is the second language of 
his mother. In the footage, the mother explains the difficulties that she has, and the 
distress that she feels, in attempting to control his behaviour. The footage of the 
child’s behaviour is a clear demonstration of hyperactive symptomatology. For 
example, the child climbs over the mother, calls her names, and shouts and runs 
around for the duration of the film. The child’s inattentive behaviours and relatively 
poor academic performance and social interactions at school are described by his 
mother. 
The scenarios were designed to depict footage that resembled an initial primary 
healthcare consultation of a child presenting with a psychological disorder (Flanagan, 
1954). A General Practitioner who specialises in neurodevelopmental disorders and a 
Paediatric Clinical Psychologist, outlined a range of questions pertaining to four broad 
areas of interest (AOI) for the researcher that they would typically ask in the context of 
a child behavioural consultation. Subsequently, the clinical scenarios were structured 
interviews that contained questions pertaining to the patient’s behaviour in four key 






Table 5.3: Behavioural areas of interest for the simulated clinical scenarios 
 
Behavioural setting Areas of interest discussed between 
parent and interviewer 
Behaviour at home Following instructions, organizational 
and self-care skills, energy levels, mood 
regulation and anxiety levels 
Behaviour at school or preschool Following instructions, time taken to 
settle to an activity, listening and 
concentration skills, ability to stay on 
task, academic progress, interactions 
with classmates 
Social Behaviour Play behaviours, relationships and 
interactions with family members, peers, 
and teachers 
Comparisons of behaviour to same age 
peers and sibling(s) 
Specific comparative examples of 




The ASD and ADHD scenarios comprised of 20 minutes of footage. The scenario 
for ASD consisted of information derived from an interview with the patient, the two 
parents of the patient, the child’s General Practitioner, and the researcher. The interview 
was conducted in the consultation room of the patient’s General Practitioner and was 
led by the General Practitioner. The patient was filmed interacting with his parents, his 
general practitioner, and the researcher throughout the interview, however the interview 
was centred around information derived from the parents of the patient. This format is 
reflective of the dynamic of a consultation in a clinical general practice setting (Dr. 
Anne-Marie Cullen (GP), personal communication, March 3 2014, April 10 2016; 
Norman Rees (Clinical Psychologist and Lecturer of Psychology at Macquarie 
University), personal communication, March 21, 2018; Francis Towsey (Paediatric 
Clinical Psychologist) personal communication, June 26, 2015). 
The scenario for ADHD was filmed after the scenario for ASD. The interview for 
the ADHD scenario followed a similar format to the interview of the ASD scenario. 





throughout the interview and the interview was centred around information derived 
from the mother of the patient. However, the interview was led by the experimenter 
who was present for the filming of the ASD patient, as the patient’s GP was not present. 
The interview was conducted in the patient’s home.   
 
Diagnostic Options List: Participants were provided with a list of 11 diagnostic 
options24 at the start of the experiment that included typical development, ASD, ADHD, 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Intellectual Developmental Disorder (IDD), 
and six possible co-morbid presentations of these four disorders.  
 
Procedure  
The experiment was conducted in two small adjacent rooms. On arrival, 
participants signed a consent form and were randomly assigned into one of four groups 
(DSM-5, ‘Content Control’, ‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Unaided’). There were 16 
participants in each diagnostic-aid group. Participants’ phones were switched off and 
placed on the opposite side of the room to where they were sitting, and they were 
instructed not to use the internet. All of the participants observed the ASD and ADHD 
scenarios with their assigned diagnostic-aid. The order in which the clinical videos 
(ASD, ADHD) were viewed was counterbalanced within diagnostic-aid groups.  
Participants in the DSM-5, ‘Content Control’, and ‘Unaided’ groups received a 
pen and refill paper before the scenarios commenced. They were advised to write down 
information of perceived relevance throughout the scenarios as if they were a clinician 
observing a patient, as is common procedure in an initial consultation with a primary 
                                               
 
24 Typical development; ASD; OCD; IDD; ADHD; ASD and OCD; ASD and IDD; ASD and 





healthcare clinician for a child with a suspected psychological disorder (Dr. Anne-
Marie Cullen (GP), personal communication, March 3, 2014, April 10 2016). 
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were provided with a different 
set of instructions prior to the commencement of the first scenario. Participants were 
advised that each of the disorders for which a diagnosis might be considered had a 
column in the first segment of the interface (refer to Figure 5.1) and were associated 
with a particular colour and symbol25. They were informed that the four features in each 
of the columns were features that were commonly associated with that disorder. 
However, if a feature was present in other disorder(s) it would contain the symbol(s) of 
the relevant disorder(s).  
Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were advised to consider the 
16 features and the symbols on each of the features in the first segment of the interface, 
and the feature-values in the second segment (refer to Figure 5.2), to determine whether 
any were relevant to the patient. They were further advised to select features of 
perceived relevance to the patient if the observed behaviour matched one of the feature-
values (refer to Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Participants could use the interface to categorise 
features by comparing its different manifestations (or ‘values’) across one or more 
diagnostic categories and selecting a feature-value if it was perceived to be relevant to 
the patient (refer to Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3). The colour-coding mechanism of the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ recorded the selected feature-value by highlighting the 
feature (located in the first segment) with the colour associated with the disorder. 
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were shown that they could deselect 
any feature that they had highlighted or change the categorisation of a feature by 
selecting a different feature-value.  
                                               
 





The experimenter advised the user to be guided to a diagnosis by the colour 
configuration of the grid, which was based on participants selected feature-values. 
Participants were advised that a predominantly white grid (specifically 0, 1, or 2 
features highlighted) may suggest that they did not think any (or too few) diagnostic 
features were applicable to the patient, in which case the patient may be a typically 
developing child. If another colour were prominent, for example green, it would 
indicate a preponderance of IDD symptomatology. If two colours were prominent, for 
example green and blue, this would suggest a co-morbid presentation of IDD and ASD 
symptomatology.   
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were not given a pen and 
paper to write down behaviours of perceived relevance throughout the observation of 
the patient. Instead of recording a set of anecdotal behaviours from the scenario, 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were advised to select feature-
values of perceived relevance to the patient throughout the observation.  
The footage for the first scenario ran without interruption. The experimenter 
entered the room at the conclusion of the scenario. Participants in the DSM-5 and 
‘Content Control’ groups were issued their diagnostic-aids. All participants were given 
a diagnostic-options list and advised to use their diagnostic-aid and written observation 
notes (if relevant) to formulate an accurate diagnosis. Once participants had made their 
decision, they circled the corresponding option on the list and notified the experimenter. 
The experimenter was positioned outside the room to avoid experimenter bias. The time 
taken to formulate a diagnosis was recorded from the moment the experimenter shut 
the door until participants opened the door and signalled that they had finished the task. 
No time limit was imposed, and participants were not notified that they were being 






The majority of participants in the ‘Unaided’ group recorded a diagnosis 
immediately after receiving the diagnostic-options list without instruction or a verbal 
prompt. These participants notified the experimenter that they had finished as the 
experimenter was exiting the room or just after the experimenter had shut the door . 
Therefore, the response latencies from participants who made diagnoses unaided were 
not compared with the response latencies from participants who used a diagnostic-aid.  
All participants repeated the procedure with a different clinical scenario. 
Participants did not receive any feedback on their performance and were asked to 









The dependent variables comprised response accuracy and response latency for the 
correct diagnosis for two clinical scenarios. The diagnostic-aid used for the task was 
the between-subjects factor.  
Level of response accuracy: Participants’ scores ranged between zero to two, 
depending upon the number of scenarios that they diagnosed correctly. Four planned 
Mann-Whitney U tests were undertaken to determine whether there were differences in 
level of accuracy between the DSM-5, ‘Content Control’, ‘Categorisation Interface’, 
and ‘Unaided’ diagnostic-aid groups. Accuracy scores were recorded on a scale from 0 
to 2.  The distributions of accuracy scores were not consistent, and therefore, the mean 
ranks, rather than medians, are reported. Exact p-values were adjusted for multiple 
testing using a Bonferroni correction.  
The accuracy score for the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group (mean rank = 21) was 
statistically significantly greater in comparison to the DSM-5 group (mean rank = 12), 
U = 56, p = .024. Similarly, the accuracy score for the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group 
(mean rank = 20.62) was significantly greater than the ‘Content Control’ group (mean 
rank = 12.38), U = 62, p = .024. The accuracy score for the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
group (mean rank = 23.12) was also statistically significantly greater relative to the 
‘Unaided’ group (mean rank = 9.88), U = 22, p < .001. The final Mann-Whitney U test 
compared accuracy scores between the DSM-5 and the ‘Unaided’ groups. The accuracy 
score for the DSM-5 group (mean rank = 19.50) was not statistically significantly 
greater than the accuracy score for the ‘Unaided’ group (mean rank = 13.50), U = 80, 






Figure 5.4. Proportion of participants in each diagnostic-aid group who scored 0, 
1, or 2 depending on the number of correct diagnoses made in Study One 
 
ASD and ADHD Diagnoses: Participants selected a diagnosis from a list of 11 
possible alternatives and therefore, had a one in 11 (or 9%) probability of selecting an 
accurate diagnosis for each scenario. To establish whether differences in accuracy were 
associated with specific scenarios, the relationship between a correct diagnosis for the 
ASD and ADHD scenarios and diagnostic-aid group relative to chance was examined 
separately using chi-square tests of independence. The expected cell frequencies for 
two groups (‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Unaided’) were less than 5 and therefore, 
Fisher’s exact values are reported. The frequency of correct responses for ASD and 









































Table 5.4: The proportion (%) of correct responses for the ASD and ADHD 











Categorisation Interface 100 75 16 
DSM-5  50 50 16 
Content Control 50 50 16 
Unaided  12.5 38 16 
Chance  9 9 - 
 
ASD scenario 
The results revealed a statistically significant association between response 
accuracy for ASD and diagnostic-aid group, c2 = 24.847, N = 64, p < .001. Based on 
(Cohen, 1988), Cramer’s V = .623, the relationship can be considered ‘strong’. To 
examine where the association between response accuracy for ASD and diagnostic-aid 












Table 5.5: Chi-square tests examining differences of the proportion (%) of correct 
ASD responses between diagnostic-aid groups 












32 .002* .577 




32 .002* .577 
Categorisation Interface 
Unaided 





48 .053 .365 
 
The results presented in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 suggest that participants were most 
likely to accurately diagnose the ASD scenario if they were in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group. There were no statistically significant differences between the DSM-




In contrast to ASD, there was no statistically significant association between 
response accuracy for the ADHD scenario and diagnostic-aid group, c2 = 4.769, N = 
64, p = .195, Crammer’s V = .2730. The descriptive data on the frequency of selection 
of ASD and ADHD between diagnostic-aid groups suggest that participants in the 
‘Unaided’ group diagnosed ASD at a similar frequency to chance, whereas they 






Response latency for ASD: Parametric analyses could not be conducted on 
response latency data as they were not normally distributed. A Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ASD between the DSM-5, ‘Content Control’, and ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
groups. Only the response latencies for correct ASD diagnoses were examined. 
Distributions of diagnostic time for ASD (minutes) were similar across the three 
groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot and therefore, median times, rather 
than mean ranks, are reported.  
Median response latencies for diagnosing ASD were statistically significantly 
different between different diagnostic-aid groups, c2(2) = 15.397, N = 32, p < .001. 
Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. This 
post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ASD between the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (Mdn = 1.37) and DSM-5 (Mdn 
= 9.19) groups (p = .001), and the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and ‘Content Control’ 
(Mdn = 5.04) groups (p = .041) groups. There was no statistically significant difference 
between the DSM-5 and ‘Content Control’ (p = .857) groups.  
Response Latency for ADHD: Parametric analyses could not be conducted on 
response latency data as they were not normally distributed. A Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ADHD between the DSM-5, ‘Content Control’, and ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ groups. Only the response latencies for correct ADHD diagnoses were 
examined. Distributions of diagnostic time for ADHD (minutes) were similar across 
the three groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot and therefore, median 





Median response latencies for diagnosing ADHD were statistically significantly 
different between diagnostic-aid groups, c2(2) = 13.923, N = 28, p = .001. Pairwise 
comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc 
analysis revealed statistically significant differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ADHD between the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (Mdn = 1.33) and DSM-5 
(Mdn = 6.38) groups (p = .002), and the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and ‘Content 
Control’ groups (Mdn = 6.08) (p = .015). There was no statistically significant 
difference between the DSM-5 and ‘Content Control’ (p = 1.00) groups.  
The results for diagnostic response latency suggest that factors attributable to 
the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group resulted in participants diagnosing ASD and 







Study One tested the effectiveness of a diagnostic-aid that employed two 
reduced-processing principles (a restricted set of diagnostic features preconfigured by 
clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders, which allowed for the 
simultaneous comparison of feature-values) to diagnose two neurodevelopmental 
disorders from filmed scenarios, amongst naïve diagnosticians with underdeveloped or 
non-existent illness scripts.  The DSM-5 is the most widely used standardised mental-
health diagnostic system and manual in Australasia (the DSM-5). Response accuracy 
and response latency were measured and compared amongst naïve diagnosticians who 
were randomly assigned to one of four groups (DSM-5, ‘Categorisation Interface’, 
‘Content Control’, ‘Unaided’) to diagnose two patients with different 
neurodevelopmental disorders (ASD, ADHD). 
The participants in Study One were naïve in the context of neurodevelopmental 
disorders (including ASD and ADHD) as they lacked basic theoretical knowledge and 
therefore, were presumed to possess underdeveloped or non-existent illness scripts in 
this domain. This enabled the researchers to compare the effects of two reduced-
processing design principles (‘preconfigured content, feature-focused’) amongst a 
population where no standardised theoretical learning had occurred. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported. Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group 
(‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) selected the optimal outcome across two scenarios 
(diagnose both ASD and ADHD correctly), thereby achieving a significantly higher 
accuracy score compared to participants in the DSM-5 (‘full content, disorder-
focused’), ‘Content Control’ (‘preconfigured, disorder-focused’), and ‘Unaided’ 
groups (refer to Figure 5.4). Further analyses revealed that participants in the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group were significantly more likely to diagnose ASD 





(refer to Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Although the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group had a 
higher proportion of correct ADHD diagnoses, there were no significant differences 
in the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD between groups (refer to Table 5.4).  
Hypothesis 2 was supported. Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group 
(‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) were faster at correctly diagnosing ASD and ADHD 
compared to participants in the DSM-5 (‘full content, disorder-focused’), and ‘Content 
Control’ (‘preconfigured, disorder-focused’) groups (refer to Figure 5.4). 
These results suggest that a ‘feature-focused’ interface that was preconfigured by 
clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders and restricted access to task-
specific features, may have the potential to improve the diagnostic accuracy scores 
(facilitate two correct diagnoses) and likelihood of diagnosing ASD relative to the 
DSM-5, amongst a naïve population. The results from the ‘Content Control’ group 
suggest that diagnostic accuracy and latency were not improved by a restricted set of 
features that were preconfigured by clinicians if arranged in a ‘disorder-focused’ 
format. Furthermore, a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid 
(‘Categorisation Interface’) may have the potential to simultaneously improve 
diagnostic accuracy and reduce response latency.   
Perry et al. (2013) suggest that a decision support system that incorporates two 
reduced-processing strategies (‘preconfigured content, feature-focused’) was the most 
effective in assisting naïve personnel select the optimal outcome in the context of 
simulated firefighting tasks. Consistent with Perry et al. (2013), the diagnostic-aid of 
the present study that contained a relatively restricted set of preconfigured diagnostic 
features (compared to the DSM-5) and enabled the simultaneous comparison of 
feature-values pertaining to different categories (‘Categorisation Interface’), was the 
most effective in assisting naïve personnel select the optimal outcome in two 








There were no significant differences in the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD 
between groups. The ‘Categorisation Interface’ group had the highest proportion of 
correct ADHD diagnoses, although the proportion of correct ADHD diagnoses was 
lower relative to the proportion of correct ASD diagnoses. The proportion of correct 
ASD and ADHD diagnoses from participants in the DSM-5 and ‘Content Control’ 
groups were identical for each scenario and between diagnostic-aid groups, which 
suggests that the scenarios may have been equally difficult for these groups (refer to 
Table 5.4). However, the proportion of correct ADHD diagnoses was three times higher 
than the proportion of correct ASD diagnoses amongst participants who made 
diagnoses without a diagnostic-aid (‘Unaided’ group).  
The descriptive data from the ‘Unaided’ groups suggests the ADHD scenario may 
have been easier relative to the ASD scenario. It is possible that the ADHD scenario 
used in the present study was less ambiguous relative to the ASD scenario. The ASD 
scenario was led by an experienced general practitioner (GP) who specialises in 
neurodevelopmental disorders, whereas the ADHD scenario was led by an 
experimenter who had been instructed by a GP but had not received formal training in 
clinical interviews. This may have resulted in an inferior interview style for the ADHD 
scenario. It is also possible that naïve diagnosticians are more familiar with the 
diagnostic features of ADHD relative to ASD.  
The descriptive data from the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group suggest the 
proportion of correct ADHD diagnoses was slightly lower relative to the proportion of 
correct ASD diagnoses. This pattern was the inverse to the ‘Unaided’ group. The 





‘Categorisation Interface’ group were not significant. However, it is possible that the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ was more effective in assisting with the diagnosis of ASD 
compared to ADHD.  
There was more information on ASD to acquire compared to the three other 
disorders that participants were directed to consider (ADHD, OCD, IDD) across the 
three diagnostic-aid groups. This is consistent with ASD being a spectrum disorder, in 
which the range of features is often expanded relative to non-spectrum disorders 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This was indicated by longer ASD chapters 
relative to the chapters of other disorders (OCD, IDD, ADHD) in both the DSM-5 and 
‘Content Control’ diagnostic-aids. This was indicated by a greater number of ASD 
symbols in the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ compared to the other 
three disorders, which may have directed participants to a correct ASD diagnosis. 
However, the greater number of ASD symbols did not distract the vast majority of 
participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group from accurately identifying ADHD 
(refer to Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4). Studies Three and Four of this thesis further test the 
effect of the number of ASD symbols in influencing the diagnostic accuracy of ASD.  
A further limitation of Study One was that participants in the DSM-5 and 
‘Content Control’ groups did not have access to their respective diagnostic-aids 
during the observation of the patient in each scenario. Pilot data suggested that 
participants who had access to the DSM-5 and ‘Content Control’ during the 
observation of the patient did not improve accuracy. Furthermore, the consulting 
clinicians suggested it may be impractical and uncommon for a GP to refer to a 
physical copy of the DSM-5 in an interview that is restricted to 20-minutes. 
The results of Study One suggest that written, unstructured note-taking during 
the passive observation of a patient followed by access to the DSM-5 did not improve 





accurate and faster at diagnosing if they had had access to the DSM-5 during the 
observation. This limitation is addressed in subsequent studies.   
Study One aimed to simulate scenarios that were similar to the natural context 
of an initial child behavioural consultation in a primary care setting. Part of this 
strategy involved ensuring that participants in the DSM-5 group focused on writing 
the behaviours that they observed throughout the videos to determine how they would 
use an unstructured set of notes in combination with the DSM-5. This approach was 
compared with the more structured note-taking mechanism of the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ that recorded diagnostic features and feature-values of perceived relevance 
This mechanism enabled participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to select 
and record features and feature-values from the DSM-5 by pushing two buttons. 
Therefore, participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group had a structured set of 
notes containing clinically relevant terminology and behaviours, as opposed to an 
unstructured set of hand-written anecdotal behaviours.  
Finally, the present study failed to control for the interactive mechanism of the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ that enabled participants to categorise symptoms through 
the recording of selected features and feature-values. The ‘feature-focused’ 
arrangement of information was a necessary prerequisite for this design mechanism.  
Further research is needed to determine the role of the recording mechanism of the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ in improving diagnosis. Studies Three and Four tested the 
impact of the mechanism to record uncategorised symptoms (features only) and 
categorised symptoms (features and feature-values) on diagnosis.  
In conclusion, the results suggest that restricted preconfigured content alone 
was not sufficient to improve diagnostic accuracy or efficiency compared to the 
DSM-5. Restricted preconfigured content that facilitates the simultaneous comparison 





efficiency in the absence of theoretical knowledge and clinical experience. A decision 
support system that utilises ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ design principles to 
reduce processing demands may be useful in assisting naïve diagnosticians to rapidly 
identify and categorise diagnostic features from the passive observation of patients 
with neurodevelopmental disorders. 
  Further studies are intended to determine whether a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
diagnostic-aid is sufficient in improving decision-making or whether this format 
serves only as a necessary prerequisite for a mechanism that enables users to record 
features and feature-values of perceived relevance to diagnostic scenarios. Prior to a 
more detailed examination of the mechanisms of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ that 
was used in the present study, Study Two compared the effects of the DSM-5 and 
‘Categorisation Interface’ on diagnostic accuracy and efficiency amongst presumed 







Chapter 6: Testing a DSS without a predictive-mechanism in a simulated clinical 
setting with novice psychologists   
A ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ Decision Support System that facilitates 
practitioners to match task relevant features to disorder categories during information 
acquisition may be useful in reducing errors that can occur in the early steps of the 
clinical reasoning process (such as failure to identify and/or misattribute critical 
features) amongst competent non-experts (Groves et al. 2003). A DSS with the same 
mechanism may also be useful in assisting ‘novice’ practitioners to synthesise and 
apply theoretical knowledge to produce more accurate diagnostic outcomes. The aim 
of Study Two was to examine whether a ‘feature-focused’ DSS, which facilitates 
users to match a preconfigured set of task-relevant features to potential diagnostic 
categories during information acquisition, could improve the diagnostic outcomes of 
‘novice’ psychologists. 
 
Study Two  
Study Two tested the effectiveness of the DSM-5 and the ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ diagnostic-aid used in Study One (referred to as the ‘Categorisation Interface’) 
to improve the response accuracy and latency of novice diagnosticians across two 
diagnostic scenarios. The present study used two of the same diagnostic-aids and the 
same diagnostic scenarios (ASD and ADHD) from Study One to compare their 
effectiveness amongst novice diagnosticians who had received some training in 
psychological disorders. The participants of Study Two were presumed to be novice 
diagnosticians in the domain of psychological disorders relative to undergraduate 
students (and the general population) who were presumed to be naïve in the domain of 
psychological disorders.  
The DSM-5 is the most widely used standardised mental-health diagnostic system 





features and supporting information for all psychological disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The DSM-5 facilitates users to consider multiple 
symptoms in the context of a single disorder category (‘disorder-focused’).  
The ‘Categorisation Interface’ that was purpose built for Study One was a 
diagnostic-aid that employs two reduced-processing design principles that were 
adapted from interfaces from Perry et al. (2012; 2013), which: (a) Contained a restricted 
set of 16 diagnostic features (relative to the DSM-5) that were preconfigured by two 
clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders, and (b) facilitated the 
simultaneous comparison of feature-values across decision options (Morrison et al. 
2010; Mosier & Skitka, 1996; Wickens & McCarley, 2008). The ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ facilitates users to consider a single symptom in the context of multiple 
disorder categories (‘feature-focused’). 
The results from Study One suggested that a decision support system (DSS) that 
utilised ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ design principles to reduce processing 
demands may have been useful in assisting naïve diagnosticians to rapidly identify 
and categorise diagnostic features from the passive observation of two diagnostic 
scenarios. The aim of Study Two was to test whether the same ‘preconfigured, 
feature-focused’ DSS was more effective than the DSM-5 in assisting novice 
diagnosticians to select the optimal outcome across two scenarios in the context of 
diagnosing neurodevelopmental disorders.  
The mean age of participants in Study One was 19 years old and the majority of 
participants were at the beginning of their tertiary education studies. The participants 
were presumed to have minimal or no knowledge or experience of the standardised 
diagnostic criteria of psychological disorders, general evidenced-based psychology 
principles, nor the hypothetico-deductive method, and were therefore considered 





The mean age of participants in Study Two was 28 years old and participants 
were selected from postgraduate Master of Psychology programs. The participants of 
Study Two were were presumed to have more developed schemas in psychology, and 
a greater understanding of the hypothetico-deductive method in comparison to both the 
participants of Study One and the general population. However, the participants in 
Study Two lacked clinical exposure and experience and were therefore, considered 
“novices” in the diagnosis of psychological disorders.  
The primary aim of Study Two was to compare the effectiveness of a 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid with the effectiveness of the DSM-5 
(‘full content, disorder-focused’) to diagnose two neurodevelopmental disorders, 
amongst a novice population (Master of Psychology students) with more sophisticated 
illness scripts relative to the undergraduates used in Study One (naïve population). 
Response accuracy and latency were measured and compared amongst novice 
diagnosticians who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and the DSM-5 to diagnose two 
patients with different neurodevelopmental disorders (ASD, ADHD). The following 
hypotheses were formulated:  
 
1. Participants who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid 
(‘Categorisation Interface’ group) would achieve a greater accuracy score 
(diagnose both ASD and ADHD correctly) compared to participants who used 
a ‘full content, disorder-focused’ diagnostic-aid (DSM-5 group).  
2.  
a. Participants who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface 
(‘Categorisation Interface’ group) would be faster at diagnosing ASD 
and ADHD than participants who used a ‘full content, disorder-





b. Participants who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface 
(‘Categorisation Interface’ group) would be faster to record a 
diagnosis (correct or incorrect) in the ASD and ADHD scenarios than 
participants who used a ‘full content, disorder-focused’ diagnostic-aid 
(DSM-5 group). 
 
A secondary aim of Study Two was to collect descriptive data to examine how 
novice diagnosticians used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ during the task. This was done 
by recording the features and corresponding feature-values selected by participants who 









This research complied with the American Psychological Association Code of 
Ethics and was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Macquarie University. 
Informed consent was obtained from each participant. The participants consisted of 
22 postgraduate psychology students (18 female, 4 male) who participated in the 
study as part of an in-class professional development exercise. They ranged in age 
from 22 to 55 years, with a mean age of 28 (SD = 9.03). Postgraduates were enrolled 
in a master’s degree of Psychology at Macquarie University in Sydney Australia. Data 
were collected in a classroom on the Macquarie University campus.  
 
Design 
The experiment comprised a one-way between-subjects design with diagnostic-
aid (DSM-5 and ‘Categorisation Interface’) as the between-subjects factor. The 




Visual Stimuli: The two filmed clinical scenarios that were used in Study One and 
Study two were employed to examine the effectiveness of the diagnostic-aids in Study 
Three. One of the scenarios was a three-year-old boy who had been diagnosed with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) by a team of expert clinical psychologists. The other 
scenario was a seven-year-old boy who had received a diagnosis of Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) by a team of expert clinical psychologists. Refer to 





was played on a desktop computer and participants listened to the audio through 
headphones.  
Diagnostic Options List: Participants were provided with a list of 11 diagnostic 
options26 at the start of the experiment that included typical development, ASD, ADHD, 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Intellectual Developmental Disorder (IDD), 
and six possible co-morbid presentations of these four disorders.  
 
Diagnostic-aids 
Categorisation Interface: The ‘Categorisation Interface’ that was used in Study 
One was also employed in Study Two. The tablet-based, ‘Categorisation Interface’ was 
a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid with a mechanism that recorded 
categorised features of perceived relevance (refer to Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The colour of 
a selected feature in the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was dependent 
on the feature-value selected27. The colour-coded mechanism of the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ removed the requirement to hold and process features and corresponding 
feature-values of perceived relevance to the patient in working memory (refer to Figure 
6.2).  
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-
5): The DSM-5 (a paper-based full content, ‘disorder-focused’ manual) was used in 
Study Two. The DSM-5 contained the full set of diagnostic criteria with supporting 
information for every psychological disorder (full content) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). The DSM-5 had the highest volume of data compared to 
‘Categorisation Interface’. Participants presumably had the added step of determining 
                                               
 
26 Typical development; ASD; OCD; IDD; ADHD; ASD and OCD; ASD and IDD; ASD and 
ADHD; OCD and IDD; OCD and ADHD; IDD and ADHD  





high value data (data that was useful for an initial child behavioural assessment by a 
General Practitioner) from low value data. The manual is arranged so that each disorder 
has its own chapter and therefore, users have access to all of the features pertaining to 
a single disorder at one time across one or multiple pages (‘disorder-focused’) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
The DSM-5 has no mechanism to record categorised or uncategorised symptoms 
of perceived relevance to the patient (i.e. features or feature-values of perceived 
relevance). The DSM-5 does not facilitate the simultaneous comparison of feature-
values. The manual facilitates the acquisition of multiple symptoms (features) 
associated with a single disorder (‘disorder-focused’) as opposed to the simultaneous 
comparison of different manifestations of a single symptom across multiple disorders 
(‘feature-focused’) (refer to Tables 6.1 and 6.2).  Participants who used the DSM-5 
were provided with a paper and pencil so that they could manually record and categorise 
clinically-relevant features from the manual (and/or anecdotal behaviours) that they 
associated with the patient. Participants were required to hold and process diagnostic 
features of perceived relevance that they had not written in their observation notes.  
Table 6.1: Definitions of the properties (content type and arrangement) of the 
diagnostic-aids used in Study Two 
 
Content type Arrangement of content 
‘Full content’ 
 
Full and comprehensive set of diagnostic 
features and supporting information for each 
disorder (full content). 
‘Disorder-focused’ 
 
Facilitated the processing of multiple symptoms 
(features) in the context of a single disorder  
‘Preconfigured content’ 
 
Reduced set of diagnostic features 
preconfigured by two clinicians who specialise 
in neurodevelopmental disorders 
‘Feature-focused’ 
 
Facilitated the processing of a single symptom (feature) 





Table 6.2: The properties of the diagnostic-aids used in Study Two 
 
Procedure  
Study Two followed a procedure similar to Study One with four key differences. 
Participants completed the experiment as an in-class exercise that was part of the 
clinical component of one of the Master’s Degrees at the university. At the beginning 
of the class, participants signed a consent form if they agreed to conduct the exercise 
as part of an experiment and have their responses collected and analysed. One student 
elected not to participate in the experiment and completed the procedure as a learning 
exercise.  
All of the participants observed and diagnosed the ASD and ADHD scenarios using 
their randomly assigned diagnostic-aid. The first key procedural difference of Study 
Two was that there were only two diagnostic-aid groups: The DSM-5 and 
‘Categorisation Interface’ groups. The DSM-5 (n = 10) and ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
(n = 12) were randomly assigned to participants. The ‘Content Control’ diagnostic-aid 
was not used in Study Two as there were no significant differences between the 
‘Content Control’ and DSM-5 groups in Study One. 
Participants in the DSM-5 and ‘Categorisation Interface’ groups sat on opposite 
sides of the classroom. There was at least one desk between each participant and task 
instructions were given to each group separately before the commencement of the first 
diagnostic scenario.  
Diagnostic-aid 
 
Content type Arrangement of content Interactive recording 
mechanism 
DSM-5 Full content Disorder-focused None 
Categorisation Interface Preconfigured content Feature-focused Selected features and feature-





The second key procedural difference for Study Two was that participants in the 
DSM-5 group were given a copy of the DSM-5 to refer to throughout the footage. 
Participants in the DSM-5 group received a copy of the DSM-5, a pen, and refill paper 
before the videos commenced and were advised to take notes throughout the videos as 
if they were a clinician observing a patient, as is common procedure in an initial 
consultation with a primary healthcare clinician for a child with a suspected 
psychological disorder (Dr. Anne-Marie Cullen (GP), personal communication, March 
3 2014, April 10 2016). Participants in the DSM-5 group were advised to refer to the 
DSM-5 throughout the video, in addition to writing notes. Furthermore, if they did not 
think any (or too few) diagnostic features were applicable to the patients, they may be 
typically developing children. 
Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were advised that each of the 
disorders for which a diagnosis might be considered had a column in the first segment 
and were associated with a particular colour and symbol. They were informed that the 
four features in each of the four columns were features that were commonly associated 
with that disorder. However, if a feature was present in other disorder(s) it would 
contain the symbol(s) of the relevant disorder(s). Participants were advised to consider 
the 16 features in the first segment (refer to Figure 6.1), the symbols on each of the 
features, and the descriptions of the feature-values in the second segment (refer to 
Figure 6.2) to determine whether any were relevant to the patient. 
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were advised to select features 
of perceived relevance to the patient if the observed behaviour of the patient matched 
one of the descriptions (feature-values) in the second segment of the interface (refer to 
Figure 6.2). Participants categorised features by comparing the different manifestations 
of a feature (feature-values) of perceived relevance to a patient across one or more 





patient (refer to Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3). The colour-coding mechanism of the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ recorded the selected feature-value by highlighting the 
feature in the first segment with the colour associated with the disorder28. Participants 
were shown that they could deselect any feature that they had highlighted or change the 
categorisation of a feature by selecting a different feature-value in the second segment. 
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were recommended to allow the 
colour configuration of their interface (i.e. their selected feature-values) guide their 
diagnosis.  
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were advised that a 
predominantly white grid (specifically 0, 1, or 2 features highlighted) may suggest that 
they did not think any (or too few) diagnostic features were applicable to the patient, in 
which case the patient may be a typically developing child. If another colour were 
prominent, for example green, it would indicate a preponderance of IDD 
symptomatology. If two colours were prominent, for example green and blue, this 
would suggest a co-morbid presentation of IDD and ASD symptomatology 
 
 
                                               
 







Figure 6.1. Screenshot of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’. 
 
 







   
 
Figure 6.3. Screenshots of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
following the selection of the OCD (purple), IDD (green), and ASD (blue) values for 
‘repetitive behaviours’29  
 
The third key procedural difference of Study Two was that participants were given 
10 minutes to formulate a diagnosis, due to the time constraints of the class. The median 
times to make correct ASD and ADHD diagnoses for naïve diagnosticians in Study One 
were under 10 minutes across all groups. Therefore, 10 minutes was selected as the 
time limit for both diagnostic scenarios in Study Two as it was deemed unlikely to place 
too much pressure on the participants to sacrifice accuracy for speed (based on the 
median times from Study One). All of the participants were informed that they would 
have up to 10 minutes to select a single diagnosis from the list of 11 options at the 
conclusion of each video.  
The fourth key procedural difference in Study Two was that participants observed 
the footage of the diagnostic scenarios together in a single room at the same time. The 
scenarios were projected on a large screen at the front of the classroom. The ASD case 
study was selected as the first video and the footage ran for 20 minutes. Answer sheets 
listing the 11 diagnostic alternatives were handed to participants at the conclusion of 
the first video. Two experimenters (one for each diagnostic-aid group) commenced 
                                               
 
29 The intention of Figure 6.3 is to demonstrate colour-coding mechanism, each screenshot 





timing together once every participant had received an answer sheet. Participants raised 
their hand as soon as they had selected a diagnosis and the experimenters recorded the 
time taken for each participant. The answer sheets and written notes (if relevant) were 
collected when the last participant from a diagnostic-aid group notified the assigned 
experimenter that they had formulated a diagnosis. This procedure was repeated for the 







The dependent variables comprised response accuracy and response latency for 
two patient case scenarios. The diagnostic-aid used for the task was the between-
subjects factor.  
Level of response accuracy: Participants’ scores ranged between zero to two, 
depending upon the number of disorders that they diagnosed correctly. A Mann-
Whitney U test was undertaken to determine whether there were differences in level of 
accuracy between the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and the DSM-5 groups. Accuracy was 
recorded on a scale from 0 to 2. The distributions of accuracy scores were not 
consistent, and therefore, the mean ranks, rather than medians, are reported. Accuracy 
scores for the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group (mean rank = 14.92) were statistically 
significantly higher in comparison to the DSM-5 group (mean rank = 7.40), U = 19, p 
= .006.   
 
Figure 6.4. Proportion of participants in each diagnostic-aid group who scored 0, 
1, or 2 depending on the number of correct diagnoses made (Study Two). 
 
ASD and ADHD Diagnoses: Participants selected a diagnosis from a list of 11 



































accurate diagnosis. To establish whether differences in accuracy were associated with 
specific conditions, the relationship between a correct diagnosis for ASD and ADHD 
and diagnostic-aid group was examined separately using chi-square tests of 
independence. The expected cell frequencies for two groups were less than 5 and 
therefore, Fisher’s exact values are reported. The frequency of correct responses for the 
ASD and ADHD scenarios for each diagnostic-aid group are presented in Table 6.3. 
  
Table 6.3: The proportion (%) of correct responses for the ASD and ADHD 
scenarios for each diagnostic-aid group in Study Two 
 
 









Categorisation Interface 100 83 12 
DSM-5  50 50 10 
 
ASD 
The results revealed a statistically significant association between response 
accuracy for ASD and diagnostic-aid group, c2 = 7.765, N = 22, p = .010. Based on 
(Cohen, 1988), Cramer’s V = .594, the relationship can be considered ‘strong’. This 
result suggests that participants were most likely to accurately diagnose ASD if they 
were using the ‘Categorisation Interface’. 
ADHD 
Although twice the number of participants in the CI group made an accurate 





there was no statistically significant association between response accuracy for ADHD 
and diagnostic-aid group, c2 = 2.794, N = 22, p = .172, Cramer’s V = .356.  
 
Response latency for ASD: Parametric analyses could not be conducted on 
response latency data as they were not normally distributed. A Mann-Whitney U test 
was conducted to determine whether there were differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ASD between diagnostic-aid groups. Only the response latencies for 
correct ASD diagnoses were examined. Both the median times and mean ranks are 
reported. Visual inspection of a boxplot indicated that the distributions of response 
latencies for ASD (minutes) were not consistent across groups. As a result, the mean 
ranks, rather than median times, were analysed. Participants in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group (mean rank = 7.17) were not significantly faster in diagnosing ASD 
than participants in the DSM-5 group under time constraints (mean rank = 12.50), U = 
40, p = .058, using an exact sampling distribution for U (Dineen & Blakesley, 1973). 
Response latency for ADHD: Parametric analyses could not be conducted on 
response latency data as they were not normally distributed. A Mann-Whitney U test 
was conducted to determine whether there were differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ADHD between diagnostic-aid groups. Only the response latencies for 
correct ADHD diagnoses were examined. Both the median times and mean ranks are 
reported. Visual inspection of a boxplot indicated that the distributions of response 
latencies for ADHD (minutes) were not consistent across groups. As a result, the 
mean ranks, rather than median times, were analysed. Participants in the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group (mean rank = 7.05) were not significantly faster in 
diagnosing ADHD than participants in the DSM-5 group under time constraints 
(mean rank = 9.90), U = 34.50, p = .254, using an exact sampling distribution for U 






Table 6.4: The time taken (minutes) for participants to diagnose ASD and ADHD 
correctly in each diagnostic-aid group in Study Two 









Categorisation Interface 0.25 12 0.25 10 
DSM-5 5.09 4 0.46 5 
 
 
The results for response latency for correct diagnoses suggest that the two 
diagnostic-aid groups did not differ significantly in the amount of time taken to 
diagnose ASD or ADHD under time constraints.  
Further analyses were conducted to compare the total amount of time participants 
in each diagnostic-aid group took to record a diagnosis (correct or incorrect) during 
the ASD and ADHD scenarios (refer to Table 6.5). A Mann-Whitney U test was run 
to determine if there were differences in the time spent deliberating a diagnosis in the 
ASD scenario between diagnostic-aid groups. Distributions of the time taken to 
record a diagnosis in the ASD scenario were not similar, as assessed by visual 
inspection, and therefore the mean ranks instead of the medians, are reported. 
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group (mean rank = 7.92) were 
significantly faster in recording a diagnosis (correct or incorrect) in the ASD scenario 
compared to participants in the DSM-5 group (mean rank = 15.80), U = 103, p = .003, 
using an exact sampling distribution for U (Dineen & Blakesley, 1973). 
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were differences in the 





diagnostic-aid groups. Distributions of the time taken to record a diagnosis for the 
ADHD scenarios were not similar, as assessed by visual inspection, and therefore the 
mean ranks instead of the medians, are reported. Participants in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group (mean rank = 9.75) were not significantly faster in recording a 
diagnosis (correct or incorrect) in the ADHD scenario compared to participants in the 
DSM-5 group (mean rank = 13.60), U = 81, p = .180, using an exact sampling 
distribution for U (Dineen & Blakesley, 1973). 
 
Table 6.5: The time taken (minutes) for participants to record a diagnosis 
(correct or incorrect) for the ASD and ADHD scenario in each diagnostic-aid group 
in Study Two 
Diagnostic-aid 
group 
Median time to record a 





Median time to record a 







0.25 12 0.25 12 
DSM-5 5.16 10 1.15 10 
 
The combined results for accuracy and the total amount of time taken by 
participants in each diagnostic-aid group to record a diagnosis (correct or incorrect) 
during the ASD scenario suggest that, although participants in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group spent significantly less time formulating a diagnosis during the ASD 






Selection of features and feature-values (‘Categorisation Interface’ group): 
Descriptive data was collected to examine how participants used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’. The symptoms (features) and corresponding feature-values (refer to Figures 
6.1 and 6.2) that participants selected were recorded to examine how participants 
categorised symptoms of perceived relevance for nine symptoms that belonged to 
multiple disorder categories. Feature-values (contained in the second segment of the 
interface) had to be selected in order for a feature (contained in the first segment of the 
interface) to be highlighted. The colour of a selected feature in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ was dependent on the feature-value selected30 (refer to Figure 6.3). 
Therefore, the ‘Categorisation Interface’ recorded categorised features only.  
Twelve participants used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to diagnose both the ASD 
and ADHD patients. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 contain the descriptive data on the frequency 
of feature-values selected by participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to 
diagnose (n = 12).  
  
                                               
 





 Table 6.6: The proportion (total count) of the selection of feature-values by 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to diagnose ASD (n =12) in Study 





Feature-value of ASD 
selected 
 
Feature-value of an 
alternate disorder 
(not ASD) selected 
 
 
Feature not selected  
 
 
Displays perfectionist traits  10 0 2 
Repetitive behaviours 10 0 2 
Inattention 9 0 3 
Deficits in developing, maintaining, 







Deficits in adaptive functioning 6 1 5 
Significant levels of anxiety and 
distress 
5 0 7 
Language delays 4 1 7 
Deficits in regulating emotion and 
behaviour 
3 0 9 
Deficits in or advanced non-verbal 
communication/ perceptual skills 
3 0 9 
 
The descriptive data in Table 6.6 suggest participants selected the ASD feature-
value more frequently than the alternate (non-ASD) feature-value(s) for features of 
perceived relevance to the ASD scenario (a total of 59 times). Feature-values from 
alternate disorder categories (not ASD) were rarely selected for the nine features 






 Table 6.7: The proportion (total count) of the selection of feature-values by 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to diagnose ADHD (n =12) in 
Study Two, from the most frequently selected feature (top) to the least frequently 












Feature not selected  
 
 








Inattention 11 0 1 
Deficits in developing, maintaining, 







Deficits in adaptive functioning 8 0 4 
Deficits in or advanced non-verbal 







Language delays 4 0 8 
Significant levels of anxiety and 
distress 
 





Repetitive behaviours NA 1 11 
Displays perfectionist traits  NA 0 12 
 
The descriptive data in Table 6.7 suggest participants selected the ADHD feature-
value more frequently than the alternate (non-ADHD) feature-value(s) for features of 
perceived relevance to the ADHD scenario (a total of 48 times), if applicable. 
Feature-values from alternate disorder categories (not ADHD) were seldom selected 







Study Two tested the effectiveness of a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
diagnostic-aid with the effectiveness of the DSM-5 (‘full content, disorder-focused’) to 
diagnose two neurodevelopmental disorders in a simulated context, amongst a novice 
population with more sophisticated illness scripts compared to the naïve population of 
Study One. The DSM-5 is the most widely used standardised mental-health diagnostic 
system and manual in Australasia (the DSM-5). Response accuracy and response 
latency for a correct diagnosis (under time constraints) were measured and compared 
amongst novice diagnosticians who were randomly assigned to one of two diagnostic-
aid groups (‘Categorisation Interface’, DSM-5) to diagnose two children with different 
neurodevelopmental disorders (ASD, ADHD).  
The participants in Study Two were considered to be novices in the context of 
neurodevelopmental disorders (including ASD and ADHD) as they possessed some 
theoretical knowledge of psychological disorders and had experience using the DSM-
5. Therefore, they were presumed to have more developed feature-event associations 
in this domain. This enabled the researchers to compare the effects of a diagnostic-aid 
that employed two reduced-processing principles (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) 
with the DSM-5 amongst a population where some standardised theoretical learning 
had occurred. 
The results provided partial support for Hypothesis 1. Participants in the 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid group (‘Categorisation Interface’) 
achieved a greater response accuracy score compared to participants who used a ‘full 
content, disorder-focused’ diagnostic-aid (DSM-5) (refer to Figure 6.4). Further 
analyses revealed that participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were 





group. There were no group differences in the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD (refer 
to Table 6.3).  
Study One demonstrated that a ‘feature-focused’ interface that was 
preconfigured by clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders and 
restricted access to task-specific features, may have the potential to improve the 
diagnostic accuracy scores and likelihood of diagnosing ASD relative to the DSM-5, 
amongst a naïve undergraduate population. Study Two extended the response 
accuracy results of Study One to a novice population. 
Hypothesis 2a was not supported. Participants who used a ‘preconfigured, 
feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid (‘Categorisation Interface’) were not faster in 
correctly diagnosing ASD or ADHD in comparison to participants in the DSM-5 
(‘full content, disorder-focused’) group (refer to Table 6.4). There was partial support 
for Hypothesis 2b as participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group took 
significantly less time to record a diagnosis (correct or incorrect) for the ASD 
scenario compared to participants in the DSM-5 group (refer to Table 6.5). However, 
participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group did not take significantly less time 
to record a diagnosis (correct or incorrect) for the ADHD scenario compared to 
participants in the DSM-5 group.  
The combined results for accuracy and the total amount of time taken by 
participants in each diagnostic-aid group to record a diagnosis (correct or incorrect) 
during the ASD scenario suggest that, even though participants in the DSM-5 group 
allocated significantly more time to formulating a diagnosis in the ASD scenario, they 
were not able to attain the same level of diagnostic accuracy as participants in the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group. These results suggest that mechanisms associated 





process critical clinical information more accurately and efficiently compared with 
the physical manual of the DSM-5. 
Participants in Study Two had access to the DSM-5 from the beginning of the 
task through to the end. This addressed one of the methodological limitations of Study 
One where participants received the DSM-5 at the end of each observation. Consistent 
with the diagnostic accuracy results of naïve diagnosticians in Study One, the overall 
diagnostic accuracy of presumed novice psychologists who used the DSM-5 remained 
significantly lower than participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ in Study 
Two.  
In summary, presumed novice psychologists who had access to the DSM-5 during 
the patient observations were significantly less accurate than participants’ who used the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group (lower accuracy scores and likelihood of diagnosing 
ASD). The DSM-5 group took longer to record a diagnosis in the ASD scenario (but 
not the ADHD scenario). However, in contrast to the naïve diagnosticians in Study One, 
novice diagnosticians in the DSM-5 group who made an accurate ASD diagnosis were 
not slower in formulating a final diagnosis in comparison to participants in the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group. It is possible that participants in the DSM-5 group 
who made an accurate ASD diagnosis possessed more knowledge pertaining to ASD 
compared participants in the DSM-5 group who made an inaccurate ASD diagnosis, 
and therefore were faster to record a response.  
The descriptive data in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 suggest participants who used the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ compiled a set of feature-event (symptom-disorder) 
associations that were relevant to the diagnostic category of the patient in both the ASD 
and ADHD scenarios. Participants rarely selected a feature-value that was not 
associated with the disorder category of the patient (refer to Tables 6.6 and 6.7).  The 





ASD and ADHD without co-morbid features of another psychological disorder. 
However, further testing is required to determine which features and corresponding 
feature-values should have been selected, based on the footage of the patient. 
 Domain experts have demonstrated a superior capacity to more effectively and 
efficiently acquire and categorise a reduced set of task critical features, and spend less 
time evaluating informational resources compared to non-experts (Elstein & Schwarz, 
2002; Groves et al. 2003; Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b; Norman et al. 
1989; Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006; Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). Genuine experts are 
theorised to be able to reliably engage in pattern recognition a lot of the time without a 
necessary concurrent loss in accuracy, due to the possession of complex domain-related 
schemas in long-term memory (Groves et al. 2003; Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et 
al. 2013b; Norman et al. 1989). It is possible that the ‘Categorisation Interface’ may 
facilitate clinical reasoning amongst naïve and novice diagnosticians by providing a 
reduced set of preconfigured features with an external mechanism to categorise and 
record features of perceived relevance, thereby removing the requirement to hold this 
information in working memory, thereby reducing information processing demands. 
Further research should examine the mechanism of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ that 
lets users simultaneously categorise and record features of perceived relevance to the 
scenario.  
Limitations 
The primary limitations of Study One remained in Study Two. There were a 
greater number of ASD symbols in the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
compared to the other three disorders (OCD, IDD, ADHD). The number of symbols 
needs to be controlled for in order to determine whether this display mechanism 
influences decision-making. Moreover, it remains unclear which properties of the 





diagnosticians. The ‘feature-focused’ arrangement of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
was a necessary design precursor for the mechanism that simultaneously categorised 
and recorded features of perceived relevance. It is yet to be determined whether a 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface without the mechanism to record 
categorised symptoms of perceived relevance can improve diagnostic accuracy, as 
this mechanism was not controlled for in Studies One or Two. This mechanism 
reduced the number of items that participants were required to retain in working 
memory relative to the DSM-5 group, which may have assisted accuracy. Studies 
Three and Four tested the effects of ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aids 
to record categorised symptoms (features and corresponding feature-values) and 
uncategorised symptoms (features only).  
Conclusion 
The results from Study Two suggest that novice diagnosticians who used a 
diagnostic-aid with a preconfigured set of reduced features that were arranged in a 
‘feature-focused’ display were more likely to make two correct diagnoses and 
increase the likelihood of diagnosing ASD compared to novice diagnosticians who 
used the DSM-5. It is yet to be determined whether a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
diagnostic-aid would remain effective in facilitating diagnostic accuracy without the 
mechanism to record categorised symptoms (features and corresponding feature-








Chapter 7: Examining the impact of removing the requirement to categorise and 
retain critical features in working memory during clinical reasoning 
 
Information acquisition, decision-making, and action execution are the three 
theoretical stages that constitute information processing (Wickens & Carswell, 2006). 
An individual acquires and processes informational input, formulates an appropriate 
response, and executes the corresponding action (Rasmussen, 1983; Wickens & 
Carswell, 2006). The experience and knowledge of the individual in the related 
domain, and the difficulty of the task itself, influence this process (Ericsson, 2004; 
Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006). Decision-making under conditions of uncertainty is a 
critical cognitive skill, especially in dynamic and time-constrained domains that 
require a high degree of accuracy, such as medicine, aviation, firefighting, and 
financial trading (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Morrison et al. 2010; Perry et al. 
2012; Pinnock & Welch, 2014). 
Dual process theory (DPT) is the dominant theoretical account of human 
reasoning (Crosskerry, 2009; Crosskerry, Petrie, Reilly & Tait, 2014; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Loveday et al. 2013b; Pinnock & Welch, 2014; 
Sloman, 1996). The DPT outlines two qualitatively distinct types of reasoning: Type 
1 and Type 2 (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  Previously, good decisions were 
considered to be the result of slow and deliberative Type 2 processes (Ericsson, 2004; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Type 1 processes were 
perceived to be largely irrational and biased and therefore, to be avoided when 
engaging in complex decision-making tasks (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Furthermore, since Type 1 reasoning reduces 
decision time considerably, it was assumed that a concurrent reduction in decision 






Dual Process Theory does not champion one mode of reasoning over the other. 
Rather, it is based on the assumption that there are benefits and difficulties associated 
with each and that both types work to complement one another (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Kahneman, 2011). Type 1 and Type 2 processes are theorised to be used in 
combination to assist individuals to process and structure transient information in a 
meaningful way. Transient information gets relayed to conceptual structures of 
organised knowledge stored in long-term memory (schemas), which are made up of 
associated references between environmental features and events (Sweller, 2003; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Individuals are theorised to acquire and process a 
limited amount of transient information in working memory and link it with schemas 
in long term memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2011; Sweller, 2003). There are circumstances under which individuals 
can rely on Type 1 processes, and instances where it is best to allow Type 2 to 
intervene (Crosskerry et al. 2014; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996; 2002) demonstrate that Type 1 processes, such 
as satisficing and the recognition heuristic, can decrease decision-time and cognitive 
load without a concurrent reduction in accuracy. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) 
constructed and compared the effectiveness and efficiency of computer-simulated 
algorithms that represented Type 2 and Type 1 reasoning. The satisficing algorithm 
reflected a commonly used Type 1 strategy where an individual seeks to sufficiently 
satisfy decision criteria rather than optimize a response, particularly under conditions 
of limited time, knowledge, and processing capacity (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Prabha, Connaway, Olszewski & Jenkins, 2007).  
The algorithms were compared as to how quickly and accurately they could 
make inferences about 83 German cities with populations greater than 100,000. The 





associated validity that was indicative of its predictive power (i.e. its ecological 
validity). For example, the ecological cue ‘soccer team present in the German football 
league’ had an associated validity of .87. The algorithm predicted with 87% accuracy 
that unknown City X contained a larger population than unknown City Y based solely 
on the cue that City X had a team in the soccer league whereas City Y did not 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).  
The results revealed that the Type 1 satisficing algorithm was faster than the 
Type 2 algorithm and, more importantly, was just as accurate in making inferences 
about the real-world environment (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). The authors 
concluded that if one of two objects is recognised and the other is not, then one can 
reliably infer that the recognised object has a higher value with respect to the criterion 
as a valuable heuristic strategy (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).  
A second study by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2002) further examined the value 
of recognition as a reliable heuristic. Fifty-two US undergraduates from the 
University of Chicago took two tests, one of which examined knowledge on 22 of the 
largest cities in the US and the other examined knowledge on 22 of Germany’s largest 
cities. Participants were asked to infer which of the two cities was the largest. There 
were 100 city pairs for both tests. The students performed with a median accuracy of 
70% and 73% on the US and German cities tests, respectively (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 2002). Despite the fact that the students possessed more declarative 
knowledge pertaining to cities in their own country (they were relative “experts” in 
US city criterion identification), and a lack of comparable declarative knowledge 
regarding German cities (i.e.  “novices” in German city criterion identification), they 






Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2002) concluded that the students were able to 
employ the satisficing recognition heuristic for the German cities test, due to their 
comparative lack of definitive knowledge on German versus cities in the United 
States (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2002). It was assumed that the students’ declarative 
knowledge on US cities prevented them from initiating the ‘fast and frugal’ 
recognition heuristic, which they had been able to employ during the German cities 
test (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2002). Consequently, they achieved a lower 
performance on the US test. 
The default-interventionist model of the Dual Process Theory (DPT) proposes 
that human reasoning defaults to “fast and frugal” Type 1 processes that are less 
reliant on limited-capacity working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 
2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Miller, 1956; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; 
Wickens & Carswell, 2006). Type 1 processes (commonly referred to as ‘intuitive’) 
are rapid and automatic and include heuristic processes (mental shortcuts), biases, and 
pattern recognition (Crosskerry et al. 2014; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Mattson, 2014). Furthermore, Type 1 processes do 
not require individuals to actively monitor which information they will attend to and 
which information they will ignore (controlled attention) and are referred to as the 
‘default’ processes of reasoning because humans are considered to be cognitive 
misers with a preference for the path of least resistance when expending cognitive 
effort (De Neys et al. 2013; Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; 
Kane, Bleckley, Conway & Engle 2001).  
When decisions are difficult, novel, and/or motivation is high, then slow and 
deliberative Type 2 processes override Type 1 processes, and the individual begins to 
monitor which information they will attend to and which information they will ignore 





Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Sweller, 2003). Type 2 
processes (commonly referred to as ‘analytical’) are associated with measures of 
working memory capacity, conscious control, and deductive reasoning (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011).  
 ‘Experts’ in a domain are theorised to possess sophisticated domain-related 
schemas that have been acquired over time through deliberate practice (Ericsson, 2004; 
Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Johnson et al. 2014). Deliberate 
practice involves extensive task repetition that is accompanied by timely and accurate 
feedback on task performance (Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Expert 
problem solving in a complex domain, such as medicine, is aided by the acquisition of 
tens of thousands of complex domain-specific schemas (Sweller, 2003). Complex 
schemas allow experts to more reliably engage in rapid Type 1 processes, such as 
pattern recognition in clinical diagnosis (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011; Mattson, 2014; Sweller, 2003).  
Clinical diagnosis is primarily a categoristion task whereby clinicians engage in 
the extraction and association of transient information in working memory with 
domain-specific schemas to varying levels of expertise (Brooks et al. 1991; Charlin et 
al. 2000; Custers, 2015). Schemas are commonly referred to as ‘illness scripts’ in the 
medical education literature (Custers, 2015; Keemink, Custers, van Dijk, ten Cate, 
2018). Illness scripts assist clinicians in interpreting and predicting new information 
(Croskerry, 2009; Custers, 2015; Keemink et al. 2018). 
Expert clinicians possess ‘rich and mature’ illness scripts that are the product of 
comprehensive theoretical knowledge and extensive practical experience (Keemink et 
al. 2018). Illness scripts that are considered ‘rich’ consist of elaborate mental 
representations of the symptoms, pathophysiological mechanisms, and patient and 





Lubarsky et al. 2015). An illness script is considered ‘mature’ if it can be activated in 
the appropriate contexts (Keemink et al. 2018). Rich and mature illness scripts enable 
expert clinicians to effectively and efficiently infer a probable diagnosis with the 
provision of minimal information (Hobus, Schmidt, Boshuizen, Patel, 1987; Keemink 
et al. 2018). Therefore, illness scripts that are rich and mature enable clinicians to 
reliably utilise Type 1 processes, such as heuristics and pattern recognition, much of 
the tine (Kahneman, 2011; Keemink et al. 2018; Mattson, 2014). 
It is generally to be expected that expert diagnosticians will rely heavily on Type 
1 processes when formulating a diagnosis due to operational constraints, such as time 
pressure (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). This is due to the fact that, as the 
complexity of a situation increases, the demand on working memory (cognitive 
demand) also increases (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Blissett et al. 2012; Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006; Johnson et al. 2014; Khaneman, 2011, Sweller, 2003). Type 1 
processes are not heavily reliant on working memory, and therefore, are more resilient 
to increases in cognitive demand (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Johnson et al. 2014).   
The capacity of working memory to retain and process information is limited to 
seven plus/minus two single unit items of information (including digits, words 
(Baddeley, 2003; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Miller, 1956; Peterson & Peterson, 1959). 
Therefore, increases in cognitive demand are associated with reductions in task 
performance due to the number of items that need to be retained in working memory 
(Blissett et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2014; Miller, 1956; Sweller, 2003; Wiggins & 
Bollwerk, 2006). Type 2 processes are theorised to be relatively more reliant on 
working memory and therefore more vulnerable to increases in cognitive demand 





Experts who possess rich and mature illness scripts are more likely to select 
accurate clinical diagnoses utilising their default Type 1 processes compared to 
individuals with naïve and novice illness scripts (Custers, 2015; Keemink et al. 2018; 
Ericsson, 2004). The possession of rich and mature illness scripts allows experts to 
utilise their working memory more effectively by facilitating the piecing together of 
single units of incoming domain-related information into larger and more meaningful 
chunks (Shen, Popov, Delahay, & Reder, 2018). The illness scripts of naïve 
diagnosticians are likely to consist of anecdotal experience and information (if they 
exist at all). In contrast to the illness scripts of naïve individuals, the illness scripts of 
novice clinicians typically contain advanced declarative knowledge (Groves et al. 
2003; Norman et al. 1989). However, novices lack clinical experience, which is a 
critical aspect in the development of rich and mature illness scripts (Custers, 2015; 
Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1999; Keemink et al. 2018).  
Naïve and novice diagnosticians in a domain may sense that a patient exhibits 
clinical symptomatology (Wickens & Carswell, 2006) but if they use default Type 1 
processes to identify a diagnosis, their underdeveloped or non-existent illness scripts 
will likely produce an erroneous and/or a delayed response (Custers, 2015; Sweller, 
1994, Sweller, 2003, Wickens & Carswell 2006). If naïve or novice diagnosticians 
feel motivated to identify an accurate diagnosis, then it is likely that analytical Type 2 
processes may intervene (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Sweller, 
2003). Naïve and novice diagnosticians rely heavily (or solely) on limited-capacity 
working memory to acquire, retain, and process individual pieces of task-related 
information using serial processing (i.e. processing one item of information at a time) 
(Custers, 2015; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Hobus, Schmidt, Boshuizen & Patel, 1987; 
Kahneman, 2011; Sweller, 2003). If a diagnosis is complex (and therefore high in 





memory will be adversely affected and response accuracy and/or latency will be 
compromised (Blissett et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2014; Miller, 1956; Sweller, 2003; 
Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006).   
To summarise, individuals who lack rich and mature illness scripts in a domain 
are unlikely to produce an accurate diagnosis using Type 1 processes due to unreliable 
feature-event associations in long-term memory (Custers, 2015; Keemink et al. 2018). 
If their Type 2 processes intervene, then working memory capacity will be adversely 
affected if the task is complex, with information processing, response accuracy and/or 
latency likely to suffer (Blissett et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2014; Miller, 1956; 
Sweller, 2003; Wiggins & Bollwerk, 2006).  
The diagnosis and treatment of psychological disorders are complex tasks that 
are often reserved for clinicians who are assumed to possess rich and mature illness 
scripts in the domain of psychological disorders (Psychiatrists, Clinical Psychologists, 
Neuropsychologists). However, the identification and/or management of children 
frequently falls on clinicians or professionals who do not necessarily possess rich and 
mature scripts for psychological disorders, such as General Practitioners, 
paediatricians, nurses, and teachers, for varying systemic and/or socio-political 
reasons, including resource constraints due to funding cuts or freezes to national 
healthcare services (House of Commons Health Committee, 2014; Jesus et al. 2019; 
Kerasidou & Kingori, 2019; Kerwick et al. 1997; Young et al. 2001). An external 
mechanism that assists clinicians to organise domain-related information into larger 
and more meaningful chunks may assist non-expert personnel in providing more 








Study Three tested whether reducing the number of items that were required to 
be held in working memory would improve decision outcomes amongst naïve 
personnel with no domain-related theoretical knowledge or experience. The aim of 
Study Three was to examine the mechanistic properties of the ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ interface evaluated in Studies One and Two (‘Categorisation Interface’) that 
produced two accurate and rapid diagnoses (ASD, ADHD) amongst both naïve and 
novice diagnosticians. Specifically, the aim of the present study was to further examine 
the different mechanisms of the ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface that were 
intended to reduced information processing demands on working memory, amongst a 
naïve population with underdeveloped or non-existent illness scripts for 
neurodevelopmental disorders.  
Ahmed et al. (2011) examined a reduced content interface that prioritised the 
display of ‘high value data’ designed to reduce errors associated with information 
overload amongst intensive care physicians during the acquisition stage of 
information processing (Wickens, & Carswell, 2006). Critically ill patients generate a 
high volume of data that are increasingly being stored in extensive Electronic Medical 
Records (EMR) (Jha et al. 2009). The interface examined by Ahmed et al. (2011) 
incorporated a strategy that reduced the amount of information that needed to be 
processed by prioritizing the information to correspond to an Intensive Care Unit 
(ICU) task to assist with the filtering and extraction of information by a group of 
Subject Matter Experts.  
Twenty physicians used both a reduced content interface (102 data points per 
patient) and a standard EMR interface commonly used in teaching hospitals in the 
United States, which did not prioritise high value data (full content; 1008 data points 





data compared to the full content interface, thereby presumably reducing the retention 
of information in working memory (Ahmed et al. 2011). Participants were randomly 
assigned the reduced content or full content interface to assess four actively bleeding 
patients in a simulated ICU task (Ahmed et al. 2011). Participants assessed a further 
four patients using a different interface to the one used for the first four patients.  
Response errors (defined as responses that were incompatible with the patient’s 
data), response latency, and cognitive load were compared between the two 
interfaces. Cognitive load is the perceived effort required to complete a task 
adequately and is commonly assessed using the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-
TLX), a standardized measure of perceived workload (Hart & Staveland, 1988). 
Physicians made significantly fewer errors and recorded faster response latencies 
when assessing patients with the reduced content interface compared to the full 
content interface (Ahmed et al. 2011). NASA-TLX scores were lower when 
participants used the reduced content interface, which suggests participants 
experienced lower levels of perceived cognitive load with the reduced content 
interface (Ahmed et al. 2011).  
The diagnostic-aids used in Study One and Study Two differed in their capacity 
to reduce processing demands through the manipulation of information: 
‘Preconfigured’ content compared to ‘full’ content, and ‘feature-focused’ compared to 
‘disorder-focused’. Study Three compared participants’ diagnostic accuracy and 
response latency for a correct diagnosis with three ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
interfaces (‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’) that 
were identical in their content and arrangement of information but differed in their 
capacity to further reduce processing demands through recording mechanisms 
(described below) that reduced the amount of information to be retained and processed 





Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate how the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (CI) enabled 
participants to highlight clinical features (symptoms) and match features to a disorder 
(event) of perceived relevance. In this case, participants did not have to remember 
features upon observation, nor how they had categorised them, thereby presumably 





Figure 7.1. The corresponding values (image below) for the feature ‘frequent & 








Figure 7.2. Screenshots of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
following the selection of the ASD (blue), ADHD (red), and OCD (purple) values for 
‘frequent & persistent patterns of inattention’ 
 
The ‘Highlighting Interface’ (HI) enabled participants to highlight features of 
perceived relevance to the patient. Participants could not use the software to match 
(categorise) the feature to a disorder. Therefore, they were required to retain in 
working memory the process of categorisation. As an example, Figure 7.3 indicates 
how a participant might select a symptom (inattention), but it is unclear which of the 
three corresponding values (ADHD, ASD, OCD) of the symptom (refer to Figure 7.1) 






Figure 7.3. The first segment of the ‘Highlighting Interface’ following the 
selection of any one of the feature-values for ‘frequent & persistent patterns of 
inattention’ 
 
Participants who used the ‘Passive Interface’ (PI) were required to retain both 
symptoms (features) and feature-values of perceived relevance in working memory. 
Participants’ could not record features (symptoms) nor match symptoms to disorders 
using the ‘Passive Interface’. Participants in the DSM-5 group also had to retain 
features and feature-values of perceived relevance in working memory. This was 
made more difficult for DSM-5 participants as they had the added navigation steps of: 
(a) filtering and discerning high value data from less relevant data (‘full content’), and 
(b) they had to retain the different manifestations of shared symptomatology across 
disorders in working memory as the DSM-5 did not allow for the simultaneous 
comparison of feature-values (i.e. the DSM-5 is ‘disorder-focused’).  
Four diagnostic-aids that differed in their capacity for reduced-processing were 
tested in Study Three (DSM-5, ‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, 





reduced content), (b) the arrangement of content (‘feature-focused’ vs. ‘disorder-
focused’), and (c) the capacity for the diagnostic-aid to record symptoms (features) of 
perceived relevance to the patient (categorised symptoms vs. uncategorised symptoms 
vs. no symptoms). 
 
Table 7.1: Definitions of the properties of the diagnostic-aids used in Study Three 
(content type, content arrangement, and the capacity to record symptoms)  
 
Table 7.2: The properties of the diagnostic-aids used in Study Three 
 
 
Content type Arrangement of content Symptom recording mechanism 
‘Full content’ 
 
Full and comprehensive set of 
diagnostic features and supporting 




Facilitated the processing of multiple 




Interface has the capacity to 
simultaneously record symptoms 
(features) and corresponding feature-
values of perceived relevance 
‘Preconfigured content’ 
 
Reduced set of diagnostic features 
preconfigured by two clinicians 




Facilitated the processing of a single 




Interface has the capacity to record 








DSM-5 Full content Disorder-focused None 
Categorisation Interface Preconfigured content Feature-focused Categorised symptoms 
Highlighting Interface Preconfigured content Feature-focused Uncategorised symptoms 





The primary aim of Study Three was to compare the effectiveness of several 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces (with different recording mechanisms) with 
the effectiveness of the DSM-5 to diagnose two neurodevelopmental disorders, 
amongst a naïve population with underdeveloped or non-existent illness scripts. 
Response accuracy, latency, and perceived workload were measured and compared 
amongst naïve diagnosticians who used one of four diagnostic-aids (‘Categorisation 
Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’, DSM-5) to diagnose two 
patients with different neurodevelopmental disorders (ASD, ADHD). The following 
hypotheses were formulated:  
1. Participants who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface 
(‘Categorisation’, ‘Highlighting’, and ‘Passive’ interface groups) 
would achieve a greater accuracy score (diagnose both ASD and 
ADHD correctly) compared to participants who used a ‘full content, 
disorder-focused’ diagnostic-aid (DSM-5 group).  
2. Participants who used a ‘preconfigured content, feature-focused 
interface’ (‘Categorisation’, ‘Highlighting’, and ‘Passive’ interface 
groups) would be faster at diagnosing ASD and ADHD than 
participants who used a ‘full content, disorder-focused’ diagnostic-aid 
(DSM-5 group). 
3. Participants who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface 
(‘Categorisation’, ‘Highlighting’, and ‘Passive’ interface groups) 
would rate the process of diagnosis as lower in mental demand, 
temporal demand, effort, and frustration in comparison to participants 






A secondary aim of Study Three was to collect descriptive data to examine how 
participants used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ during the task. This was done by 
recording the features and corresponding feature-values selected by participants who 








This research complied with the American Psychological Association Code of 
Ethics and was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Macquarie University. 
Informed consent was obtained from each participant. 
The participants consisted of 71 undergraduate students (50 female, 21 male) who 
participated in the study voluntarily for course credit. They ranged in age from 17 to 58 
years (M = 21, SD = 7.39). Undergraduates were enrolled in a 100-level psychology 
course at Macquarie University in Sydney Australia. Data were collected in the 
Psychology Laboratories of the Macquarie Psychology Departments over a two-month 
period. First year psychology students were selected to determine the mechanistic 
effects of the diagnostic-aids amongst a population with underdeveloped or non-
existent illness scripts for neurodevelopmental disorders.  
 
Design 
The experiment comprised a one-way, between-subjects design with diagnostic-
aid group (‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’, 
DSM-5) as the between-subjects factor. The dependent variables comprised response 
accuracy (0, 1, or 2 correct diagnoses), response latency, and perceived workload as 
indicated by NASA-TLX subscale scores.  
Instruments 
Visual Stimuli: The two filmed clinical case studies that were used in Study One 
and Study two were employed to examine the effectiveness of the diagnostic-aids in 
Study Three. One of the diagnostic scenarios was a three-year-old boy who had been 





psychologists. The other scenario was a seven-year-old boy who had received a 
diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) by a team of expert 
clinical psychologists. Refer to the Method section of Study One for a detailed 
description of the diagnostic scenarios. The footage was played on a desktop computer 
and participants listened to the audio through headphones.  
Diagnostic Options List: Participants were provided with a list of 11 diagnostic 
options31 at the start of the experiment that included typical development, ASD, ADHD, 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Intellectual Developmental Disorder (IDD), 
and six possible co-morbid presentations of these four disorders.  
NASA-TLX: Participants were administered the paper-and-pencil version of the 
NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX), a widely used and validated measure of 
perceived workload (Hart & Staveland, 1988). The NASA-TLX consists of six 
subscales that are designed to indicate the perceived mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration associated with a task (Hart & 
Staveland, 1988). Operators select a raw score for each subscale from one to 21 and 
then provide a weighting for each subscale depending upon its perceived relevance to 
measuring workload for that particular task (Hart, 2006). The ranking of perceived 
relevance to the task of each subscale by participants provides a weighted average of 
ratings (Hart & Staveland, 1988).  
A shortened version of the NASA-TLX measures operators’ raw ratings (not the 
weighted average of ratings) and allows researchers to exclude subscales that are less 
relevant to particular tasks (Bustamante & Spain, 2008; Hart, 2006). There is empirical 
evidence to suggest that the shortened version of the NASA-TLX is as (or more) 
experimentally valid as the longer version, which has the added step of pairwise 
                                               
 
31 Typical development; ASD; OCD; IDD; ADHD; ASD and OCD; ASD and IDD; ASD and 





comparisons of weighted averages of subscale ratings (Bustamante & Spain, 2008; 
Hart, 2006). The shortened version of the NASA-TLX was adopted for the current 
study and the subscale for ‘physical demand’ was excluded as participants remained 
seated for the vast majority of the task. 
Diagnostic-aids used in Study Three 
Categorisation Interface: The ‘Categorisation Interface’ that was used in Study 
One and Study Two was also employed in Study Three. The tablet-based, 
‘Categorisation Interface’ was a restricted content (relative to the DSM-5) 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid with a mechanism that recorded 
categorised features of perceived relevance (i.e. selected feature-values). The colour of 
a selected feature in the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was dependent 
on the feature-value selected in the second segment32. The colour-coded mechanism of 
the ‘Categorisation Interface’ removed the requirement to hold and process features and 
corresponding feature-values of perceived relevance to the patient in working memory 
(refer to Tables 7.3 and 7.4).  
‘Highlighting Interface’: The tablet-based, ‘Highlighting Interface’ was a 
restricted content (relative to the DSM-5) ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-
aid with a mechanism that highlighted (and recorded) uncategorised features of 
perceived relevance ‘yellow’ (a colour that was not associated with a disorder). 
Participants selected a feature-value of perceived relevance in the second segment of 
the interface in order to highlight the feature in the first segment. A feature was coloured 
‘yellow’, regardless of the feature-value that was selected. The ‘Highlighting Interface’ 
was created for Study Three. Participants who used the ‘Highlighting Interface’ were 
not required to retain features of perceived relevance to the patient in working memory. 
                                               
 





However, they were required to retain and process feature-values of perceived 
relevance in working memory (refer to Tables 7.3 and 7.4).  
‘Passive Interface’: The tablet-based, ‘Passive Interface’ was a restricted content 
(relative to the DSM-5) ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid with no 
mechanism to record categorised or uncategorised features of perceived relevance to 
the patient. The ‘Passive Interface’ was created for Study Three. Participants who used 
the ‘Passive Interface’ were required to hold and process features and corresponding 
feature-values of perceived relevance to the patient in working memory (refer to Tables 
7.3 and 7.4).  
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-
5): The DSM-5 (a paper-based ‘full content, disorder-focused’ manual) was used in 
Study Three. The DSM-5 contained the full set of diagnostic criteria with supporting 
information for every psychological disorder (full content), which includes (but is not 
limited to) common co-morbid disorders and instructions on differential diagnosis, 
prevalence rates, and demographic differences such as gender and cultural differences 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The DSM-5 had the highest volume of data 
compared to the other three interfaces. Participants presumably had the added step of 
determining high value data (data that was useful for an initial child behavioural 
assessment by a General Practitioner) from low value data. The manual is arranged so 
that each disorder has its own chapter and therefore, users have access to all of the 
features pertaining to a single disorder at one time across one or multiple pages 
(‘disorder-focused’) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
The DSM-5 has no mechanism to record categorised or uncategorised symptoms 
of perceived relevance to the patient (i.e. features or feature-values of perceived 
relevance) (refer to Table 7.3). The DSM-5 does not facilitate the simultaneous 





symptoms (features) associated with a single disorder (‘disorder-focused’) as opposed 
to the simultaneous comparison of different manifestations of a single symptom across 
multiple disorders (‘feature-focused’).  Participants who used the DSM-5 in Study 
Three were provided with a paper and pencil so that they could manually record and 
categorise clinically-relevant features from the manual (and/or anecdotal behaviours) 
that they associated with the patient. 
Table 7.3: The capacity of each diagnostic-aid to record uncategorised 
symptoms (features only) or categorised symptoms (features and corresponding values) 
 
Table 7.4: Diagnostic information (contained in the interface) that participants 
were required to retain in working memory during information acquisition. 
Diagnostic-aid 
 
à Recording mechanisms of diagnostic-aid 
Categorisation Interface  Selected features and feature-values (categorised symptoms) 
Highlighting Interface  Selected features (uncategorised symptoms) 
Passive Interface  No feature selection or categorisation mechanisms 
(i.e. no recording mechanisms) 
DSM-5  No feature selection or categorisation mechanism 
(i.e. no recording mechanisms) 
Diagnostic-aid 
 
à Items from diagnostic-aid that participants were required to 
retain in working memory 
Categorisation Interface  No items 
Highlighting Interface  Feature-values of perceived relevance 
Passive Interface  Features and feature-values of perceived relevance 
DSM-5  Features and feature-values of three or four disorders (dependent on the pages 





Summary of diagnostic-aid properties 
(1) Content of diagnostic-aid (preconfigured content vs. full content):  
Preconfigured content: The three tablet-based diagnostic-aids (‘Categorisation 
Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’) contained a restricted set of 16 
diagnostic features that were preconfigured by a Paediatric Clinical Psychologist and 
General Practitioner (GP) who specialised in neurodevelopmental disorders. 
Participants who used a preconfigured diagnostic-aid were not required to determine 
high value data (clinically relevant features from the DSM-5 for an initial child 
psychological assessment by a GP) from low value data (less relevant data from the 
DSM-5 for an initial child psychological assessment by a GP).   
Full content: The DSM-5 contained the full and comprehensive set of diagnostic 
features and supporting information for each disorder (full content). Participants 
presumably determined high value data from low value data for the task. 
(2) Arrangement of content (feature-focused vs. disorder-focused): The three 
tablet-based diagnostic-aids (‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, 
‘Passive Interface’) were designed to support participants’ processing of a single 
feature in the context of multiple disorders on a single screen (‘feature-focused’). The 
information in the DSM-5 is arranged in a way that encourages participants to process 
a set of features in the context of a single disorder (‘disorder-focused’).  
(3) Diagnostic-aid recording mechanism: The ‘Categorisation Interface’ and 
‘Highlighting Interface’ had a mechanism that enabled participants to select and 
automatically record33 categorised or uncategorised symptoms of perceived relevance, 
                                               
 
33 In the context of the diagnostic-aids used in this study, the term ‘automatic’ refers to a 






respectively. The ‘Passive Interface’ and DSM-5 had no mechanism to select and 
automatically record diagnostic features of perceived relevance to the patient.  
 
Procedure  
The experiment was conducted in two adjacent rooms. On arrival, participants 
signed a consent form and were randomly assigned to one of four diagnostic-aid groups 
(‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’, DSM-5). 
Participants’ phones were switched off and placed on the opposite side of the room to 
where they were sitting, and they were instructed not to use the internet. All of the 
participants observed and diagnosed a patient with ASD and a patient with ADHD from 
filmed interviews using their assigned diagnostic-aid. The order in which the clinical 
scenarios (ASD, ADHD) were viewed was counterbalanced within groups.  
Participants in the DSM-5 group (n = 17) received a copy of the DSM-5, a pen, 
and refill paper before the videos commenced. They were advised to write down 
information of perceived relevance throughout the scenarios as if they were a clinician 
observing a patient, as is common procedure in an initial consultation with a primary 
healthcare clinician for a child with a suspected psychological disorder (Dr. Anne-
Marie Cullen (GP), personal communication, March 3, 2014, April 10 2016). The 
DSM-5 group was advised to refer to the DSM-5 throughout the observation, in 
addition to writing notes. Participants in the DSM-5 group were advised that if they did 
not think any (or too few) diagnostic features were applicable to the patient, they may 
be a typically developing child. 
Participants who used a ‘preconfigured content, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid 
(‘Categorisation’, ‘Highlighting’, and ‘Passive’ interface groups) were advised that 
each of the disorders for which a diagnosis might be considered had a column in the 





They were informed that the four features in each of the four columns were features 
that were commonly associated with that disorder. However, if a feature was present in 
other disorder(s) it would contain the symbol(s) of the relevant disorder(s). Participants 
were advised to consider the 16 features in the first segment (refer to Figure 7.4) the 
symbols on each of the features, and the descriptions of the feature-values in the second 
segment (refer to Figure 7.5) to determine whether any were relevant to the patient. 
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group (n = 18) were advised to select 
diagnostic features of perceived relevance to the patient if the observed behaviour of 
the patient matched one of the feature-values in the second segment of the interface 
(refer to Figures 7.4-7.6). Participants categorised features by comparing feature-
values (i.e. the different manifestations of a feature) of perceived relevance to a patient 
across one or more diagnostic categories and selecting the feature-value that provided 
the best fit for the patient (refer to Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6). The colour-coding 
mechanism of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ recorded the selected feature-value by 
highlighting the feature in the first segment with the colour associated with the 
disorder34. Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were shown that they 
could deselect any feature that they had highlighted or change the categorisation of a 
feature by selecting a different feature-value in the second segment. This strategy was 
designed to reduce the requirement to retain features and corresponding feature-values 
of perceived relevance in working memory (refer to Table 7.3 and 7.4).  
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were instructed to allow the 
colour configuration that they had selected guide their diagnosis. Participants were 
advised that a predominantly white grid (specifically 0, 1, or 2 features highlighted) 
may suggest that they did not think any (or too few) diagnostic features were applicable 
                                               
 





to the patient, in which case the patient may be a typically developing child. If another 
colour were prominent, for example green, it would indicate a preponderance of IDD 
symptomatology. If two colours were prominent, for example green and blue, this 
would suggest a co-morbid presentation of IDD and ASD symptomatology. 
 
 






Figure 7.5. A screen from the second segment of all ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ interfaces (displayed are three values associated with the feature ‘repetitive 
behaviours’)  
 
   
 
Figure 7.6. Screenshots of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
following the selection of the OCD (purple), IDD (green), and ASD (blue) values for 
‘repetitive behaviours’ 
 
Participants in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ group (n = 18) were advised to select 
features of perceived relevance to the patient throughout the video if the observed 





interface by selecting the relevant feature-value (refer to Figure 7.6). Feature(s) in the 
first segment of the interface would be highlighted a neutral yellow colour if any of its 
corresponding feature-values were selected. The experimenter demonstrated to 
participants in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ group that they could deselect any symptom 
that they had highlighted using the deselect button. In this case, it was not necessary to 
retain features in working memory, but they did have to retain feature-values of 
perceived relevance in working memory (refer to Tables 7.3 and 7.4). Participants were 
advised that a predominantly white grid (specifically 0, 1, or 2 features highlighted) 
may suggest that they did not think any (or too few) diagnostic features were applicable 
to the patient, in which case the patient may be a typically developing child. 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Screenshot of the first segment of the ‘Highlighting Interface’ 
following the selection of any one of the feature-values for ‘Repetitive Behaviours’ 
 
Participants in the ‘Passive Interface’ group (n = 18) were advised to consider the 
features and feature-values as they observed the footage and to mentally note whether 
they considered any to be relevant to the patient. Participants in the ‘Passive Interface’ 





interface had no mechanism to record categorised or uncategorised symptoms (refer to 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4). Participants in the ‘Passive Interface’ group were advised that if 
they did not think any (or too few) diagnostic features (specifically 0, 1, or 2 features) 
were applicable to the patient, they may be a typically developing child. 
The footage for the case study ran without interruption. The experimenter entered 
the room at the conclusion of the first video. Participants were instructed to use their 
interface and written observation notes (if relevant) to formulate an accurate diagnosis. 
Once participants had made their decision, they circled the corresponding option on the 
list and notified the experimenter. The experimenter was positioned outside the room 
to avoid experimenter bias. The time taken to formulate a diagnosis was recorded from 
the moment the experimenter shut the door until participants opened the door and 
signalled that they had finished the task. The experimenter took screenshots of the first 
segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to record the features and corresponding 
feature-values selected by participants who used this interface. 
All participants repeated the procedure with a different clinical case study and 
completed the NASA-TLX subscales at the conclusion of the task (i.e. after diagnosing 
the patient in the second clinical scenario). Participants did not receive any feedback 
on their performance and were asked to maintain the privacy of the individuals in the 






The dependent variables comprised response accuracy and response latency for a 
correct diagnosis for two diagnostic scenarios (ASD and ADHD), and perceived 
workload for the overall task. The interface used for the task was the between-subjects 
factor.  
Level of response accuracy: Participants’ scores ranged between zero to two, 
depending upon the number of disorders that they diagnosed accurately. A Kruskal-
Wallis test was conducted to determine whether there were differences in level of 
accuracy between the ‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive 
Interface’, and the DSM-5 groups. The distributions of accuracy scores were not 
consistent, and therefore, the mean ranks, rather than medians, are reported. Response 
accuracy scores differed significantly between diagnostic-aid groups, c2(3) = 11.269, 
N = 71, p = .010. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure 
with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (refer to Table 7.5). Adjusted p-





 Table 7.5: Kruskal Wallis pairwise comparisons for participants’ response 
accuracy scores (0, 1, or 2 correct diagnoses) between diagnostic-aid groups  
 
































Accuracy scores for the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group were statistically 
significantly greater relative to the DSM-5 group. Accuracy scores did not differ 
significantly between the ‘Highlighting Interface’ and DSM-5 groups, or the ‘Passive 
Interface’ and DSM-5 groups (refer to Table 7.5 and Figure 7.8).   
 
Figure 7.8. Proportion of participants in each diagnostic-aid group who scored 0, 





ASD and ADHD Diagnoses: Participants selected a diagnosis from a list of 11 
possible alternatives and therefore, had a one in 11 (or 9%) probability of selecting an 
accurate diagnosis. To establish whether differences in accuracy were associated with 
specific disorders, the relationship between a correct diagnosis for ASD and ADHD 
and interface group was examined separately using chi-square tests of independence. 
The expected cell frequencies for two groups were less than 5 and therefore, Fisher’s 
exact values are reported for all groups.  The frequency of correct responses for ASD 
and ADHD as a function of interface group, are presented in Table 7.8. 
 
Table 7.6: The proportion (%) of correct responses for the ASD and ADHD 
scenarios for each diagnostic-aid group in Study Three 
 









Categorisation Interface 83.3 72.2 18 
Highlighting Interface  22.2 72.2 18 
Passive Interface  44.4 66.7 18 
DSM-5   23.5 52.9 17 
 
ASD 
The results revealed a statistically significant association between response 
accuracy for ASD and diagnostic-aid group, c2 = 17.686, N = 71, p = .001. Based on 
(Cohen, 1988), Cramer’s V = .499, the relationship can be considered ‘strong’. To 
examine where the association between response accuracy for ASD and diagnostic-aid 





Table 7.7: Chi-square tests examining differences of the proportion (%) of correct 
ASD responses between diagnostic-aid groups in Study Three 








Categorisation Interface - DSM-5 12.60 
 
35 .001* .600 
 Categorisation Interface - ‘Passive Interface’ 5.90 
 
36 .035* .405 
Categorisation Interface - ‘Highlighting 
Interface’ 
13.49 36 < .001* .612 
DSM-5 – ‘Passive Interface’ – ‘Highlighting 
Interface’ 
2.64 53 .321 .223 
 
The results presented in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 suggest that participants were most 
likely to accurately diagnose ASD if they were using the ‘Categorisation Interface’. 
There were statistically significant differences in the number of correct ASD diagnoses 
between the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group and the ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive 
Interface’, and DSM-5 groups. There were no statistically significant differences 
between the DSM-5, ‘Passive Interface’, and ‘Highlighting Interface’ groups.  
 
ADHD 
There was no statistically significant association between response accuracy for 
ADHD and diagnostic-aid group, c2 = 1.921, N = 71, p = .589, Crammer’s V = .1645 






Response latency for ASD: Parametric analyses could not be conducted on 
response latency data as they were not normally distributed. A Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ASD between diagnostic-aid groups. Only the response latencies for correct 
ASD diagnoses were examined. Visual inspection of a boxplot indicated that the 
distributions of response latencies for ASD (minutes) were similar across the four 
groups, and therefore, median times, rather than mean ranks, are reported. Median 
response latency for a correct ASD diagnosis was statistically significantly different 
between diagnostic-aid groups, c2(2) = 8.949, N = 31, p = .030. Table 7.8 displays the 
median time (minutes) taken by each group to make an ASD diagnosis. Pairwise 
comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (refer to Table 7.8). Adjusted p-values are 
presented.  
 
Table 7.8: The time taken for participants to diagnose ASD correctly in each 
diagnostic-aid group in Study Three 
 
Diagnostic-aid group  
ASD 


































This post hoc analysis revealed a statistically significant difference in diagnostic 
time for ASD between the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and DSM-5 groups (refer to Table 
7.8).  
 
Response Latency for ADHD: Parametric analyses could not be conducted on 
response latency data as they were not normally distributed. A Kruskal-Wallis test 
was conducted to determine whether there were differences in response latency for 
diagnosing ADHD between the diagnostic-aid groups. Only the response latencies for 
correct ADHD diagnoses were examined. Visual inspection of a boxplot indicated 
that the distributions of response latencies for ADHD (minutes) were similar across 
the four groups, and therefore, median times, rather than mean ranks, are reported. 
Median response latency for a correct ADHD diagnosis was not statistically 
significantly different between diagnostic-aid groups, c2(2) = 3.623, N = 47, p = .305 
(refer to Table 7.9). 
 
Table 7.9: The time taken (minutes) for participants to diagnose ADHD correctly 
in each diagnostic-aid group in Study Three. 
 
Interface group  
ADHD 
Mdn time (mins) 
 
N 
Categorisation Interface 1.37 13 
Highlighting Interface 1.07 13 
Passive Interface 0.23 12 







Selection of features and feature-values (‘Categorisation Interface’ group): 
Descriptive data were collected to examine how participants used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’. The symptoms (features) and corresponding values (refer to Figures 7.4-
7.6) that participants selected were recorded to examine how participants categorised 
symptoms of perceived relevance for nine symptoms that belonged to multiple disorder 
categories. Feature-values (contained in the second segment of the interface) had to be 
selected in order for a feature (contained in the first segment of the interface) to be 
highlighted. The colour of a selected feature in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was 
dependent on the feature-value selected35. Therefore, the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
recorded categorised features only.  
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 are screenshots of the feature-event associations 
compiled for the ASD and ADHD scenarios from a naïve diagnostician who made 
two correct diagnoses, and a naïve diagnostician from Study Three who made two 
incorrect diagnoses, respectively, from the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group. 
 
Figure 7.9. Screenshots of the feature-event associations attributed to the ASD 
patient (left) and the ADHD patient (right) by a naïve diagnostician in Study Three 
                                               
 









7.10. Screenshots of the feature-event associations attributed to the ASD patient 
(left) and the ADHD patient (right) by a naïve diagnostician in Study Three 
(participant #31) who made two incorrect diagnoses using the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’  
 
Eighteen participants used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to diagnose both the ASD 
and ADHD patients. A technical error resulted in the loss of the feature-values selected 
by eight participants for the ASD patient, and the loss of feature-values selected by six 
participants for the ADHD scenario37. Tables 7.10 and 7.11 contain the remaining 
descriptive data on the frequency of feature-values selected by participants who used 
                                               
 
36 The images demonstrate the function of the colour-coded recording mechanism (refer to 
Figure 7.4 for an enlarged display of the first segment of the interface)  
37 The lost data were collected from participants on the same day. Participants’ screenshots 
were always mailed to the researcher before being deleted from the tablets prior to use by 
subsequent participants. On this day, the tablets lost connection to the internet and the 
researcher was unaware that the emails containing the screenshots from these particular 












 Table 7.10: The proportion (total count) of the selection of feature-values by 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to diagnose the patient in the ASD 
scenario (n =10) in Study Three, from the most frequently selected feature (top) to the 




Feature-value of ASD 
selected 
 
Feature-value of an 
alternate disorder 
(not ASD) selected 
 
 
Feature not selected  
 
 
Displays perfectionist traits  9 1 0 
Repetitive behaviours 9 0 1 








Inattention 7 0 3 
Deficits in developing, maintaining, 







Deficits in adaptive functioning 6 1 3 








Language delays 4 2 4 
Deficits in or advanced non-verbal 








The descriptive data in Table 7.10 suggest participants selected the ASD feature-
value more frequently than the alternate (non-ASD) feature-value(s) for features of 
perceived relevance to the ASD patient (a total of 58 times). Feature-values from 
alternate disorder categories (not ASD) were not selected frequently for the nine 






 Table 7.11: The proportion (total count) of the selection of feature-values by 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to diagnose the patient in the 
ADHD scenario in Study Three (n =12), from the most frequently selected feature (top) 












Feature not selected  
 
 
Deficits in regulating emotion and 
behaviour 
11 0 1 
Inattention 10 1 1 
Deficits in developing, maintaining, 







Deficits in adaptive functioning 9 0 3 
Deficits in or advanced non-verbal 
communication/ perceptual skills 
7 1 4 
Language delays 6 0 6 
Significant levels of anxiety and 
distress 
Not Applicable (NA) 3 9 
Repetitive behaviours NA 1 11 
Displays perfectionist traits  NA 0 12 
 
The descriptive data in Table 7.11 suggest participants selected the ADHD feature-
value more frequently than the alternate (non-ADHD) feature-value(s) for features of 
perceived relevance to the ADHD patient (a total of 51 times), if applicable. Feature-
values from alternate disorder categories (not ADHD) were not selected frequently for 






Figures 7.11 and 7.12 are screenshots of the features attributed to the ASD 
and ADHD scenarios from a naïve diagnostician who made two correct diagnoses, 
and a naïve diagnostician who made two incorrect diagnoses, respectively, from the 




Figure 7.11. Screenshots of the features attributed to the ASD patient (left) 
and the ADHD patient (right) by a naïve diagnostician in Study Three (participant #4) 
who made two correct diagnoses using the ‘Highlighting Interface’ 
 
 
   
 
Figure 7.12. Screenshots of the features attributed to the ASD patient (left) and 
the ADHD patient (right) by a naïve diagnostician in Study Three (participant #49) 








Parametric analyses could not be conducted on the raw ratings of the NASA-
TLX subscales as the data were not normally distributed. Therefore, Kruskal Wallis 
tests were undertaken to investigate whether diagnostic-aid group (‘Categorisation 
Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’, DSM-5) impacted 
participants’ perceptions of workload across five subscales of the NASA-TLX 
(mental demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, frustration). Data on 
perceived workload from five participants are missing due to technical error.   
Table 7.12 displays the results from the Kruskal Wallis analysis for each 
subscale. There were no significant between-group differences between for perceived 
workload. These results suggest that participants experienced similar levels of 
perceived workload for the task irrespective of diagnostic-aid group.   
 
Table 7.12: NASA-TLX subscale scores between four diagnostic-aid groups: 
Categorisation Interface (CI), Highlighting Interface (HI), Passive Interface (PI), 
DSM-5. 
NASA-TLX Subscale  CI – HI – PI – DSM-5 
 c2 (2) N p 
Mental demand .641 66 .887 
Temporal demand 5.52 66 .137 
Performance 
 
3.53 66 .316 
Effort 1.96 66 .580 










Study Three compared the effectiveness of several ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ interfaces (with different recording mechanisms) with the effectiveness of the 
DSM-5 to diagnose two neurodevelopmental disorders, amongst a naïve population 
with underdeveloped or non-existent illness scripts in simulated context. Response 
accuracy, latency, and perceived workload were measured and compared amongst 
naïve diagnosticians who used one of four diagnostic-aids (‘Categorisation Interface’, 
‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’, DSM-5) to diagnose two patients with 
different neurodevelopmental disorders (ASD, ADHD).  
The participants in Study Three were naïve in the context of 
neurodevelopmental disorders (including ASD and ADHD) as they lacked basic 
theoretical knowledge and therefore, were presumed to possess underdeveloped or 
non-existent illness scripts in this domain. This enabled the researchers to compare 
the effects of several diagnostic-aids amongst a population where no standardised 
theoretical learning had occurred. 
The results provided partial support for Hypothesis 1. Participants from one of 
the three ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid groups (‘Categorisation 
Interface’) selected the optimal outcome across two scenarios (diagnose both ASD 
and ADHD correctly), thereby achieving greater accuracy scores compared to 
participants in the DSM-5 group (‘full content, disorder-focused’) (refer to Figure 
7.8). Further analyses revealed that participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
group were significantly more likely to diagnose ASD compared to the ‘Highlighting 
Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’, and DSM-5 groups (refer to Tables 7.6 and 7.7). There 
were no group differences in the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD (refer to Table 7.6).  
The diagnostic accuracy results suggest that a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 





not more effective in assisting the diagnosis of ASD amongst naïve diagnosticians in a 
simulated context compared to the DSM-5 (full content, disorder focused). The high 
proportion of ADHD diagnoses made overall (particularly amongst participants who 
used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid) and the absence of group 
differences in the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD suggest participants were relatively 
accurate in diagnosing ADHD, independent of diagnostic-aid group (refer to Table 7.7). 
This was the third replication of this result. The accuracy results from Study Three and 
Study One (particularly the results from participants who made a diagnosis without a 
diagnostic-aid in Study One) suggest that the ADHD scenario was less complex than 
the ASD scenario and/or naïve diagnosticians may have a better understanding of the 
diagnostic features of ADHD relative to ASD (i.e. naïve diagnosticians may have more 
reliable feature-event associations for ADHD compared to feature-event associations 
for ASD).  
The results provided partial support for Hypothesis 2. Participants from one of 
the three ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid groups (‘Categorisation 
Interface’) were faster at diagnosing ASD (but not ADHD) compared to participants 
who used a ‘full content, disorder-focused’ (DSM-5) diagnostic-aid (refer to Table 7.8 
and 7.9). Participants in the ‘Highlighting’ and ‘Passive Interface’ groups (both 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aids) were not faster in diagnosing ASD or 
ADHD in comparison to participants in the DSM-5 group. Importantly, participants in 
the ‘Highlighting’ and ‘Passive Interface’ groups were not significantly slower than the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group in making a correct ASD diagnosis. These results 
suggest that a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid without the capacity to 
record categorised symptoms may reduce diagnostic response times relative to the 





 In combination with response latency results for a correct diagnosis from Study 
One, the results from Study Three suggest that naïve diagnosticians who had access to 
the DSM-5 during the observation of the patient (Study Three) and/or immediately 
following the observation of the patient (Study One) were slower to make a correct 
ASD diagnosis (but not ADHD diagnosis) relative to participants in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group.   
Hypothesis 3 was not supported as participants who used a ‘preconfigured, 
feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid (Categorisation, ‘Highlighting’, and ‘Passive’ 
interface groups) did not rate the task as lower in mental demand, temporal demand, 
effort, or frustration in comparison to participants who used a ‘full content, disorder-
focused’ diagnostic-aid (DSM-5 group). These results suggest that none of the 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid reduced the perceived workload of the 
task compared to a ‘full content, disorder-focused’ diagnostic-aid. Counter to 
predictions, actual group differences in accuracy scores, likelihood in diagnosing 
ASD and response latencies were not reflected in group differences in perceptions of 
task load.  
This finding was inconsistent with research by Ahmed et al. (2011), who 
reported that lower perceived workload in a simulated Intensive Care Unit task 
reflected more accurate and faster decisions amongst physicians who used a restricted 
content, preconfigured diagnostic-aid relative to a full content diagnostic-aid. The 
restricted content, preconfigured diagnostic-aid in Ahmed et al. (2011) required fewer 
navigation steps to access data of perceived high value to the diagnostic task in 
comparison to a full content diagnostic-aid with more navigation steps to access data 
that were of perceived low and high value to the task. However, the participants in 
Ahmed et al. (2011) used both the restricted, preconfigured and full content 





same diagnostic-aid for two patient scenarios. Further research should examine 
whether NASA-TLX scores would differ between groups if participants used both a 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid and ‘full content, disorder-focused’ 
diagnostic-aid across two patient scenarios.  
Previous research has demonstrated dissociations between perceived task 
difficulty, and actual and perceived task (Adam & Vogel, 2017; Horrey, Lesch, & 
Garabet, 2009; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Schooler et al. 2011; Vidulich & 
Wickens, 1986). Horrey et al. (2009) found discrepancies between drivers’ actual 
performance and perceived reports of their driving when they examined the effects of 
two competing in-vehicle tasks of varying degrees of engagement (high and low) on 
actual driving performance, perceived workload, and perceived task performance 
amongst participants who completed both tasks. Driving was more impaired during 
the high-engagement in-vehicle task (‘guessing task’) compared to the low-
engagement in-vehicle task (‘addition task’), yet participants’ rated their performance 
during the high-engagement task more favourably. Furthermore, although participants 
rated the ‘guessing task’ as more demanding than the ‘addition task’ when the tasks 
were completed on their own (i.e. not while driving), they did not rate the ‘guessing 
task’ as more demanding than the ‘addition task’ when they were completed as in-
vehicle tasks while driving. A primary limitation of Study Three was that the NASA-
TLX was administered on the completion of both diagnostic scenarios to determine 
overall perceptions of task workload. Considering the presence and absence of 
significant group differences on measures of task performance (response latency and 
likelihood of correct diagnoses) between diagnostic-aid groups for the different 
diagnostic scenarios (ASD and ADHD), the NASA-TLX should be administered on 





The ‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, and ‘Passive Interface’ 
were identical in content type, volume (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’), and display. 
However, only participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group selected the 
optimal outcome across two scenarios (diagnose both ASD and ADHD correctly), 
thereby achieving greater accuracy scores compared to participants in the DSM-5 
group (‘full content, disorder-focused’). These results suggest that there are factors 
beyond the two reduced-processing principles adapted from Perry et al. (2012;2013) 
(‘preconfigured’ content, ‘feature-focused’ arrangement), and display of the interface 
that resulted in improved accuracy amongst the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group.  
The accuracy results from the ‘Passive’ and ‘Highlighting’ interface groups 
suggest that the greater number of ASD symbols in the interfaces relative to the number 
of symbols of other disorders did not result in participants making an accurate ASD 
diagnosis (refer to Figure 7.8 and Table 7.6). The accuracy results from the 
‘Highlighting Interface’ group suggest that a mechanism that allowed participants to 
select and automatically record uncategorised diagnostic features (i.e. features without 
corresponding feature-values) did not result in participants making an accurate ASD 
diagnosis (refer to Figure 7.8 and Table 7.6).  
The only difference between the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and ‘Highlighting 
Interface’ was the capacity of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to automatically record 
participants’ assignment of individual diagnostic features to diagnostic categories (i.e. 
the feature-values selected by participants). Participants in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ and ‘Highlighting Interface’ groups were advised to select a feature-value in 
the second segment of the interface for the feature to be highlighted in the first segment. 
A selected feature in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ was coloured ‘yellow’, regardless of 





in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was dependent on the feature-value selected (refer to 
Figures 7.4-7.6).  
For participants who used the ‘Highlighting Interface’, it was necessary to retain 
and process feature-values of perceived relevance in working memory. The colour-
coded mechanism of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ removed the requirement to hold 
and process feature-values of perceived relevance in working memory. The results from 
the ‘Highlighting Interface’ and ‘Categorisation Interface’ groups suggest that a 
mechanism that removes the requirement to retain features of perceived relevance from 
working memory without the concurrent capacity to remove the retention of the 
respective feature-values, was not adequate in improving the correct and rapid 
diagnosis of the ASD scenario for naïve diagnosticians. Further research should 
examine whether the ‘Highlighting Interface’ and ‘Passive Interface’ would improve 
accuracy in diagnosing the ASD scenario amongst novice diagnosticians.  
The descriptive data in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 indicate the feature-values that 
participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group selected for the ASD and ADHD 
scenarios, respectively, for features that were present in multiple categories. The 
descriptive data suggest participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ compiled a set 
of feature-event (symptom-disorder category) associations that were relevant to the 
diagnostic category of the patient for both the ASD and ADHD scenarios. Participants 
rarely selected a feature-value that was not associated with the disorder category of 
the patient (refer to Tables 7.10 and 7.11). The ASD and ADHD scenarios of the 
present study contained clinical footage of two children who were diagnosed with 
ASD and ADHD, respectively, without co-morbid features of another psychological 
disorder. However, further testing is required to determine which features and 
corresponding feature-values should have been selected, based on the footage of the 





domain of psychological disorders to determine which feature-values they would 
select for each patient based on the footage used in the present study.  
In conclusion, the results of Study Three suggest that a restricted set of 
preconfigured features (relative to the DSM-5), which facilitates the simultaneous 
comparison of feature-values across decision options, is only effective in improving 
the diagnostic accuracy and efficiency of ASD amongst naïve diagnostician in 
combination with a mechanism that records selected feature-values. A further study is 
needed to determine whether a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid that 
records selected feature-values can be used immediately following the observation of 









Chapter 8: The efficacy of a mechanism to categorise and record symptoms of 
perceived relevance at two different points in information acquisition 
 
Several ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces were compared that differed 
in their capacity to enable the recording of uncategorised or categorised symptoms of 
perceived relevance at different points during the observation of a three-year-old with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The present study used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ from Studies One, Two, and Three, together with the ‘Highlighting Interface’ 
and ‘Passive Interface’ from Study Three. All three interfaces were considered 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ as they reduced processing demands by: (a) reducing 
the amount of information to be processed; and (b) facilitating information to be 
acquired in a sequence that enabled the simultaneous comparison of feature-values 
pertaining to different diagnostic options (disorders) (Morrison et al. 2010; Mosier & 
Skitka, 1996; Wickens & McCarley, 2008).  
The ‘Categorisation Interface’ was presumed to further reduce processing 
demands relative to the ‘Highlighting’ and ‘Passive’ interfaces’ by enabling 
participants to assign symptoms to specific diagnostic categories with a colour-coded 
categorisation mechanism. The colour-coded categorisation mechanism 
simultaneously recorded the feature and corresponding feature-value that the user 
attributed to the patient. Therefore, in the case of the ‘Categorisation Interface’, it was 
not necessary for users to retain feature-values of perceived relevance in working 
memory.  
Prior to Study Three, it was presumed that the ‘Highlighting Interface’ would 
reduce demands on working memory in comparison to the ‘Passive Interface’ by 
providing users with the capacity to record uncategorised symptoms (features) using a 
neutral highlighting colour that was not associated with a disorder category (refer to 





required to retain in working memory, any observed feature(s) that they perceived were 
relevant to the patient. However, users of the ‘Highlighting Interface’ were required to 
retain information from the second segment of the interface, which describes the 
different manifestations (feature-values) of an individual symptom (feature) across 
multiple disorders (refer to Figure 8.2). Users of the ‘Highlighting Interface’ could 
record that they had observed a feature, but they were unable to record the associated 
feature-value that they perceived to be present in the patient, and therefore, users would 
be required to retain and process this information in working memory. The ‘Passive 
Interface’ was presumed to reduce processing demands to the lowest degree since, 
unlike the ‘Highlighting Interface’, it did not enable users to record uncategorised 
features, and unlike the ‘Categorisation Interface’, users could not record feature-values 
(categorised features). 
The results from Study Three suggest that the ‘Highlighting Interface’ does not 
reduce processing demands in comparison to the ‘Passive Interface’ nor the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition (DSM-5). The ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
interface that recorded uncategorised features (‘Highlighting Interface’) was no more 
useful in assisting the diagnosis of ASD than a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
interface that did not allow users to record features (‘Passive Interface’) or a ‘full 







Study Four was designed to examine whether the diagnostic accuracy of 
participants who used the ‘Highlighting Interface’ and ‘Passive Interface’ during the 
observation of a patient could be improved if they were provided the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ immediately following the observation of a patient (prior to diagnosis). Study 
Four was also designed to examine how participants used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
during the task. This was done by recording the features and corresponding feature-
values selected by participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’.  
The ‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, and ‘Passive Interface’ 
groups from Study Three were replicated in Study Four with the addition of two further 
groups: (1) the ‘Highlighting Interface’ (HI) used during the observation of the patient, 
and the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (CI) used post observation (HIàCI group), and (2) 
the ‘Passive Interface’ (PI) used during the observation of the patient and the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ (CI) used post observation (PIàCI group). A summary of 
the recording mechanisms for each interface and the number of items required to be 
retained in working memory for users of each interface are provided in Tables 8.1 and 







Table 8.1: The capacity of each diagnostic-aid to record uncategorised 
symptoms (features only) or categorised symptoms (features and corresponding values) 



























CI  Select and categorise  Select and categorise   
HI  Select   Select    
PI  No selection or categorisation 
mechanism 
(no recording mechanisms) 
 No selection or categorisation 
mechanism 
(no recording mechanisms) 
  
HIà CI  Select   Select and categorise   
PIà CI  No selection or categorisation 
mechanism 
(no recording mechanisms) 





Table 8.2: Diagnostic information (contained in the interface) that participants 




It was hypothesised that:  
1. Participants who had access to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ during 
and immediately after the observation of the patient (‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group) or immediately after the observation of the patient 
(HIàCI and PIàCI groups) would be more likely to select Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) as their diagnosis than participants who did 
not use the ‘Categorisation Interface’ at any point throughout the task 
(‘Highlighting’ and ‘Passive’ interface groups); 
2. Participants who had access to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ during 
and immediately after the observation of the patient (‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group) would be more likely to select ASD as their 
















Categorisation  No items  No items   
Highlighting  Feature-values  Feature-values   
Passive  Features and feature-values  Features and feature-values   
HIà CI  Feature-values  No items   





Interface’ immediately after the observation (HIàCI and PIàCI 
groups); and  
3. Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group would be faster 
at diagnosing ASD than participants in the HIàCI and PIàCI groups. 
4. Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ would be more 
likely to select the ASD feature-value than the feature-value(s) of 
other disorder categories for symptoms (features) of perceived 









This research complied with the American Psychological Association Code of 
Ethics and was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Macquarie University. 
Informed consent was obtained from each participant. The participants consisted of 
93 undergraduate students (56 female, 37 male) who participated in the study 
voluntarily for course credit. They ranged in age from 18 to 48 years (M = 21, SD = 
4.54). Undergraduates were enrolled in a 100-level psychology course at Macquarie 
University in Sydney Australia. Data were collected in the Psychology Laboratories 
of the Macquarie Psychology Departments over a two-month period.  
 
Design 
The experiment was a mixed design with interface group (‘Categorisation 
Interface’ (CI), ‘Highlighting Interface’ (HI), ‘Passive Interface’ (PI), HIàCI, 
PIàCI) as the between-subjects factor comprising five groups. The between-subjects 
dependent variables comprised a correct or incorrect ASD diagnosis (response 
accuracy) and the time taken to make a diagnosis (response latency). Response 
latency was recorded from the moment the experimenter left the room after providing 
participants with the post-footage instructions (see below) until the participants 
opened the door and signalled that they had made a diagnosis. The within-subjects 
dependent variable comprised the feature-values (ASD feature-value or feature-value 









Diagnostic-aids: The three ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces that were 
used in Study Three (‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive 
Interface’) were used in the present study.  
Visual Stimuli: The video of the ASD patient that was used in Studies One, Two, 
and Three was used in the present study. The video featured a three-year-old boy who 
had been diagnosed with ASD by a team of expert clinical psychologists. Refer to the 
Method section of Study One for a more detailed description of the video. The footage 
was played on a desktop computer and participants listened to the audio through 
headphones.  
Diagnostic Options List: Participants were provided with a list of 11 diagnostic 
options at the start of the experiment including typical development, ASD, OCD, IDD, 
ADHD38, and six possible co-morbid presentations of these four disorders.  
 
Procedure  
The experiment was conducted in two small adjacent rooms. On arrival, 
participants signed a consent form and were randomly assigned to one of five 
interface groups. Three interface groups were identical to groups present in Study 
Three (‘Categorisation Interface’, ‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’) and 
two new groups were added in which participants used the ‘Highlighting Interface’ or 
‘Passive Interface’ during the observation and the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
immediately following the observation (prior to selecting a diagnosis) (refer to Table 
8.1). Participants’ phones were switched off and placed on the opposite side of the 
room to where they were sitting, and they were instructed not to use the internet.  
                                               
 
38 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Intellectual 





Prior to the commencement of the video, all of the participants were directed to 
focus primarily on the 16 symptoms in the first segment of the interface and their 
different symbols, and to give less consideration to the columns in which the 
symptoms were featured. This verbal prompt was provided to all participants.  
Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group (n = 18) were advised to 
select diagnostic features of perceived relevance to the patient if the observed 
behaviour of the patient matched one of the feature-values in the second segment of 
the interface (refer to Figures 8.1-8.3). Participants’ categorised features by 
comparing feature-values (i.e. the different manifestations of a feature) of perceived 
relevance to the patient across one-three diagnostic categories and selecting the 
feature-value that provided the best fit for the patient (refer to Figure 8.2 and Figure 
8.3). The colour-coding mechanism of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ recorded the 
selected feature-value by highlighting the feature in the first segment with the colour 
associated with the disorder 39. Participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group 
were shown that they could deselect any feature that they had highlighted or change 
the categorisation of a feature by selecting a different feature-value in the second 
segment. This strategy was designed to reduce the requirement to retain features and 
corresponding feature-values of perceived relevance in working memory (refer to 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2).  
Participants were advised that a predominantly white grid (specifically 0, 1, or 2 
features highlighted) may suggest that they did not think any (or too few) diagnostic 
features were applicable to the patient, in which case the patient may be a typically 
developing child. If another colour were prominent, for example green, it would 
indicate a preponderance of IDD symptomatology. If two colours were prominent, for 
                                               
 











Figure 8.1. Screenshot of the first segment of all three ‘preconfigured, feature-







Figure 8.2. Three feature-values for ‘repetitive behaviours’ (second segment) 
 
   
 
Figure 8.3. Screenshots of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
following the selection of the OCD (purple), IDD (green), and ASD (blue) values for 
‘repetitive behaviours’. 
 
Participants in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ group (n = 20) were advised to 
select features of perceived relevance to the patient throughout the video if the 
observed behaviour of the patient matched one of the descriptions (feature-values) in 
the second segment of the interface (refer to Figure 8.4). Feature(s) in the first 





corresponding feature-values were selected. The experimenter demonstrated to 
participants in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ group that they could deselect any 
symptom that they had highlighted using the deselect button. In this case, it was not 
necessary to retain features in working memory, but they did have to retain feature-
values of perceived relevance in working memory (refer to Tables 8.1 and 8.2). 
Participants were advised that a predominantly white grid (specifically 0, 1, or 2 
features highlighted) may suggest that they did not think any (or too few) diagnostic 




Figure 8.4. Screenshot of the first segment of the ‘Highlighting Interface’ 
following the selection of any one of the feature-values for ‘repetitive behaviours’ 
  
Participants in the ‘Passive Interface’ group (N = 18) were advised to consider 
the features (first segment of the interface) and feature-values (second segment of the 
interface) as they observed the footage and to mentally note whether they considered 





Interface’ group were advised that if they did not think any or too few (specifically 0, 
1, or 2) diagnostic features were applicable to the patient, the patient may be a 
typically developing child. Participants in the ‘Passive Interface’ group were required 
to retain features and feature-values in working memory as the interface had no 
recording mechanisms.  
Prior to the commencement of the video, participants in the ‘Highlighting 
InterfaceàCategorisation Interface’ (HIàCI) group (N = 19) received the same 
instructions as participants in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ group. The experimenter 
entered the room once the footage ended and handed participants the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’40. Participants were then given similar41 instructions as participants in the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group. The HIàCI group were informed that they could 
use the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to categorise the features selected on the 
‘Highlighting Interface’ solely, or they could delete/ add features on the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ that they had selected/ not selected with the ‘Highlighting 
Interface’ during the observation. Participants were advised to select a diagnosis only 
after they had completed the categorisation procedure with the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’. The experimenter left the room. Participants had both the ‘Highlighting’ 
and ‘Categorisation’ interfaces present as they made a decision.  
Prior to the commencement of the video, participants in the ‘Passive 
InterfaceàCategorisation Interface’ (PIàCI) group (N = 18) received the same 
instructions as participants in the ‘Passive Interface’ group. The experimenter entered 
the room once the footage ended and gave participants the ‘Categorisation Interface’. 
                                               
 
40	The experimenter had a timer running while the participant watched the footage. 
41 The HIàCI group were not given identical instructions to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
group as their experience prior to receiving the Categorisation Interface was different. 
Participants in the HIàCI group had already highlighted features of perceived relevance to 
the patient during the footage, prior to receiving the ‘Categorisation Interface’, and therefore 





Participants in the PI àCI group were then given the same instructions that the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group received prior to observing the footage. Participants 
were advised to select a diagnosis only after they had completed the categorisation 
procedure on the ‘Categorisation Interface’. Participants had both the ‘Passive 
Interface’ and ‘Categorisation Interface’ present as they made a decision. 
The clinical footage ran continuously. The experimenter entered the room at the 
conclusion of the video. All of the participants were given a list of diagnostic options 
(identical to the list that remained in the room throughout the task) on which to circle 
a response, and participants in the HIàCI and PIàCI groups received the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ with the relevant instructions (see above). Participants were 
instructed that they had up to 10 minutes to formulate an accurate diagnosis and to 
immediately inform the experimenter (who would be stationed outside the room) once 
they had done so. 
Once participants had made their decision, they circled the corresponding 
option on the list and notified the experimenter. The experimenter was positioned 
outside the room to avoid experimenter bias. The time taken to formulate a diagnosis 
was recorded from the moment the experimenter shut the door until the participant 
opened the door and signalled that she/he had finished the task. Participants did not 
receive any feedback on their performance and were asked to maintain the privacy of 
the individuals featured in the video by not discussing its content with anyone. The 
experimenter took screenshots of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to 
record the features and corresponding feature-values selected by participants who 









The response accuracy and response latency data from seven participants were 
removed as these participants were prompted to make a diagnosis by the experimenter 
at the 10-minute mark (i.e. they exceeded the 10-minute deliberation period). The 
between-subjects dependent variables comprised the accuracy of the diagnosis and the 
time taken to make a diagnosis (response latency). The within-subjects dependent 
variable was the feature-values selected by participants who used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’. 
Response accuracy: Participants selected a diagnosis from a list of 11 possible 
alternatives and therefore, had a one in 11 (or 9%) probability of selecting an accurate 
diagnosis.  The relationship between the likelihood of a correct diagnosis for ASD 
and interface group was examined with a chi-square test of independence. The 
expected cell frequencies for one group was less than 5 and therefore, Fisher’s exact 
value is reported. The frequency of correct responses for ASD, as a function of 






 Table 8.3 The proportion (%) of correct responses for the ASD scenario for 
each interface group in Study Four. 
 
Interface group 
Frequency of participants who 




Categorisation Interface (CI) 77.8 18 
Highlighting Interface (HI)  31.6 19 
Passive Interface (PI) 22.2 18 
PI à CI 80 15 
HIàCI 62.5 16 
 
 
The results revealed a statistically significant association between response 
accuracy for ASD and interface group, c2 = 19.61, N = 86, p = .001. Based on 
(Cohen, 1988), Cramer’s V = .478, the relationship can be considered ‘strong’. To 
examine where the association between response accuracy for ASD and interface 
group lay, a series of individual chi-square tests were conducted (refer to Table 8.4). 
Fisher’s exact values are reported for five out of seven tests as they each included at 







 Table 8.4: Chi-square tests examining differences of the proportion (%) of 











Categorisation Interface (CI) – Highlighting Interface 9.80 37** .003 .515 
 Categorisation Interface – Passive Interface 11.11 36** .002 .556 
Highlighting Interface (HI) – (HIàCI) 4.64 35 .031 -0.36 
Passive Interface (PI) – (PIàCI) 10.94 33** .002 -0.576 
Highlighting Interface – (PIàCI) 7.438 34 .009 .468 
Passive Interface – (HIàCI) 5.673 34** .035 -0.409 
CI – (HIàCI) – (PIàCI) 1.007 49** .673 .143 
 
There were no statistically significant differences between the CI, HIàCI, or 
PIàCI groups in the frequency with which participants diagnosed ASD (refer to 
Table 8.3 and Table 8.4). This result suggests that participants who used the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ during and after the observation of the patient 
(‘Categorisation Interface’ group) were not more likely to correctly diagnosis the 
patient compared to participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ only after the 
observation of the patient (HIàCI and PIàCI groups).  
The significant differences in diagnostic accuracy between groups in which the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ was not used (‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’ 
groups) and interface groups where the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was used 
(‘Categorisation Interface’, HIàCI, and PIàCI groups) suggest that participants 
were most likely to correctly diagnose the patient if they used the ‘Categorisation 





Response latency: A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine whether 
there were differences in the response latency to diagnose ASD between the five 
diagnostic-aid groups. Only the response latencies for correct ASD diagnoses were 
analysed. Visual inspection of a boxplot of the diagnostic times for ASD indicated a 
single outlier in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group. On removal of the outlier, the 
distribution of diagnostic times for ASD (seconds) were similar across the five 
groups, and therefore, median times, rather than mean ranks, are reported. Median 
diagnostic times for ASD were statistically significantly different between different 
diagnostic-aid groups, c2(2) = 20.59, N = 43, p < .001. Subsequently, 10 pairwise 
comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons. This post hoc analysis revealed a statistically 
significant difference in diagnostic time between the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and 
‘Highlighting InterfaceàCategorisation Interface’ (HIàCI) groups (p = .033), and 
the ‘Categorisation Interface’ and ‘Passive InterfaceàCategorisation Interface’ 
(PIàCI) groups (p < .001) groups (adjusted p-values are presented). The remaining 
pairwise comparisons were non-significant.  
Table 8.5: The time taken for participants to diagnose ASD correctly in each 
diagnostic-aid group in Study Four 
Diagnostic-aid group ASD 
Mdn time (secs) 
 
N 
Categorisation Interface (CI) 73 13 
Highlighting Interface (HI) 259  5 
Passive Interface (PI) 107 4 
HIàCI 300 10 






 The response latency results indicate that participants in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group, who had access to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ during the clinical 
footage, were faster in diagnosing the patient accurately than participants in the 
‘Categorisation InterfaceàHighlighting Interface’ (CIàHI) and ‘Categorisation 
Interfaceà Passive Interface’ (CIàPI) groups. Participants in the CIàHI and CIàPI 
groups had access to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ from the immediate conclusion of 
the clinical footage until the end of the task.  
Overall, the combined response accuracy and latency results suggest that using an 
interface to categorise features (thereby reducing the number of items to be retained 
and processed in working memory) during the observation of a patient improves 
diagnostic accuracy whilst simultaneously reducing response latency.  
 
Selection of features and feature-values: A total of 55 participants used the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ during and/or immediately after the observation of the 
patient. Data were combined from participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group 
(N=18) and participants in the HIàCI group (N=19) and PIàCI group (N=18).  
The symptoms (features) (refer to Figure 8.1) and corresponding feature-values 
(refer to Figure 8.2) that participants selected were recorded to examine how 
participants categorised symptoms of perceived relevance for nine symptoms that 
belonged to multiple disorder categories The feature-value (contained in the second 
segment of the interface) had to be selected in order for a feature (contained in the 
first segment of the interface) to be highlighted. Therefore, the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ recorded categorised features only. Table 8.6 contains descriptive data on 







Table 8.6: The proportion (total count) of the selection of feature-values by all 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to diagnose the patient in the ASD 








Feature-value of ASD 
selected 
 
Feature-value of an 
alternate disorder 
(not ASD) selected 
 
Repetitive behaviours 6 46 3 
Inattention 11 35 9 
Displays perfectionist traits 12 41 2 
Deficits in developing, 








Anxiety 16 37 2 
Deficits in adaptive functioning 21 24 10 
Deficits in regulating emotion and 
behaviour 
25 27 3 
Language delays 26 19 10 
Deficits in or advanced non-verbal 
communication/ perceptual skills 
30 20 5 
 
Nine chi-square goodness-of-fit tests were conducted to determine whether 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were more likely to select the 
ASD feature-value or the feature-value of an alternate disorder (not ASD). The 
feature-values of alternate disorders (not ASD) were collapsed into a single category 
for eight of the nine features with 3 feature-values, as their cell frequencies were less 





Table 8.7: Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests that examined how participants 









Repetitive behaviours 80.84 49 <.001 
Inattention 42.29 44 <.001 
Displays perfectionist traits 
(two feature-values) 
35.37 43 <.001 
Deficits in developing, maintaining, 
and understanding relationships 
74.12 40 <.001 
Anxiety 66.47 39 <.001 
Deficits in adaptive functioning 21.24 34 <.001 
Deficits in regulating emotion and 
behaviour 
43.36 30 <.001 
Language delays 13.52 29 <.001 
Deficits in or advanced non-verbal 
communication/ perceptual skills 
24.51 25 <.001 
 
The data in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 suggest that participants were significantly more 
likely to select the ASD feature-value than the feature-value of an alternate disorder 
for nine features. These results suggest that participants who used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ were more likely to categorise features of perceived relevance to the patient 
as symptoms of ASD than they were to categorise them as symptoms of an alternate 







Study Four tested the recording mechanisms of several ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ interfaces that were designed to reduce the number of items to be retained 
and processed in working memory to varying degrees. The interfaces differed in their 
capacity to record categorised symptoms (features and feature-values) or 
uncategorised symptoms (features only) during and/or immediately following a 20-
minute observation of a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (refer to Table 
8.1). Response accuracy and latency were measured and compared amongst naïve 
diagnosticians who used one of five interfaces (‘Categorisation Interface’ (CI), 
‘Highlighting Interface’ (HI), ‘Passive Interface’ (PI), HIàCI, PIàCI) to diagnose a 
patient with ASD in a simulated clinical context. 
The participants in Study Four were naïve in the context of neurodevelopmental 
disorders (including ASD) as they lacked basic theoretical knowledge and therefore, 
were likely to possess underdeveloped or non-existent illness scripts in this domain. 
This enabled the researchers to examine the effects of different recording mechanisms 
of several ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces at different points during a 
diagnostic task amongst a population where no standardised theoretical learning had 
occurred.  
The results provided support for Hypothesis 1 as participants in the 
‘Categorisation Interface’, HIàCI, and PIàCI groups were significantly more likely 
to select ASD as their diagnosis compared to participants in the ‘Passive’ and 
‘Highlighting’ interface groups (refer to Tables 8.3 and 8.4). These results indicate 
that participants who had access to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ during and/or 
immediately after the observation of the patient were more likely to select an accurate 






Hypothesis 2 was not supported as participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
group were not significantly more likely to select an accurate ASD diagnosis compared 
to participants in the HIàCI and PIàCI groups (refer to Tables 8.3 and 8.4). These 
results suggest that the ‘Categorisation Interface’ might be used during and/or 
immediately after the observation of the patient to improve the accuracy of ASD 
diagnoses. Furthermore, the results suggest that diagnostic accuracy was not dependent 
upon participants recording categorised symptoms (feature-values) during the 
observation of the patient.  
Hypothesis 3 was supported as participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group 
were significantly faster in diagnosing ASD compared to participants in the HIàCI 
and PIàCI groups (refer to Table 8.5). These results indicate that participants who had 
access to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ during the observation of the patient were 
significantly faster in diagnosing ASD than participants who only had access to the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ immediately after the observation of the patient (during the 
decision deliberation period). 
The response accuracy results suggest that the ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
interface that enabled the recording of categorised symptoms (i.e. the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’) assisted naïve diagnosticians during the observation of a patient and/or 
immediately following the observation of a patient to diagnose ASD accurately in a 
simulated context. In combination, the results suggest that the time taken to formulate 
an accurate ASD diagnosis was reduced when the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was used 
during the observation of the patient.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4 was supported as participants who used the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ were significantly more likely to select the ASD feature-





ADHD)42 for features of perceived relevance to the patient (refer to Table 8.6 and 
Table 8.7). The results suggest that participants who used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ compiled a set of feature-event (or symptom-disorder) associations and 
they were more likely to select the feature-value that corresponded with the diagnosis 
of the patient than the feature-value of a disorder that was not relevant to the 
diagnosis of the patient. The observation video contained clinical footage of a patient 
who was diagnosed with ASD without co-morbid features of another psychological 
disorder. However, further testing is required to determine which features and 
corresponding feature-values should have been selected, based on the footage of the 
patient. 
The ‘Categorisation’, ‘Highlighting’, and ‘Passive’ interfaces were identical in 
content type, volume, and display (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’). However, only 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (during and/or immediately after 
the observation of the patient) were significantly more likely to select ASD. All of the 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces facilitated the comparison and evaluation of 
different manifestations (feature-values) of individual symptoms (features) across 
multiple disorders. The interfaces differed in their capacity to allow participants to 
record categorised and uncategorised symptoms of perceived relevance to the patient 
at different points during the task (refer to Tables 8.1 and 8.2).  
Participants in the ‘Highlighting’ or ‘Passive’ interface groups were required to 
hold feature-values in working memory throughout the duration of the task. The 
relatively poor diagnostic accuracy from both the ‘Highlighting’ and ‘Passive’ interface 
groups suggests that the capacity of a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface to 
record uncategorised symptoms (thereby removing the requirement to retain 
                                               
 
42 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD); Intellectual Developmental Disorder (IDD); 





uncategorised symptoms in working memory) does not assist naïve diagnosticians in 
identifying ASD.  
The only difference between the Categorisation and ‘Highlighting’ interfaces’ was 
the capacity of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to record participants’ assignment of 
individual symptoms to diagnostic categories (i.e. the feature-values selected by 
participants). Participants who used the Categorisation and ‘Highlighting’ interfaces 
were required to select a feature-value in the second segment of the interfaces for the 
feature to be highlighted in the first segment (refer to Figures 8.1-8.4). A selected 
feature in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ was coloured ‘yellow’, regardless of the feature-
value that was selected. The colour of a selected feature in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
was dependent on the feature-value selected43. For participants who used the 
‘Highlighting Interface’, it was necessary to retain and process feature-values of 
perceived relevance in working memory. The colour-coded mechanism of the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ removed the requirement to hold and process feature-values 
of perceived relevance in working memory.  
The primary limitation of this study was that the interfaces were tested in 
assisting the identification of a single disorder (ASD). Future studies are necessary to 
test the capacity of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to assist the diagnosis of other 
complex psychological disorders. This would help determine the generalisability of 
the effectiveness of the mechanisms employed by the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (refer 
to Tables 8.1 and 8.2) to assist in the identification of psychological disorders in the 
absence of complex schemas.  
A further limitation of Study Four was the 10-minute decision deliberation 
period (i.e. the set period allocated to formulate a diagnosis immediately following 
                                               
 





the observation of the patient). Consistent with the response latencies in studies one 
and three, the median time to correctly diagnose ASD was under 10 minutes for all 
diagnostic-aid groups in Study Four (refer to Table 8.5). However, a relatively high 
frequency of participants (six of 37) who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
immediately after the observation were excluded for exceeding the 10-minute 
decision deliberation period (the single remaining participant to exceed the time 
period was in the ‘Highlighting Interface’ group). The removal of these participants 
did not significantly alter group differences. However, it is recommended that, in 
future studies, a time limit not be imposed on the post-observation decision 
deliberation period to control for a sense of restricted time that may be experienced by 
participants who utilise the ‘Categorisation Interface’ only after the observation of a 
patient.  
In conclusion, the results suggest that a reduced-content, feature focused 
interface is only useful in assisting naïve diagnosticians in identifying ASD if the 
interface has a mechanism that records categorised symptoms.  Such an interface can 
be used to categorise symptoms during the observation of a patient with ASD and/or 
immediately following the observation of a patient (during the decision deliberation 
period) to improve accuracy in a simulated context amongst naïve diagnosticians. If 
the symptom categorisation process occurs both during the observation of a patient 
and the decision deliberation period (prior to diagnosis), this can simultaneously 
improve the diagnostic accuracy of ASD and reduce decision time. Future research 
needs to determine the generalisability of the mechanisms employed by the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ (‘preconfigured’ content, ‘feature-focused’ arrangement 
and the capacity to records categorised symptoms) to assist in correctly identifying 






Chapter 9: General Discussion 
Diagnosis is a categorisation task whereby clinicians engage in the (largely) 
non-conscious process of extracting and associating features of a presenting patient 
with illness categories (or ‘scripts’) stored in long-term memory (Charlin et al. 2000; 
Croskerry, 2009; Klein, 1989; Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993). The overall aim of this 
thesis was to test reduced-processing principles of decision support in facilitating the 
process of identifying and extracting features from patients with neurodevelopment 
disorders and associating these features with the most appropriate illness categories to 
produce correct diagnoses. Furthermore, the research was designed to identify the 
specific features of decision support interfaces that improve diagnoses in this context. 
Due to reported difficulties of children with neurodevelopment disorders accessing 
specialised clinicians in public health systems, non-expert populations were utilised to 
test interfaces amongst individuals who do not possess complex schemas (Canadian 
Association of Paediatric Health Centres, 2010; House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2014; Kowalewski et al. 2011) 
Several manipulations of decision support systems were tested across four 
independent samples, including one population of prospective diagnosticians (Study 
2) and three populations of naïve diagnosticians (Studies 1, 3, and 4). Two of the 
reduced-processing principles employed by the DSSs used in the present thesis were 
based on previous research that demonstrated the efficacy of ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ DSSs in assisting diagnosis at the point of information acquisition in 
simulated firefighting scenarios amongst experienced firefighters (Perry et al. 2012) 
and naïve firefighters (Perry et al. 2013). This thesis comprised four experiments that 
were designed to extend the findings of Perry et al. (2012; 2013) pertaining to 





neurodevelopmental disorders44, including a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) and a child with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 
Specifically, the researcher tested whether ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ DSSs 
could improve the diagnostic accuracy of participants across two diagnostic scenarios, 
in the absence of complex domain-specific schemas.  
The same task paradigm was adopted in all four experiments in which 
participants used a randomly assigned diagnostic-aid to diagnose patients based on the 
passive observation of 20 minutes of clinical footage. The same two filmed diagnostic 
scenarios were used throughout the thesis. One of the scenarios featured a three-year-
old boy with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and the other featured a seven-year-
old boy with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (refer to the Method 
section of Study One for a detailed description of the scenarios)  
The properties of the diagnostic-aids used in the present thesis differed in the 
type of content (‘full’ vs. ‘preconfigured’), the arrangement of content (‘disorder-
focused’ vs. ‘feature-focused’), and mechanism by which symptoms were recorded 
(‘categorised symptoms’ vs. ‘uncategorised symptoms’ vs. NA45). Table 9.1 provides 
a summary of these properties. Table 9.2 summarises the type of content, the 
arrangement of content, and interactive recording mechanisms for each diagnostic-
aid.   
 
Table 9.1: Definitions of the properties of the diagnostic-aids used in the 
present thesis (content type, content arrangement, capacity to record symptoms).  
                                               
 
44	Neurodevelopmental disorders are a subcategory of psychiatric disorders in which brain 
development is abnormal (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). ASD and ADHD belong 
to this subcategory of psychiatric disorders.  
45 Not Applicable. The diagnostic-aid did not contain an interactive mechanism to record 






Table 9.2: The properties of each diagnostic-aid. 
 
There were subtle changes to key variables across the four experiments of this 
thesis. Study One was designed to test the effectiveness of diagnostic-aids that 
employed one or two reduced-processing design principles for DSSs (‘preconfigured’ 
and/or ‘feature-focused’ content) against diagnoses using the DSM-546 and unaided 
diagnoses. Study Two differed from Study One (and subsequently Studies Three and 
                                               
 
46	The most widely used standardised mental-health diagnostic system and manual in 
Australasia.	
Content type Arrangement of content Interactive recording mechanism 
‘Full content’ 
 
Full and comprehensive set of 
diagnostic features and supporting 




Facilitated the processing of multiple 
symptoms in the context of a single 
disorder (option)  
‘Categorised symptoms’ 
 
Interface has the capacity to 
simultaneously record symptoms 
(features) and corresponding feature-
values of perceived relevance 
‘Preconfigured content’ 
 
Reduced set of diagnostic features 
preconfigured by two clinicians 




Facilitated the processing of a single 




Interface has the capacity to record 






were used in 




DSM-5 (physical manual) 1, 2, 3 Full content Disorder-focused None 
Content Control 1 Preconfigured content Disorder-focused None 
Categorisation Interface 1, 2, 3, 4 Preconfigured content Feature-focused Categorised symptoms 
Highlighting Interface 3, 4 Preconfigured content Feature-focused Uncategorised symptoms 





Four) as novice, rather that naïve diagnosticians, were tested. The role of a 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface (used in Studies One and Two) to record 
categorised symptoms, was tested in Studies Three and Four. Finally, Study Four was 
designed to test two different points of information acquisition during information 
processing in which a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface might be used to 
improve the diagnostic accuracy and timeliness of ASD.  
 
Findings and Implications of Studies  
Study One 
Study One tested three diagnostic-aids that reflected none, one, or two of the 
reduced-processing (RP) principles employed by the interfaces in Perry et al. (2013), 
which were designed to reduce processing demands at the point of information 
acquisition, including: (1) a restricted set of diagnostic features (relative to the DSM-
5) that were preconfigured by two clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental 
disorders (‘preconfigured’); and (2) a display that facilitated the simultaneous 
comparison of multiple values across a single feature (‘feature-focused’). Perry et al. 
(2012) tested the effects of restricted content, ‘feature-focused’ interfaces that were 
self-configured by experienced and inexperienced Incident Commanders (IC) in 
simulated firefighting scenarios. They suggested that inexperienced ICs may have had 
reduced accuracy scores compared to experienced ICs because they produced more 
variable and potentially sub-optimal self-configured interfaces. Perry et al. (2013) 
then tested the effects of two, restricted content, ‘feature-focused’ interfaces that were 
self-configured by participants or preconfigured by firefighting Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs), amongst participants who were naïve in the context of firefighting. 
Decision accuracy scores were significantly higher amongst participants who used the 





feedback compared to participants who used the self-configured interface and 
completed six practice scenarios with performance feedback (Perry et al. 2013).  
In Study One of the present thesis, the diagnostic accuracy and latency of naïve 
diagnosticians (undergraduate students) were compared amongst naïve participants 
who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (two RP principles), the ‘Content Control’ (1 
RP principle), and DSM-5 (no RP principles) diagnostic-aids, as well as participants 
who formulated diagnoses in the absence of a diagnostic-aid (refer to Tables 9.1 and 
9.2). Consistent with predictions and building on the findings from Perry et al. (2012; 
2013), participants who used a diagnostic-aid that employed two RP principles of 
decision support (‘Categorisation Interface’) recorded significantly higher diagnostic 
accuracy scores (i.e. made two correct diagnoses) and were significantly more likely 
to diagnose ASD correctly compared to participants who used a diagnostic-aid that 
employed one (‘Content Control’), or no (DSM-5) RP principles, or no diagnostic-
aid. Furthermore, participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were 
significantly faster to correctly diagnose ASD and ADHD. ‘Preconfigured’ content 
arranged in a ‘disorder-focused’ format (i.e. did not allow for the simultaneous 
comparison of feature-values), did not improve measures of decision-making. These 
findings provide preliminary evidence that a diagnostic-aid that employs two RP 
design principles (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) intended to reduce processing 
demands at the point of information acquisition, may improve diagnostic accuracy 
and reduce response latency in simulated clinical scenarios compared to the DSM-5 
amongst naïve diagnosticians (refer to Tables 9.1 and 9.2).  
Study Two  
With the intent to build on the findings from Study One, Study Two tested the 
efficacy of the DSM-5 and ‘Categorisation Interface’ amongst novice diagnosticians 





9.2).  Diagnostic accuracy and latency were compared amongst novices who used the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) or the DSM-5 (‘full 
content, disorder-focused’) to diagnose patients in the ASD and ADHD scenarios. 
Participants who employed the ‘Categorisation Interface’ recorded significantly 
higher diagnostic accuracy scores (i.e. made two correct diagnoses) and were 
significantly more likely to diagnose ASD correctly compared to participants who 
used the DSM-5. Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were 
significantly faster in recording a diagnosis (correct or incorrect) in the ASD scenario, 
but not the ADHD scenario, compared to participants who used the DSM-5. However, 
participants in the DSM-5 group who made an accurate ASD diagnosis were just as 
efficient in formulating an accurate diagnosis as participants in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ group. The results from Study Two suggest that a diagnostic-aid that 
employed two Reduced Processing (RP) design principles (‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’) was more useful in improving diagnostic accuracy and reducing the overall 
time taken to deliberate a diagnosis for the ASD scenario, but not more useful in 
reducing response latency for correct diagnoses, in simulated clinical scenarios 
compared to the DSM-5 amongst novice diagnosticians (refer to Tables 9.1 and 9.2).  
Studies One and Two were preliminary experiments designed to compare the 
efficacy of a DSS that employed two RP principles (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) 
with the DSM-5 in assisting diagnoses amongst two populations: Naïve and novice 
participants (i.e. individuals who do not possess complex schemas in the domain of 
neurodevelopmental disorders). Naïve diagnosticians do not possess declarative 
knowledge or practical experience, whereas novice diagnosticians possess declarative 
knowledge but lack practical experience. Therefore, neither population possessed 
complex (or ‘rich and mature’) domain-specific schemas. Furthermore, in contrast to 





feature-focused’ DSS were evident in the absence of practice exercises with 
performance feedback. 
Although a substantially higher proportion of correct ADHD diagnoses were 
made in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ group amongst naïve and novice diagnosticians 
(refer to Tables 5.4 and 6.3) there were no significant group differences in the 
likelihood of diagnosing ADHD. Interestingly, the proportion of correct ASD and 
ADHD diagnoses in the DSM-5 group was exactly half for each scenario amongst 
naïve diagnosticians (refer to Table 5.4), as well as novice diagnosticians (refer to 
Table 5.4). The identical proportions for correct diagnoses between diagnostic 
scenarios (ASD and ADHD) and populations (naïve and novice personnel) appear to 
provide descriptive evidence to suggest that the DSM-5 was similarly effective in its 
level of support for both scenarios amongst naïve and novice populations (refer to 
Table 5.4 and Table 6.3).  
The proportion of correct ADHD diagnoses made by the group of participants 
who did not use a diagnostic-aid in Study One was three times the proportion of 
correct ASD diagnoses made by this group (refer to Table 5.4). The descriptive data 
from the ‘Unaided’ group suggests that the ADHD scenario may have been less 
complex relative to the ASD scenario. Subsequently, a third replication of the task 
paradigm was conducted and a discussion of results pertaining to the ADHD scenario 
is discussed in more depth below in the review of Study Three.  
Taken together, the findings from studies One and Two provide evidence to 
suggest that diagnoses of neurodevelopmental disorders may be improved by a DSS 
that employs two RP principles of decision support (‘preconfigured, feature-focused’) 
in the absence of complex schemas. Specifically, group differences were evident in 
accuracy scores, the likelihood of diagnosing ASD, and response latencies. The 





users to record categorised symptoms of perceived relevance to patients. However, 
the role of this mechanism in assisting decision-making was not taken into account for 
preliminary investigations of a reduced-processing approach to assist clinical 
decision-making. Studies Three and Four were designed to test the efficacy of the 
interactive mechanisms that underpinned the ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ DSS 
(subsequently referred to as the ‘Categorisation Interface’). 
 
Study Three 
Two new ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces, which differed in their 
capacity to record features (symptoms) of perceived relevance, were developed. The 
efficacy of the DSM-5 and three ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces 
(‘Categorisation’, ‘Highlighting’, ‘Passive’) were tested amongst naïve diagnosticians 
in Study Three. The ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces were identical in all 
aspects except for the interactive capacity to record categorised features 
(‘Categorisation Interface’), uncategorised features (‘Highlighting Interface’), or no 
features (‘Passive Interface’) (refer to Tables 9.2 and 9.3).  
The two simulated diagnostic scenarios (ASD and ADHD) that were used in 
studies One and Two were employed again in Study Three to examine the diagnostic 
accuracy and latency of participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’, 
‘Highlighting Interface’, ‘Passive Interface’, and DSM-5. The ‘preconfigured, 
feature-focused’ interface that was employed in Studies One and Two 
(‘Categorisation Interface’) embodied the capacity to record categorised features of 
perceived relevance, thereby reducing the requirement to retain features and feature-
values in the diagnostician’s working memory. The ‘Highlighting Interface’ 
embodied the capacity to record uncategorised, rather than categorised features of 





memory. No interactive recording mechanism was available for participants who used 
the ‘Passive Interface’ or the DSM-5 and therefore, participants who used these 
diagnostic-aids were required to retain both features and feature-values in working 
memory.  
 
Table 9.3: The capacity of each diagnostic-aid to record uncategorised symptoms 
(features only) or categorised symptoms (features and corresponding values) that were 
selected by participants. 
 
Participants who employed the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (‘preconfigured, 
feature-focused’) recorded significantly higher diagnostic accuracy scores (i.e. made 
two correct diagnoses) and were significantly more likely to correctly and efficiently 
diagnose ASD compared to participants who used the ‘Highlighting Interface’, the 
‘Passive Interface’, or the DSM-5. Participants who used the ‘Highlighting’ or 
Diagnostic-aid 
 
Recording mechanisms of 
diagnostic-aid 
Items from diagnostic-aid that 




Categorised symptoms No items 
Highlighting Interface Uncategorised symptoms Feature-values of perceived relevance 
Passive Interface No interactive recording 
mechanism 
Features and feature-values of perceived relevance 
Content Control No interactive recording 
mechanism 
Features and feature-values of perceived relevance 
DSM-5 No interactive recording 
mechanism 





‘Passive’ interfaces were no more accurate nor faster than participants who used the 
DSM-5.  
Consistent with the findings of Studies One and Two, although a substantially 
higher proportion of correct ADHD diagnoses were made in the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ (and ‘Highlighting Interface’) group relative to the DSM-5 (refer to Table 
7.6), there were no significant group differences in the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD.  
Taken together, the descriptive data of the high proportion of ADHD diagnoses relative 
to ASD diagnoses amongst participants who used a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ 
diagnostic-aid in Study Three, the absence of any group differences in the likelihood of 
diagnosing ADHD across studies, and the higher proportion of correct ADHD 
diagnoses relative to ASD diagnoses made by the ‘Unaided’ group in Study One 
suggest participants were more accurate in diagnosing this scenario, independent of 
diagnostic-aid group (refer to Table 7.7).  
Overall, the findings from Study One to Three suggest that the ADHD scenario 
was less complex than the ASD scenario and/or naïve diagnosticians may have a 
better understanding of the diagnostic features of ADHD relative to ASD (i.e. naïve 
diagnosticians may have more reliable feature-event associations for ADHD 
compared to feature-event associations for ASD).  The proportion of correct ADHD 
diagnoses made by participants using the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was substantially 
and consistently higher relative to participants who used the DSM-5 across three 
studies of the current experiment, however access to the ‘Categorisation Interface’ did 
not significantly improve the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD. Future experiments are 
necessary to test the reliability of the reduced-processing principles employed by the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ (‘preconfigured’, ‘feature-focused’, removal of the 






Counter to predictions and the findings of Ahmed et al. (2011), accurate and 
faster decisions were not associated with lower levels of perceived workload in the 
current study. This may be attributable to the timing of administration of the NASA-
TLX. Participants’ completed the survey following the completion of both diagnostic 
scenarios. There were some differences on measures of actual task performance 
between the ASD and ADHD scenarios, which suggests that perceived workload 
needed to have been examined separately for each scenario. However, it is possible 
that a lack of group differences in perceived workload would have persisted 
regardless, as unlike Ahmed et al. (2011), participants in the current study used the 
same diagnostic-aid and therefore did not experience (and could not compare) 
different levels of decision support. If participants had experienced different levels of 
reduced-processing decision support, differences in perceived workload and task 
performance still may not have been evident as previous research has demonstrated 
that dissociations between perceived task difficulty, and actual and perceived task 
performance are not uncommon (Adam & Vogel, 2017; Horrey, Lesch, & Garabet, 
2009; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Schooler et al. 2011; Vidulich & Wickens, 
1986).   
The results emerging from Study Three suggest that a ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ interface was more effective in assisting the diagnoses of naïve 
diagnosticians in simulated clinical scenarios only if it embodied the capacity to 




Study Four replicated and extended the results of Study Three by examining 





‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ diagnostic-aid with the mechanism to record 
categorised symptoms (‘Categorisation Interface’) could be used by naïve 
diagnosticians to facilitate the diagnostic accuracy of a patient with ASD. The results 
of Study Four provided support for the hypothesis that a ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ interface with a mechanism to record categorised symptoms could be used 
during and/or immediately following the observation of a patient (prior to diagnosis) 
to improve diagnostic accuracy (refer to Tables 9.4 and 9.5). Furthermore, the 
findings suggest that it was not necessary for participants to categorise symptoms 
during the observation of the patient to improve the accuracy of diagnosis. Counter to 
predications, the process of symptom categorisation could occur equally effectively, 
immediately following the observation of the patient to improve diagnosis.  
 Consistent with predictions, participants who used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ during the observation of the patient were significantly faster than 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ immediately following (i.e. not 
during) the observation of the patient. This result suggests that using an external 
system to assist with the process of symptom categorisation during the observation of 
a patient can simultaneously facilitate the diagnostic accuracy and efficiency of 





 Table 9.4: The capacity for participants in the interface groups of Study Four 
to record uncategorised symptoms (features only) or categorised symptoms (features 




























Categorisation   Select and categorise  Select and categorise   
Highlighting  Select   Select    
Passive  No interactive recording 
mechanism 
 No interactive recording 
mechanism 
  
HIà CI  Select   Select and categorise   
PIà CI  No interactive recording 
mechanism 





Table 9.5: Diagnostic information (contained in the interface) that participants 
were required to retain in working memory at two different points during information 
acquisition in Study Four. 
 
Taken together, the results from studies Three and Four provide evidence that 
improvements in decision-making pertaining to response accuracy and latency with a 
‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ DSS only occurred if the DSS had the added 
mechanism to simultaneously select, categorise, and record features of perceived 
relevance to the patient. Without an interactive mechanism to record categorised 
features, a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ DSS was not more effective than the DSM-
5 in improving decision-making amongst naïve diagnosticians. It is possible that the 
mechanism to record categorised symptoms further reducing processing demands by 
removing the requirement to both categorise and hold symptoms of perceived relevance 
in working memory, thereby improving diagnoses.   
 
Tracking the classification of individual symptoms   
The primary dependent variable across four experiments was participants’ 
















Categorisation  No items  No items   
Highlighting  Feature-values  Feature-values   
Passive  Features and feature-values  Features and feature-values   
HIà CI  Feature-values  No items   





was primarily interested in the end result of the acquisition and processing of 
information as a whole in the form of a patient diagnosis. A secondary aim of this 
thesis was to track the process of the formulation of a final diagnosis by examining 
how participants classified individual bits of task-relevant information (i.e. individual 
features) using the ‘Categorisation Interface’.  
Domain experts possess complex conceptual structures of organised 
knowledge (schemas), which consist of associated references between environmental 
features and events (or ‘feature-event associations’) stored in long-term memory 
(Sweller, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Personnel acquire and process a limited 
amount of transient information in working memory and link it with schemas in long 
term memory when generating diagnoses in a given situation (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011; Sweller, 2003). The 
‘Categorisation Interface’ used in the present thesis had the capacity to record how 
participants’ categorised a set of 16 individual preconfigured features (or symptoms) 
while observing/having observed a patient with ADHD and/or ASD. Participants who 
used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were instructed to select features in the first 
segment of the ‘interface (refer to Figures 9.1 and 9.3) and consider and select a 
corresponding value (or ‘feature-value’) in the second segment of the interface (refer 











Figure 9.2. The values of three features associated with the feature ‘repetitive 






   
 
Figure 9.3. Screenshots of the first segment of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
following the selection of the OCD (purple), IDD (green), and ASD (blue) values for 
‘repetitive behaviours’ 
 
The participants of the studies of in the present thesis could not link transient 
information with complex schemas stored in long-term memory. However, 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ could externally categorise and 
store dynamic, transient information from the filmed scenarios with the knowledge-
base of the DSS. In other words, the burden on working memory to identify, classify, 
and store individual bits of task-relevant information in order to formulate a whole 
diagnosis could be shared with the ‘Categorisation Interface’. The ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ afforded participants the opportunity to classify, record, and revise ‘feature-
values’ of perceived relevance during information acquisition (refer to Figures 9.2 
and 9.3). Participants’ matched features (e.g. ‘repetitive behaviours’) of perceived 
relevance to diagnostic categories (or ‘events’) stored in the interface (e.g. OCD). In 
doing so, participants compiled a series of ‘feature-event’ associations (from a 
preconfigured set of 16 features) for observed patients. For example, Figures 9.4 and 
9.5 are screenshots of the ‘feature-event’ associations compiled for the ASD and 





diagnoses (Participant #59), and a naïve diagnostician from Study Three who made 
two incorrect diagnoses (Participant #31), respectively. 
 
Figure 9.4. Screenshots of the feature-event associations attributed to the child 
with ASD (left) and the child with ADHD (right) by a naïve diagnostician in Study 




Figure 9.5. Screenshots of the feature-event associations attributed to the child 
with ASD (left) and the child with ADHD (right) by a naïve diagnostician in Study 






Descriptive data from participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were 
collected across Studies Two, Three, and Four to examine how participants’ classified 
features (symptoms) of perceived relevance during information acquisition for the 
ASD and ADHD scenarios.  A value in the second segment was defined as having 
been selected if the corresponding symptom in the first segment was highlighted. For 
example, the left screenshot in Figure 9.4 indicates that Participant #59 attributed 6 
symptoms to the child with ASD and selected the ASD value for each symptom (i.e. 
classified each selected symptom as features of ASD).  
The descriptive data suggests that participants frequently selected the ADHD 
value for symptoms when diagnosing the child with ADHD and the ASD value for 
symptoms when diagnosing the child with ASD. Moreover, this data suggests that 
participants’ infrequently misclassified symptoms (i.e. selected a corresponding value 
that was not associated with the observed patient’s disorder category) for either the 
ASD or ADHD scenario (refer to Tables 6.6-6.7, and Tables 7.10-7.11). Symptoms’ 
selected and classified (as indicated by the colour of the symptom in the first 
segment) by naïve diagnosticians who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ for the ASD 
scenario were analysed in Study Four. The findings suggest that participants were 
significantly more likely to select the value associated with the disorder category of 
each child than select a value not associated with the respective disorder categories of 
the children (refer to Tables 8.6 and 8.7). 
The ‘feature-value’ data collected across Studies Two, Three, and Four suggest 
that participants likely used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ for its intended purpose (i.e. 
to categorise symptoms of perceived relevance to the patient) during information 
acquisition. In other words, participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
compiled an external set of ‘feature-event’ (or ‘symptom-disorder’) associations that 





to Figures 9.4 and 9.5 for the ‘symptom-disorder’ associations of Participant #59 and 
Participant #31, respectively).  
Accurate ‘feature-event’ associations form the basis of complex domain-
specific schemas, which facilitate expert diagnosticians to acquire transient 
information in working memory with relevant and reliable information in long-term 
memory to formulate rapid and accurate diagnoses much of the time (Croskerry 2009; 
Custers, 2015; Elstein & Schwarz, 2002; Groves et al. 2003; Loveday et al. 2013a; 
Loveday et al. 2013b). The combined results across four empirical studies of the 
present thesis suggest that a DSS can assist non-experts at the point of information 
acquisition (during and/or immediately following the passive observation of a patient) 
to identify, classify, and store task-relevant information using an external mechanism, 
thereby reducing actual demands on working memory (refer to Figure 9.4). This in 
turn may improve diagnostic accuracy amongst naïve and novice personnel in 
identifying and differentiating between observational categories, such as psychiatric 
diagnoses in their current form.   
It should be noted that although the patients used in the scenarios of the present 
thesis did not possess sufficient clinically significant features from another disorder 
category to warrant a co-morbid diagnosis by clinical experts47;  there are variations 
in the presentations of ASD and ADHD, as a person does not have to exhibit every 
listed symptom of a disorder to be diagnosed (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) Without gaining access to the patients’ medical records it cannot be ruled out 
that they exhibited at least some features and corresponding values from a disorder 
category that is not associated with their respective diagnostic categories. Further 
                                               
 
47 Neither the ASD or ADHD patient were diagnosed with a co-morbid disorder category. The 
patient with ASD had a single diagnosis of ASD and the patient with ADHD had a single 
diagnosis of ADHD at the time of filming. Both patients have the same current diagnoses as 





research is needed to determine which features and corresponding values an expert in 
neurodevelopmental disorders (Clinical Psychologists, Psychiatrists, or 
Developmental Paediatricians) would select for each patient from the filmed scenarios 
used in this series of experiments. 
Broader contributions of Thesis 
The results of the present series of experiments were consistent with aspects of 
and extended upon the findings of Perry et al. (2012; 2013) to the extent that a DSS 
that employed two reduced-processing (RP) principles (restricted (relative to the 
DSM-5) and preconfigured content that facilitated the simultaneous acquisition of 
‘feature-values’), improved overall decision accuracy and reduced response latency in 
the context of diagnosing neurodevelopmental disorders amongst novice and naïve 
personnel. The findings of Studies Three and Four of the present thesis revealed that 
improvements in decision-making were only evident if a ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ DSS had an interactive mechanism for the user to record categorised 
symptoms of perceived relevance.  
There were key differences between Perry et al. (2012; 2013) and the outcomes 
and methodologies of the studies in the current thesis. The diagnostic scenarios used 
in Perry et al. (2012; 2013) consisted of static information; that is participants made 
decisions based on information contained in written paragraphs (one information 
resource) detailing a hypothetical scenario in which a victim was trapped in a burning 
building and needed to be rescued. In reality, problem solving in both firefighting and 
medicine occur in dynamic environments and require the acquisition of unstable 
information (i.e. transient information that could change in frequency and magnitude, 
as well as disappear or appear) from multiple sources (Coderre et al. 2003; Tversky, 
Morrsion, & Betrancourt, 2002; Rasmussen, 1993). The exception to decision-making 





and pathology, which involve making diagnoses from static medical imagery or 
deceased patients. Indeed, perceptual specialities are estimated to have lower rates of 
diagnostic error relative to non-perceptual specialties (Berner & Graber; Graber, 
2013).  
Studies on skill acquisition in healthcare frequently use static patient summaries 
from a written informational resource(s) that contain patient symptoms, laboratory 
results, demographics, and history, in order to assess clinical reasoning amongst 
diagnosticians (Coderre et al. 2003; Groves et al. 2002; Groves et al. 2003; Norman et 
al. 1989). The two simulated diagnostic scenarios used in the current series of 
experiments involved the continuous passive observation of footage of real patient 
interviews. Participants in the present thesis acquired patient information (symptoms, 
demographics, history) in a more realistic clinical setting relative to written scenarios/ 
clinical vignettes. Patient information was acquired from multiple sources by 
observing a real patient and listening to interviews with the patient’s parents. 
Participants made diagnoses on the basis of transient patient information from a 
filmed clinical interview and static information from the diagnostic-aid. The findings 
of this thesis contribute to the medical education literature, which consists largely of 
examining decision-making using clinical vignettes with static patient information, by 
assessing non-perceptual diagnoses derived from dynamic patient information 
(Coderre et al. 2003)  
Further differences between the current thesis and Perry et al. (2012; 2013) 
were that improvements in decision-making occurred in the present thesis with: (1) a 
relative increase in task-relevant information to consider, and (2) in the absence of 
practice and performance feedback. Firstly, the diagnostic scenarios used in the 
current studies had more task-relevant information and diagnostic options for 





features to consider in the ‘preconfigured’ diagnostic-aids of the present thesis (refer 
to Tables 9.1 and 9.2) were considerably reduced relative to the DSM-5, the number 
of features to consider was not reduced in comparison to the restricted content of the 
‘preconfigured’ DSS tested in Perry et al. (2013). The ‘preconfigured, feature-
focused’ (“Intuitive”) DSS of Perry et al. (2013) restricted access to three features 
(and corresponding values), whereas the ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ DSSs of the 
present thesis restricted access to 16 features (and corresponding values). This was 
because all of the disorder categories that participants were asked to consider (ASD, 
OCD, IDD, ADHD) consist of more than three diagnostic features (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Moreover, the number of features contained in the 
‘preconfigured’ DSSs of the current thesis was ultimately determined by two 
clinicians who specialise in neurodevelopmental disorders.  
Secondly, improvements in decision-making amongst personnel in the current 
thesis occurred in the absence of practice exercises and performance feedback. Perry 
et al. (2013) found that a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interface (restricted to three 
features) was only more effective than a ‘self-configured, feature-focused’ interface in 
combination with the completion of six practice scenarios with timely performance 
feedback. These results are consistent with the theory that performance in a domain is 
associated with domain-specific practice with timely and accurate feedback 
(Campitelli & Gobet, 2011; Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Moreover, 
consistent, superior performance is necessitated by deliberate practice, which 
facilitates the development of complex schemas (Campitelli & Gobet, 2011; Ericsson, 
2004; Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Individuals at all stages of skill acquisition (naïve to 
expert) acquire and process a limited amount of transient information in working 
memory (7 ± 2 bits) and link it with schemas in long term memory (Baddeley & 





Sweller, 2003). It is theorised that the possession of complex domain-specific 
schemas automates typical aspects of a task, which reduce the demands on working 
memory, enabling domain experts to more thoroughly search for, revise, and if 
necessary, attend to, atypical information, thereby facilitating decision-making 
(Brooks et al. 1991; Charlin et al. 2000; Chase & Simon 1973; Custers, 2015; de 
Groot, 1965; Groves et al. 2003; Norman et al. 1989; Shen et al. 2018). 
Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ in the present thesis 
consistently maintained significantly higher levels of accuracy in diagnosing two 
neurodevelopmental disorders relative to participants who used the DSM-5 across 
Studies One, Two, and Three (refer to Figures 5.4, 6.4, 7.8). Participants could use 
the ‘Categorisation Interface’ to chunk bits of diagnostic information in the interface 
that they perceived to be reflective of the transient patient information presented in 
the diagnostic scenario. For example, participants who used the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ could use the interface to chunk the feature ‘repetitive behaviours’ (refer to 
Figure 9.1) with the associated value for OCD (refer to Figure 9.2 and the left 
screenshot in Figure 9.3), thereby creating a larger and more complex chunk for this 
feature. Participants could subsequently return to this feature and revise its associated 
value by unselecting the feature or selecting a different value for the feature, such as 
the value for ASD (refer to Figure 9.2 and the right screenshot of Figure 9.3).  
In comparison to the ‘Categorisation Interface’, the ‘Highlighting Interface’ did 
not afford users the capacity to chunk a feature of perceived relevance to the scenario 
(e.g. ‘repetitive behaviours’) with an associated value (refer to Figures 9.1, 9.2, and 
9.6). Participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were not required to hold 
features of perceived relevance in working memory but they were required to hold 
associated values of perceived relevance in working memory. Participants in the 





significantly greater accuracy scores nor were they more likely to correctly diagnose 
ASD (refer to Figure 7.8 and Tables 7.7 and 8.4) 
 
Figure 9.6. Screenshot of the first segment of the ‘Highlighting Interface’ 
following the selection of any one of the three values associated with ‘repetitive 
behaviours’  
 
Overall, diagnostic accuracy and response latencies were improved or 
maintained amongst participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ despite: (1) 
an increase in task-relevant information to consider relative to Perry et al. (2013), and 
(2) an absence of practice and performance feedback. It is possible that the removal of 
the requirement to hold ‘feature-values’ of perceived relevance in working memory 
reduced actual demands on working memory, and may have enabled participants to 
more thoroughly search for, revise, and if necessary, attend to, atypical information, 
thereby facilitating decision-making (Brooks et al. 1991; Charlin et al. 2000; Chase & 
Simon 1973; Custers, 2015; de Groot, 1965; Groves et al. 2003; Norman et al. 1989; 





Limitations and Future Directions 
This thesis has made some novel contributions to the field of psychology. 
However, there are a number of limitations that pertain to the four studies presented in 
this thesis. The most notable limitation was the lack of significant differences between 
diagnostic-aid groups in the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD. The proportion of 
correct ADHD diagnoses were consistently and considerably higher in the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ group compared to the DSM-5 group across three studies. 
However, these findings suggest that the ‘Categorisation Interface’ was limited to 
maintaining accurate ADHD diagnoses as opposed to improving the diagnosis of 
ADHD amongst participants. Future experiments are necessary to test the reduced-
processing principles employed by the ‘Categorisation Interface’ (‘preconfigured’, 
feature-focused’ content, and the removal of the retention of categorised symptoms of 
perceived relevance) to significantly improve the diagnosis of other complex 
psychological neurodevelopmental disorders. 
A further (potentially related) limitation of the present thesis was that 
participants who used the ‘Categorisation Interface’ were recommended to let the 
colour configuration of the grid in the ‘first segment’ (as determined by their ‘feature-
value’ selections) guide diagnoses. This recommendation was not provided to 
participants in other groups as no other diagnostic-aid contained a colour-coded 
mechanism to record categorised symptoms of perceived relevance. This is significant 
because there were more ASD features to consider in the three ‘preconfigured, 
feature-focussed’ interfaces. This is consistent with ASD being a spectrum disorder, 
in which the range of features are often expanded relative to non-spectrum disorders 





than the OCD, IDD, and ADHD chapters48 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Accordingly, there were more ASD features (and therefore blue diamond symbols49) 
in the ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces relative to other disorders.  
The static visual display of the ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ interfaces did 
not facilitate accurate ASD diagnoses, as evidenced by the findings from the 
‘Highlighting’ and ‘Passive’ interface groups.  However, the colour-coded recording 
mechanism of the ‘Categorisation Interface’ affords users the opportunity to highlight 
a greater number of features blue (i.e. classify them as ASD) relative to other 
colours49, thereby potentially altering users’ colour configurations and/or influencing 
participants to select an ASD diagnosis across both scenarios. Despite the potential to 
colour a greater number of features blue (i.e. classify as ASD) relative to red (i.e. 
classify as ADHD), participants in the ‘Categorisation Interface’ groups maintained a 
high proportion of accurate ADHD diagnoses. However, it is possible that the reduced 
opportunity to attribute (i.e. colour) more diagnostic features to ADHD may have 
influenced the final colour configuration of the interface (determined by participants) 
and/or meant that the likelihood of diagnosing ADHD was not significantly improved 
relative to the DSM-5 groups across studies One to Three.  
Ideally, the interface would afford users the opportunity to attribute the same 
number of features to each disorder. In a clinical sense, altering the interface to 
accommodate for this is likely to be a complex task due to different disorders having a 
different number of clinically significant behaviours (features) that are shared or not 
shared with other disorders. However, future research should endeavour to determine 
                                               
 
48 The ASD, OCD, IDD, and ADHD chapters in the DSM-5 contain 9.5, 8.5, 8, and 6.5 pages 
respectively  
 
49 Corresponding colours and symbols for each disorder: ASD = blue, diamond; ADHD = red, 





if and how this may influence diagnostic accuracy in the scenarios of the current 
thesis and other diagnostic scenarios. 
A clinical psychologist who was not involved in the present thesis, reviewed the 
footage for both diagnostic scenarios. He was of the opinion that the footage 
contained typical presentations of ASD and ADHD, and that the interview structure 
was generally consistent with how an initial behavioural consultation may go with a 
general practitioner who was knowledgeable in the domain of neurodevelopmental 
disorders. The scenarios were constructed in consultation with (and one was led by) a 
general practitioner with additional training and responsibilities in the assessment of 
neurodevelopmental disorders. However, clinical reasoning is inherently multi-
faceted and complex, so it follows that assessing clinical reasoning in both laboratory-
based and clinical settings, is inherently complex. Caution should be exercised, and 
methodological contexts carefully considered, when interpreting and attempting to 
generalise findings in this area of research.  
Studies on skill acquisition in healthcare frequently use static patient summaries 
from a written informational resource(s) (e.g. clinical vignettes) in assessments of 
clinical reasoning amongst diagnosticians (Coderre et al. 2003; Groves et al. 2002; 
Groves et al. 2003; Norman et al. 1989). Participants in the present thesis acquired 
patient information (symptoms, demographics, history) in a more realistic clinical 
setting relative to written scenarios/ clinical vignettes, and therefore acquired dynamic 
patient information. However, because information in video footage is more dynamic 
and multi-faceted relative to written scenarios, it is more difficult to control, isolate, 
and quantify the information.  
This thesis tested reduced-processing DSSs amongst naïve and novice 
populations in the context of neurodevelopmental disorders. Future research should 





mechanism to record categorised symptoms amongst clinicians who are not 
specialists in neurodevelopmental disorders but possess declarative knowledge and 
clinical experience in related domains (e.g. primary physicians). Accumulated years 
of experience in a specific domain (e.g. neurodevelopmental disorders) or a related 
domain (mental health in general practice) is a common measure of ‘expertise’ in 
professional settings but is an unreliable indicator of superior task performance 
(Ericsson, 2004; Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b). However, experienced 
diagnosticians (regardless of genuine skill level) possess different schemas to naïve 
and novice diagnosticians due to the added variable of experience in clinical settings. 
It would be of interest to test cue utilisation (adopting measures employed by 
Loveday et al. 2013a; Loveday et al. 2013b50)  in the context of neurodevelopmental 
disorders amongst clinicians, and then examine their diagnostic performance using the 
diagnostic-aids and clinical scenarios utilised in the present thesis.  
Practical Implications and concluding remarks 
The ‘Categorisation Interface’ tested in the present thesis was considered a 
reduced-processing DSS, which was designed to reduce information-processing 
demands at the point of information acquisition. The ‘Categorisation Interface’ 
improved and/or maintained high levels of accuracy in diagnosing 
neurodevelopmental disorders in simulated clinical contexts in the absence of 
complex schemas. The ‘Categorisation Interface’ differed from other DSSs utilised in 
clinical settings, as it did not contain a mechanical-predictive system designed to 
emulate expert human judgement via algorithmic predictions (systems most 
commonly referred to as CDSSs) (Grove et al. 2000; Wyatt & Spiegelhalter, 1991).  
                                               
 





CDSSs have been reported to disrupt general workflow and interrupt 
physicians’ natural reasoning processes by providing additional, undesirable tasks for 
physicians to perform (data entry, interpretation of complex informational outputs) 
(Baig, Gholam Hosseini, & Connolly, 2015; Berg, 2004; Berner & Graber, 2008; 
Kostopoulou, Delaney, & Munro, 2008; Teich et al. 2000; Wears & Berg, 2005). 
Moreover, it has been suggested that issues of acceptance of CDSSs amongst 
physicians could be mitigated by designing systems that are intended to give 
practitioners perceived control over the diagnostic process (Baig et al. 2019; Lee et al. 
2015; Varonen et al. 2008). Systems should provide practitioners with a sense that 
their clinical experience and knowledge is what led them to their final decision (Lee 
et al. 2015; Teich et al. 2000). It could be argued that almost by design, mechanical-
predictive CDSSs that intend to emulate (or surpass) expert human judgement via 
algorithmic predictions, reduce physicians’ autonomy in their capacity to generate 
diagnostic hypotheses, one of the most (if not the most) fundamental roles of a 
physician (Berg, 2004; Berner & Graber, 2008; Croskerry, 2009; Grove et al. 2000; 
Nuland, 1994).  
The ‘Categorisation Interface’ did not require data entry from participants. 
Consistent with Teich et al. (2000), participants in the current thesis could access 
effective decision support from the ‘Categorisation Interface’ with a maximum of two 
button pushes. Furthermore, the interface contained an additional function that 
automatically collected participants’ selected features and corresponding values and 
compiled them into an automated PDF (refer to Appendix C). Similar to Teich et al. 
(2000), in which a CDSS provided automated decision support when physicians 
entered drug orders for patients, the ‘referral function’ of the ‘Categorisation 
Interface’ automates the required task of writing mental health referrals. Constructing 





secondary mental health services. Clinicians could be motivated to use the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ in a clinical setting not for its capacity for diagnostic 
support, but because in doing so they would be able to automate the construction of 
referrals.  
In conclusion, the early detection and treatment of neurodevelopmental 
disorders significantly improves the life outcomes of affected individuals. Gaining 
timely access to domain specialists can be difficult. Consequently, the diagnosis of 
children with neurodevelopmental disorders can be substantially delayed and/or the 
responsibility of identification, referral and/or management falls on clinicians (and 
non-clinicians) such as general practitioners, general paediatricians, nurses, and 
educators who may not have the background to have developed complex schemas in 
this domain. Therefore, it is important to find viable ways to assist the decision-
making of non-specialists in this area.  
The findings of the four experiments presented in this thesis suggest that naïve 
and novice diagnosticians were able to use a ‘preconfigured, feature-focused’ DSS 
with a mechanism to record categorised symptoms of perceived relevance 
(‘Categorisation Interface’), to improve and/or maintain high levels of accuracy in a 
differential diagnostic task of two patients with neurodevelopmental disorders (ASD 
and ADHD). Furthermore, the ‘Categorisation Interface’ reduced response latencies 
for diagnosing ASD. Improvements in decision-making occurred in the absence of 
practice and performance feedback. Further research is needed to determine whether a 
mobile interface that employs the reduced-processing properties of the 
‘Categorisation Interface’ has the potential to assist diagnoses amongst clinicians with 
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From the following 11 options, please circle the one alternative that you believe 




1. Typically developing child i.e. no disorder  
 
2. Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
 
3. Intellectual Developmental Disorder (IDD) 
 
4. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
 
5. Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
 
6. OCD and ASD 
 
7. OCD and IDD 
 
8. OCD and ADHD 
 
9. ASD and IDD 
 
10. ASD and ADHD 
 











List of symptoms and the diagnostic criteria for ASD, OCD, IDD, 
and ADHD  
 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
 
DEFICITS IN social-emotional reciprocity = deficits in responding to 
social and emotional cues (e.g. often doesn’t respond when spoken to) 
Deficits range in severity from: 
o An abnormal social approach (e.g. juvenile social behaviour compared 
to same-age peers) 
o Lack of ability to hold back-and-forth conversation 
o Reduced sharing of interests (e.g. reduced joint-attention gestures such 
as pointing), emotions, or affect 
o Failure to initiate or respond to social interactions 




INSISTENCE on sameness and routine. 
o Inflexible adherence to routine; 
o Ritualised patterns of verbal behavior (language) or non-verbal 
behavior (actions);  




ABNORMAL sensory reactions or fascinations, stares intensely at 
objects. 
Hyper or hypo reactivity to sensory input or unusual interest in sensory 
aspects of the environment. 
EXAMPLES: 
o Apparent indifference to pain or temperature 
o Adverse response to specific sounds or textures e.g. dislikes hair being 
brushed, squirms in seat due to uncomfortable material of car seat, 
removes items of clothing even in the freezing cold 
o Excessive smelling or touching of objects 
o Visual fascination with lights or movements e.g. stares intensely at 







INTENSE restricted and fixated interests that are abnormal in 
intensity. 
Example of a common restricted interest: Aeroplanes 
o (1) Child's fixation is restricted to plane related things/themes: 
• She/he amasses, memorizes, and regurgitates detailed information on 
planes. 
• She/he is disinterested in doing other things and does not want to move 
onto other activities (“tunnel vision” for plane related artefacts). 
 
 
o (2) Child's fixation is abnormally intense: 
• She/he would spend hours (literally) absorbed playing with toy planes if 
left uninterrupted. 
• She/he will only wear plane-themed clothing and gets distressed or is 
uncomfortable if cannot wear favourite outfit.   
• Extreme distress at small changes, 
• Difficulties with minor transitions, 
• Rigid greeting rituals, 




Significant levels of anxiety & distress  
CAUSES: 
o Having her/his routine disrupted 
o Transitioning between activities 
o Change 
o Certain textures (e.g. clothing, foods), sounds, being touched 
o Being interrupted or stopped when engaging in special interest 
o Cognitive inflexibility 
Manifestations: 
o Frequent (ƒ) tantrums/meltdowns with minor transitions & changes 
o Repetitive behaviours (rocking, hands over ears, arm flapping, 
counting, naming things) 
o Avoids certain people, places, things 
o RB & special interests are generally EGOSYNTONIC (i.e. not 
unpleasant) & are often a source of pleasure & thus are not anxiety-
inducing 
o Perform a mixture of internal behaviours (IB = projecting negative 
emotions inward at the self) & external behaviours (EB = projecting 
negative emotions at other people or objects) 
o Labelled as “bad” or “disruptive” behaviors (running away, breaking 
things) 







Displays perfectionist traits. 
o Perfectionist traits are generally more EGOSYNTONIC than 
egodystonic (i.e. are generally neutral or pleasant behaviours, thoughts, 
and/or feelings) 
o Perfectionist traits are more a reflection of an underlying COGNITIVE 
INFLEXIBILITY and rigid thought patterns 
• Child insists on things being done a certain way due to a perceived 
certainty that method X is the only way to achieve result X 
•She/he has difficulty or is unwilling to switch between activities and 
tasks e.g. child must open the car door her/himself 
o The child is detail-oriented- She/he is very fascinated with or fixated on 
details as opposed to the “whole picture” e.g. intense staring at screens 
 
 
Repetitive Behaviours (RB). e.g. movements, use of objects, speech 
o These are not necessarily unwanted 
o Are not performed as a means of social engagement 
o May be performed in an attempt to optimize arousal levels (i.e. to 
achieve a calm but alert state) due to deficits in sensory & emotion 
regulation. 
Child engages in either: 
o Perseverative RB e.g. arm flapping, rocking, parroting of others words 
(RB are not progressive or indicative of mental growth) and non-
perseverative RB e.g. categorising objects, lining up toys counting, 
insistence on using a particular object or toy (RB are progressive or 
indicative mental growth). 
o OR non-perseverative RB only. 
 
 
DEFICITS in adaptive functioning (e.g. delayed motor & social 
milestones, difficulties with self-care). 
Deficits ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING (AF) = ability to handle common 
demands in life; a child's level of independence compared to same age 
peers [e.g. difficulties reaching motor & other practical milestones] 
o Perceptual skills > AF skills. 
o There is a discrepancy in AF and intellectual functioning (IF) i.e. 
deficits in AF are inconsistent with more advanced perceptual skills. 
o EXAMPLES: 
• Motor deficits & abnormalities: e.g. odd gait, clumsiness, swaying on 
tiptoes, arm flapping, difficulty with grasping objects & object 
manipulation 





• Self-injury (e.g. head-banging, wrist biting); 
• Deficits in self-care: feeding, dressing, toileting. 
 
 
Abnormal verbal communication (e.g. deficits in language, abnormal 
language patterns) Depending on severity, language can range from: 
'abnormal' to ‘deficits in' to 'total lack of’. Language: 
o She/he is very literal and/or speaks using overly formal words; 
o Language utilised more as a means of explication (=to analyse and 
develop an idea or principle in detail) as opposed to communication & 
interaction 
o Speech does not revolve around everyday activities (e.g. child is less 
interested (or not at all) in discussing her/his day) 
o Impairment in reciprocal language. 
o Developmental regression of language & communication can occur 
between ~12mo-24mo; Discrepancy in development of skill sets 
o Non-verbal perceptual skills > verbal communication skills 
 
 
DEFICITS IN or ADVANCED: (a) Non-Verbal communication & (b) 
Non-Verbal perceptual skills 
SUMMARY: 
o Non-verbal (NV) perceptual skills > NV communication (uneven 
profile of abilities). 
o Development may be regressive. 
(a) DEFICITS in NV COMMUNICATION: 
o Are deviant (strange) as opposed to delayed. 
o Child does not show much interest in communicating non-verbally 
o Eye contact is reduced during developmental period (~2mo-24mo) 
[“developmental regression”] 
• Child tends to gaze at others' mouths or objects as opposed to eyes 
o Gesture use and understanding is reduced e.g. reduced pointing & other 
joint-attention gestures, such as showing things to others, not following 
others' eye gaze 
o Orients to name less than typically developing & peers 
o Frequently has an overly serious facial expression or lacks emotional 
facial expression (b) Normal or advanced non-verbal perceptual skills. 
o Child functions at or above typically developing peers. 
 
 
Frequent & persistent patterns of Inattention e.g. distractible, cannot 
focus, is in her/his own world. 





o Deficits in engaging and/or sustaining attention in tasks or play 
activities 
o Focuses intensely on own special interests 
o Frequently does not follow through on simple instructions- often 
because instruction or task does not relate to their particular thought 
pattern at that time (especially if instruction deviates from normal 
routine) 
o Gets caught up in the DETAIL of an activity/task and cannot be moved 
along 
o Does not seem to listen when spoken to directly and appears to be 




DEFICITS IN regulating emotion and behaviour e.g. frequent tantrums, 
gets into rages 
o Misbehaves, has a tantrum, or gets very upset if: 
• Minor transitions/changes occur 
• Routine is disrupted 
• Interrupted whilst engaging with special interest 
• Comes in contact with certain textures or noise 
• Are overcome with an intense boredom and/or they are feeling 
inappropriately stimulated (i.e. either over or under stimulated); Boredom 
can escalate quickly into a rage 
o She/he has difficulty altering behavior to suit different social contexts. 
 
 
DEFICITS IN developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships. 
SOCIAL DISENGAGEMENT to varying degrees e.g. 
o Child can have little to no interest in interacting with others and/or an 
apparent preference for solitary activities 
o Plays alongside but not with peers and/or has atypical social 
engagement 
o Inappropriate approaches to play (seemingly aggressive, disruptive, 
comparatively abnormal) 
o Insistence on playing by very fixed rules 
DEFICITS IN: 
o Adjusting behaviour to suit various social contexts 
o Sharing imaginative play and/or toys related to their special interests 
o Switching imaginative play scenarios 







Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
Obsessions 
Obsessions [O] = intrusive, unwanted, recurrent, and persistent 
THOUGHTS, urges, or images that induce stress and anxiety. 
o O are egodystonic (inconsistent with the well-being and ego of the 




COMPULSIONS [C] (actions): Manifest as repetitive, specific 
BEHAVIOURS (e.g. hand- washing, ordering, checking) OR MENTAL 
ACTS (e.g. praying, counting, repeating words silently). 
o C are PERFORMED in response to: 
• An obsession; 
• Rigid rules 
PURPOSE of C: 
• To prevent a perceived dreaded event; • To reduce anxiety & distress. 
• C are not realistically connected to what they are used to prevent or 
neutralize and are performed excessively. 
 
Young children struggle to understand and articulate O and C. 
 
 
Significant levels of anxiety & distress. 
CAUSES: 
o Obsessive thoughts & compulsions are a source of anxiety (i.e. they are 
EGODYSTONIC) o Compulsions can reduce anxiety & distress BUT the 
uncontrollable need to perform them is also a cause of distress. 
MANIFESTATIONS: 
o Repetitive behaviors as compulsions (e.g. prayers, silent counting, 
ordering, cleaning, handwashing) 
o Feelings of unease or “incompleteness” if compulsion not performed 
o Restlessness & inattention 
o Fear-inducing ruminations 
o Panic attacks 
o Avoids certain people, places, things 
o Predominantly INTERNALISING BEHAVIOURS (IB) (= projecting 
negative emotions inward, toward the self) e.g. fearfulness, irritability, 
sadness. 









o Perfectionist traits are EGODYSTONIC (= unwanted, uncomfortable, 
behaviors, thoughts, and/or feelings) 
• E.g. child believes that if things are not done a certain way (“to 
perfection”), bad things will happen- they possess an overestimation of 
threat. 
• Child experiences discomfort or incompleteness when something does 
not go “just right”. 
o Perfectionism in OCD is a reflection of UNDERLYING ANXIETIES 
and ruminations 
o Child experiences high anxiety if her/his environment is disordered 
 
 
Repetitive Behaviours (RB) e.g. movements, use of objects, speech. 
Compulsions are RB performed in response to obsessive thoughts. RB: 
o Are unwanted, intrusive, & time consuming; 
o Performed to prevent a perceived dreaded event & to reduce anxiety. 
Frequent & persistent patterns of inattention e.g. distractible, cannot 
focus, is in her/his own world. 
Symptoms of INATTENTION include: 
o Distractedness (e.g. mind seems elsewhere) 
o Restlessness (e.g. fidgeting/tapping). 
o Symptoms of inattention occurs due to a significantly heightened state 







Intellectual Developmental Disorder (IDD) 
 
Deficits in intellectual functioning e.g. naming colours, counting, 
learning from experience. DEFICITS IN AGE-APPROPRIATE 
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING. 
o DEFICITS IN perceptual skills, reasoning, planning, abstract thinking, 
judgement, academic learning, memory e.g. the child cannot categorize or 
organise her/his toys 
o DEFICITS IN perceptual skills and language (global delay of skill sets) 
 
 
Deficits in adaptive functioning e.g. delayed motor & social milestones, 
difficulties with self- care. 
o DEFICITS IN ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING (AF). Definition of AF = 
one’s ability to handle common demands and everyday tasks in life; a 
child's level of independence compared to same age peers [e.g. 
difficulties reaching motor & other practical milestones]. 
o Deficits in AF are Global i.e. deficits in AF are consistent with deficits 
in perceptual skills. o EXAMPLES: 
• Motor deficits e.g. clumsiness, difficulty with grasping things & object 
manipulation 
• Self-injury e.g. head-banging, wrist biting 
• Deficits in self-care: feeding, dressing, toileting 
 
 
Language delays (deficits in verbal communication). 
Depending on severity, language can range from: ‘abnormal' to 'deficits 
in’ to 'total lack of'. Language: 
o Concrete and immature (less complex than typically developing peers) 
o Limited vocab and grammar 
o Utilised more as a means of communication as opposed to explication 
(=to analyse and develop an idea or principle in detail). Speech is focused 
on the 'here and now' within everyday events. 
Delays are global: 
o Verbal communication skills match non-verbal (NV) perceptual skills. 
o Note: although both skill sets are delayed, in some cases: verbal skills > 
non-verbal perceptual skills. 
 
 
DEFICITS in non-verbal behaviours: (a) non-verbal communication 
e.g. eye-contact, body language, gestures; (b) non-verbal perceptual skills 





o NV communication = or > NV perceptual skills but generally possess a 
global delay 
of abilities 
o Development is not regressive. 
(a) NV COMMUNICATION: 
o Child is interested in communicating non-verbally i.e. attempts to 
engage socially with gestures & eye-contact; 
 o NV communicative abilities develop at same pace as NV perceptual 
skills; Often compensate for lack of speech with NV communication; 
o Looks at others & orients to name more than ASD peers but less than 
typically developing peers 
(b) DEFICITS IN NV perceptual skills: 




Significant levels of anxiety & distress MANIFESTATIONS: 
o Self-injurious behaviours e.g. hitting, head-banging, and biting 
o Verbal and physical aggression e.g. screaming and shouting 
o Stereotypic movements, which are often performed as a mechanism for 
self- soothing e.g. rocking back-and-forth, arm-flapping 
 
 
Repetitive Behaviours (RB). 
All RB are perseverative i.e. RB are not progressive or indicative of 
mental growth & only serve a self-soothe function e.g. repetitive speech, 
rocking; Behaviours may be repeated if they elicit a desired social 
response such as a smile. 
DEFICITS IN regulating emotion & behaviour e.g. frequent tantrums; 
gets into rages. Emotion and behavioural regulation is age inappropriate 
due to deficits in intellectual functioning and perceptual skills. 
This is noted by typically-developing peers, who may try to take 
advantage of the child. 
 
DEFICITS IN developing, maintaining, & understanding relationships. 
o Attempts to be socially engaged & is upset by peer rejection. 
DEFICITS IN: 
o Verbal communication, conversation and language, which is immature 
& concrete; o Social cue perception (e.g. child is gullible & easily 






Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
 
Frequent & persistent hyperactivity and impulsivity 
HYPERACTIVE-IMPULSIVE symptoms have persisted 
FREQUENTLY & EXCESSIVELY for at least 6 months, and impact 
negatively on daily functioning and development: 
• Fidgeting, tapping of hands, squirming in seat 
• Leaves seat in situations when remaining seated is expected (e.g. in the 
classroom or at preschool) 
• Runs about or climbs in inappropriate situations 
• Inability to play or engage in leisure activities quietly 
• Acts as if “driven by a motor”, always “on the go” (e.g. cannot sit still 
for an extended time, perceived as restless & "difficult to keep up with") 
• Talks excessively about everything and anything (topics are non-
specific) and to anyone within earshot 
• Blurts out answers to incomplete questions & is impatient in 
conversation 
• Has difficulty waiting her/his turn (e.g. while waiting in line) 
• Interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g. butts into conversations, games, 
activities; uses other people’s things without asking or receiving 
permission). 
Several symptoms occur in 2+ settings: Home, school, with friends and 
relatives, extracurricular activities 
 
 
Frequent & persistent patterns of inattention 
6+ symptoms of INATTENTION have PERSISTED FREQUENTLY for 
at least 6 
months, and impact negatively on daily functioning and development: 
o Fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mistakes in 
schoolwork or 
during other activities 
o Deficits in sustaining attention (e.g. in tasks, play activities, class, 
conversations) 
o Does not seem to listen when spoken to directly (e.g. mind seems 
elsewhere, even 
in the absence of any obvious distraction) 
o Does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish schoolwork 
or chores 
o Difficulty organising tasks and activities (e.g. difficulty managing 
sequential tasks 
and keeping materials and belongings in order; messy; disorganised 





o Avoids, dislikes, reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained 
mental effort 
(e.g. schoolwork or homework) 
o Loses things necessary for tasks and activities (e.g. school materials, 
clothing) 
o Easily distracted by extraneous stimuli 
o Forgetful in daily routine and activities 
Several symptoms occur in 2+ settings: Home, school, with friends and 
relatives, extracurricular activities 
 
 
DEFICITS IN regulating emotion & behaviour 
o Child demonstrates reduced behavioural inhibition, effortful control, or 
constraint; Negative emotionality; and/or elevated novelty seeking 
o Child exhibits low frustration tolerance, irritability, and/or mood 
lability 
o Behavioural and emotional deficits are due to difficulties in sustaining 
mental effort, forgetting instructions, and impulsivity; behaviour is not 
characterised by negativity, hostility, and defiance 
o Misbehaves and/or has a tantrum: 
•With major transitions or changes 
•As a result of impulsive actions/ poor self-control 
o Experiences boredom very easily 
o Academic deficits (i.e. under achievement not due to reduced cognitive 
abilities) and school-related problems are present. 
 
 
DEFICITS in developing, maintaining, & understanding relationships 
o Severe forms of ADHD can markedly impair familial, social, and/or 
scholastic adjustment 
o An inadequate or variable self-application to tasks that require 
sustained mental effort is often interpreted by others as laziness, 
irresponsibility, or failure to cooperate across settings (i.e. home, school, 
and/or extracurricular activities) 
o Child is SOCIALLY ENGAGED, keen to interact and play with peers 
& is upset by 
peer rejection 
o Peer relationships are often disrupted by peer rejection, neglect, or 
teasing of the individual 
 
 





• Child’s AF skills are disrupted by symptoms of inattention and 
hyperactivity- impulsivity (i.e. child’s ability to self-care and self-manage 
is significantly worse compared to same-aged peers.) 
• Child is physically able to complete self-care and self-management 
tasks (such as feeding, brushing teeth, dressing, poor planning) but does 
not engage with tasks without constant prompting and supervision 
• Child’s daily functioning and ability to engage is impacted negatively 
across settings (home, school, and/or extracurricular activities) 
• Impulsive, hasty actions that occur in the moment without forethought 
put the child in a position for high potential of harm (e.g. running into the 
street without looking, jumping out of windows, climbing on roofs). 
Individuals with ADHD are more likely than peers to be injured. 
 
 
Abnormal verbal communication 
o Abnormal/ excitatory patterns of verbal communication: 
• Talks excessively about everything and anything (topics are non-
specific) and to anyone within earshot 
• Interrupts conversations and/or is impatient in conversation 
o Language delays often co-occur with ADHD. Child may or may not 
exhibit less complex language compared to same-aged peers. 
 
 
DEFICITS IN or ADVANCED (a) Non-verbal communication & (b) 
Non-Verbal perceptual skills: 
o ADHD is associated with reduced school performance and academic 
attainment. Even in the absence of a specific learning disorder, academic 
performance is often impaired. 
o Academic deficits and school related problems are predominantly 
associated with elevated symptoms of inattention (e.g. avoids, dislikes, or 
is reluctant to engage with tasks that require sustained mental effort) 
o Inattentive behaviour is associated with various underlying cognitive 
processes, and individuals with ADHD may exhibit cognitive problems 
on tests of attention, executive function, or memory. 
o Symptoms of the disorder may be minimal or absent when the child is 






Example51 of an automatically generated PDF from the ‘Categorisation Interface’ upon the 
selection of five ‘feature-values’. The ‘feature’ of perceived relevance is displayed in the ‘Symptom’ 
column, the corresponding ‘value’ that was selected is displayed in the ‘Symptom Description’ 
column, and the user can manually type how the symptom presents in the individual patient etc. in the 
‘Addition Notes’ column  
 
 
                                               
 
51 Example of a PDF automatically generated (‘Symptom’ and ‘Symptom Description’ columns) by a 
participant during the experiment. Manual ‘Additional Notes’ were collected after the main experiment 




DEFICITS IN social-emotional 
reciprocity
DEFICITS IN SOCIAL-
EMOTIONAL RECIPROCITY = 
DEFICITS IN RESPONDING TO 
SOCIAL & EMOTIONAL CUES
Deficits range in severity from: 
 
 o An abnormal social approach 
(e.g. juvenile social behavior 
compared to same-age peers) 
 o Lacks ability to hold back-and-
forth conversation 
 o Reduced sharing of interests, 
emotions, or affect (e.g. reduced 
joint-attention gestures such as 
pointing) 




 GIRLS can present with subtler 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Child does not interact or 
engage other children. Does 
not share interests. Mother 
reports poor social skills
DEFICITS IN developing, 
maintaining, & understanding 
relationships
SOCIAL DISENGAGEMENT to 
varying degrees e.g.: 
 o Child can have little to no 
interest in interacting with others 
and/or an apparent preference for 
solitary activities 
 o Plays alongside but not with 
peers and/or has atypical social 
engagement 
 o Inappropriate approaches to 
play 
 (seemingly aggressive, 
disruptive, comparatively 
abnormal) 




 DEFICITS IN: 
 o Adjusting behaviour to suit 
various social contexts 
 o Sharing imaginative play and/or 
toys related to their special 
interests 
 o Switching imaginative play 
scenarios 
 
GIRLS can present with subtler 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Child disengages from 
others and does like to 
interact with others. Poor 
social skills. Little interested 
in communication to others. 
Limited awareness of social 
situation that is going on 
DEFICITS IN or ADVANCED: (a) 
Non-verbal COMMUNICATION & 
(b) Non-verbal PERCEPTUAL 
SKILLS
SUMMARY: 
 o NV perceptual skills > NV 
communication 
 (uneven profile of abilities) 
 o Development is regressive 
 
 
 (a) DEFICITS IN NV 
COMMUNICATION: 
 o Deviant (strange) as opposed 
to delayed 
 o Child does not show much 
interest in communicating NV 




 ! Child tends to gaze at others' 
mouths or objects as opposed to 
eyes 
 o Gesture use and understanding 
is reduced e.g. reduced pointing & 
other joint-attention gestures, 
such as showing things to others, 
not following others' eye gaze 
 o Orients to name less than 
typically developing & IDD peers 
 o Frequently has an overly 
serious facial expression or lacks 
emotional facial expression 
 
 
 (b) NORMAL or ADVANCED NV 
perceptual skills 
 o Child functions AT or ABOVE 
typically developing peers
Child demonstrated difficulty 
engaging in conversation. 
Does not like to be 
physically restricted by 
space, clothes etc. 
Repetitive behaviours Repetitive Behaviours (RB): 
 o Generally are not unwanted 
 o Are not performed as a means 
of social engagement 
 o May be performed in an 
attempt to optimize arousal levels 
(i.e. to achieve a calm but alert 




 CHILD ENGAGES IN EITHER:
 Perseverative RB 
 ! E.g. arm flapping, rocking, 
 parroting of others' words 
 (RB are not progressive or 




 Non-perseverative RB 
 ! E.g. categorizing objects, lining 
up toys, counting, insistence on 
using a particular object or toy 
 (RB are progressive and 
indicative of mental growth) 
 
 OR non-perseverative RB ONLY
Child makes continual noise 
such as squealing, 
screaming, laughing, and 
nondescript sounds. Mother 
reports Child engages with a 
lot of arm flapping and 
INTENSE restricted and fixated 
interests
RESTRICTED & FIXATED 
INTERESTS THAT ARE 
ABNORMAL IN INTENSITY
 EXAMPLE of a common 
restricted interest: AEROPLANES 
 
 o (1) Child's fixation is 
RESTRICTED to aeroplane 
related things/themes 
 ! She/he amasses, memorizes, 
and regurgitates detailed 
information on aeroplanes 
 ! She/he is disinterested in doing 
other things and does not want to 
move onto other activities ("tunnel 
vision" for aeroplane related 
artifacts) 
 
 o (2) Child's fixation is abnormally 
INTENSE 
 ! She/he would spend hours 
(literally) absorbed playing with 
toy aeroplanes if left uninterrupted 
 ! She/he will only wear 
aeroplane-themed clothing and 
gets distressed or is 
uncomfortable if cannot wear 
favourite aeroplane outfit 
Fixation on colours, lights. 
Once fixated can stay fixated 
and Can stay fixated for 
hours if allowed. Difficulty 
breaking the fixation, child 
needs time to adjust to new 
Frequent & persistent patterns of 
inattention
Symptoms of INATTENTION  
include: 
 
 o Deficits in engaging and/or 
sustaining attention in tasks or 
play activities 
 o Focuses intensely on own 
special interest/s 
 o Frequently does not follow 
through on simple instructions; 
often because instruction or task 
does not relate to their particular 
thought pattern at that time 
(especially if instruction deviates 
from normal routine) 
 o Gets caught up in the DETAIL 
of an activity/task and cannot be 
moved along 
 o Does not seem to listen when 
spoken to directly and appears to 
be ignoring the speaker i.e. will 
not look at their face or will stare 
at their mouth
Difficulty attending to task 
and to others. Does not 
appear to be aware of 
surrounding environment. 
Frequently absorbed in tasks 
with little interest in the 
DEFICITS IN adaptive functioning o perceptual skills > AF skills 
 o In contrast to IDD, there is a 
discrepancy in AF and intellectual 
functioning (IF) i.e. deficits in AF 
and self care (struggles to various 
degrees with toileting, dressing, 
holding a spoon) are inconsistent 




 o May exhibit motor deficits and/
or abnormalities 
 ! e.g. odd gait, clumsiness, 
swaying on tiptoes, arm flapping, 
difficulty with grasping objects & 
object manipulation 
 ! "Head lag" (weak head & neck 
control) at ~6mo 
 !Self-injury: e.g. head-banging, 
wrist biting 
 
Difficulties with learning 
basic tasks such as holding 
a spoon or putting on a 
jacket. Requires a lot of 
assistance for basic self 
INSISTENCE on sameness & 
routine
INSISTENCE ON SAMENESS & 
ROUTINE
o Inflexible adherence o routine 
 o Ritualised patterns of verbal 
behavior (language) or non-verbal 
behavior (actions) 
 o Behaviours are reflective of 





 ! Extreme distress at small 
changes 
 ! Difficulties with minor 
transitions 
 ! Rigid greeting rituals 
 ! Need to take the same route to 
pre-school or eat the same food 
everyday
Child likes same routine eg. 
Eats same food everyday. 
Food, drink must be in same 
cup same colour or child 
won't drink
DEFICITS IN regulating emotion 
& behaviour
o Misbehaves, has a tantrum, or 
gets very upset if: 
 !Minor transitions/changes occur 
 !Routine is disrupted 
 !Interrupted whilst engaging with 
special interest 
 !Comes in contact with certain 
textures or noise 
 !Are overcome with an intense 
boredom and/or they are feeling 
inappropriately stimulated (i.e. 
either over or under stimulated). 
Boredom can escalate quickly into 
a rage 
 
 o She/he has difficulty altering 
behavior to suit different social 
contexts.
Can have tantrums when 
things not going his way or if 
he has time to stop doing a 
task he is involved in. 
Tantrums when routine is 
interrupted or can get upset 
if not allowed to continue 
with fixation.
Language delays (deficits in 
verbal communication)
Depending on severity, language 
can range from: 





 o She/he is very literal and/or 
speaks using overly formal words 
 o Language utilised more as a 
means of explication (=to analyse 
and develop an idea or principle 
in detail) as opposed to 
communication & interaction 
 o Speech does not revolve 
around everyday activities (e.g. 
child is less interested (or not at 
all) in discussing her/his day) 
 o Impairment in reciprocal 
language 
 o Developmental regression of 
language & communication can 
occur between ~12mo-24mo 
 
 
 Discrepancy in development of 
skill sets: 
 o Non-verbal perceptual skills > 
verbal communication skills
Little communication and 
verbal skills... does not 
engage in conversation. In 
not attentive to conversation. 
Impaired ability to engage in 
reciprocal communication 
including understanding of 
nonverbal cues. 
Displays perfectionist traits o Perfectionist traits are generally 
more EGOSYNTONIC than 
egodystonic (i.e. are generally 
neutral or pleasant behaviours, 
thoughts, and/or feelings) 
 
 o Perfectionist traits are more a 
reflection of an underlying 
COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY and 
rigid thought patterns 
 !Child insists on things being 
done a certain way due to a 
perceived certainty that method X 
is the only way to achieve result X 
 !She/he has difficulty or is 
unwilling to switch between 
activities and tasks 
 !E.g. Child must open the car 
door her/himself 
 
 o The child is detail-oriented 
 !She/he is very fascinated with 
or fixated on details as opposed 
to the "whole picture" e.g. intense 
staring at screens 
Mother reports high 
perfectionism, that unless 
child can do something 
perfect he won't attempt it at 
all. 
ABNORMAL sensory reactions or 
fascinations
ABNORMAL sensory reactions
HYPER or HYPO reactivity to 
sensory input or unusual interest 






 o Apparent indifference to pain or 
temperature 
 o Adverse response to specific 
sounds or textures e.g. dislikes 
hair being brushed, squirms in 
seat due to uncomfortable 
material of car seat, removes 
items of clothing even in the 
freezing cold 
 o Excessive smelling or touching 
of objects 
 o Visual fascination with lights or 
movements e.g. stares intensely 
at lights, the stars, water, 
electronics (tablets, computers 
etc)
Fascination with lights, 
colours





o DEFICITS IN the conceptual 
(academic) domain. This includes 
deficits in perceptual skills, 
memory, math reasoning, 
planning, problem solving, 
judgment in novel situations, 




 o Child exhibits a (global delay of 
skill sets) across perceptual and 
language skills 
 
 o Severity can range from: 
 ! Mild (Difficulty in learning 
academic skills relative to same-
aged peers) 
 ! Moderate (Conceptual skills lag 
markedly relative to same-aged 
peers) 
 ! Severe (Limited attainment and 
little understanding of conceptual 
skills) ! Profound (Conceptual 
skills are restricted to the physical 
world rather than symbolic 
gestures; the individual may be 
able to use objects in a goal 
directed fashion) 
Child presents with language 
difficulties for his age range. 
Replies mostly with words 
and does not engage in 
conversation. Intellectually 
functioning significantly poor 




DEFICITS IN social-emotional 
reciprocity
DEFICITS IN SOCIAL-
EMOTIONAL RECIPROCITY = 
DEFICITS IN RESPONDING TO 
SOCIAL & EMOTIONAL CUES
Deficits range in severity from: 
 
 o An abnormal social approach 
(e.g. juvenile social behavior 
compared to same-age peers) 
 o Lacks ability to hold back-and-
forth conversation 
 o Reduced sharing of interests, 
emotions, or affect (e.g. reduced 
joint-attention gestures such as 
pointing) 




 GIRLS can present with subtler 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Plays on his own at daycare, 
lack of interest with other 
children.
developing, 
maintaining, & understanding 
relationships
SOCIAL DISENGAGEMENT to 
varying degrees e.g.: 
 o Child can have little to no 
interest in interacting with others 
and/or an apparent preference for 
solitary activities 
 o Plays alongside but not with 
peers and/or has atypical social 
engagement 
 o Inappropriate approaches to 
play 
 (seemingly aggressive, 
disruptive, comparatively 
abnormal) 





 o Adju ing behavi ur to suit 
various social contexts 
 o Sharing imaginative play and/or 
toys related to their special 
interests 
 o Switching imaginative play 
scenarios 
 
GIRLS can res with subtl r 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Plays on his w  at day care 
while the other children ar  
engaged in an activity
DEFICITS IN or ADVANCED: (a) 
Non-verbal COMMUNICATION & 
(b) Non-verbal PERCEPTUAL 
SKILLS
SUMMARY: 
 o NV perceptual skills > NV 
communication 
 (uneven profile of abilities) 
  Development is regressive 
 
(a) DEFICITS IN NV 
COMMUNICATION: 
  Deviant (strange) as pposed 
to delayed 
 o Child does not show much 
interest in communicating NV 
 o Eye contact is reduced during 
devel pmental period 
(~2mo-24mo) ["developmental 
regression"] 
 ! Child tends to gaze at others' 
mouths or objects as opposed to 
eyes 
 o Gesture use and understanding 
is reduced e.g. reduced pointing & 
other joint-attention gestures, 
such as showing things to others, 
not following others' eye gaze 
 o Orients to name less than 
typically developing & IDD peers 
 o Frequently has an overly 
serious facial expression or lacks 
emotional facial expression 
 
 
 (b) NORMAL or ADVANCED NV 
per eptual skills 
 o Child functions AT or ABOVE 
typically developing peers
Doesn't communicate well 
with his parents. Ignores 
them if he is distracted
Repetitive behaviours Repetitive Behaviours (RB): 
 o Generally are not unwanted 
 o Are not performed as a means 
of social engagement 
 o May be performed in an 
attempt to optimize arousal levels 
(i.e. to achieve a calm but alert 




 CHILD ENGAGES IN EITHER:
 Perseverative RB 
 ! E.g. arm flapping, r cking, 
 parroting of others' words 
(RB are not progressive or 
indicative of mental growth) 
 AND 
 
 Non-perseverative RB 
 ! E.g. categorizing objects, lining 
up toys, counting, insistence on 
using a particul r bject or toy 
 (RB are progressive and 
indicative of mental growth) 
 
 OR non-perseverative RB ONLY
Flaps his hands when he is 
excited, or sways back and 
forth while he watches tv.
INTENSE restricted and fixated 
interests
RESTRICTED & FIXATED 
INTERESTS THAT ARE 
ABNORMAL IN INTENSITY
 EXAMPLE of a common 
restricted interest: AEROPLANES 
 
 o (1) Child's fixation is 
RESTRICTED to aeroplane 
related things/themes 
  She/he amasses, memorizes, 
and regurgitates detailed 
infor ation on aeroplanes 
 ! Sh /he is d interested in doing 
other things and does ot want to 
move nto other activiti s ("tu nel 
vision" for aeroplane related 
artifacts) 
 o (2) Child's fixation is abnormally 
INTENSE 
 ! She/he would spend hours 
(literally) absorbed playing with 
toy aeroplanes if left uninterrupted 
 ! She/he will only wear 
aeroplane-themed clothing and 
gets distressed or i
uncomfortable if cannot wear 
favourite aeroplane outfit 
Fixed on the alphabet, 
shapes, and trains. 
Memorises shapes and 
alphabet and repeatedly 
recites.
Frequent & persistent patterns of 
inattention
Symptoms of INATTENTION  
include: 
 
 o Deficits in engaging and/or 
sustaining att ntion in tasks or 
play ac vities 
o Focuses intensely on own 
special interest/s 
 o Frequently does not follow 
through on si ple instructions; 
often because instruction or task 
does not relate to their particular 
thought pattern at that time 
(especially if instruction deviates 
from normal routine) 
 o Gets caught up in the DETAIL 
of an activity/task and cannot be 
moved along 
 o Does not seem to listen when 
spoken to directly and appears to 
be ignoring the speaker i.e. will 
not look at their face or will stare 
t their mouth
Has to be inf rmed prior if 
something is not in ormal 
routine. E.g moving house 
had to be told and shown 
photos beforehand.
DEFICITS IN adaptive functioning o perceptual skills > AF skills 
 
 
 o In contrast to IDD, there is a 
discrepancy in AF and intellectual 
functioning (IF) i.e. deficits in AF 
and self care (struggl s to various 
degr e  with toileting, dressing, 
holding a spoon) are inconsistent 




 o May exhibit motor deficits and/
or abnorm liti s 
 ! e.g. odd gait, clumsiness, 
swaying on tip oes, arm flapping, 
difficulty with grasping objects & 
object manipulation 
 ! "Head lag" (weak head & neck 
control) at ~6m  
 !Self-injury: e.g. head-banging, 
wrist biting 
Can not go to the toilet on 
his own, still in nappies. Can 
not dress or undress himself 
Significant levels of anxiety & 
distress
CAUSES:
o Having her/his routine di rupted 
 o Transitioning between activities 
  C ange 
o Certain textures (e.g. clothing, 
foods), sou ds, being touched 
 Being interrup ed or stopp d 
whe  engaging in special interest 




 o Frequent ƒ) tantrums/
meltdowns with minor transitions 
& changes 
 o Repetitive behaviours: rocking, 
hands over ears, arm flapping, 
counting, naming things 
 o Avoids certain people, places, 
things 
 o RB & special interests are 
generally EGOSYNTONIC (i.e.not 
unpleasant) & are often a source 
of pleasure & thus are not 
anxiety-inducing 
 o Perform a mixture of IB & EB 
(EB = projecting negative 
emotions at other people or 
objects) 
 ! Labelled "bad" or "disruptive" 
behaviors (running away, breaking 
things) 
 ! EB is more easily observable 
than IB
Has to drink out of the same 
coloured bottle or he will not 
drink it.
INSISTENCE on sameness & 
routine
INSISTENCE ON SAMENESS & 
ROUTINE
o Inflexible adherence to routine 
 o Ritualised patterns of verbal 
behavior (language) or non-verbal 
behavior (actions) 
 o Behaviours are reflective of 





 ! Extreme distress at small 
changes 
 ! Difficulties with minor 
transitions 
 ! Rigid greeting rituals 
 ! Need to take the same route to 
pre-school or eat the same food 
everyday
Rigid greeting friends, shy, 
looks away and is 
DEFICITS IN regulating emotion 
& behaviour
o Misbehaves, has a tantrum, or 
gets very upset if: 
 !Minor transitions/changes occur 
 !Routine is disrupted 
 !Interrupted whilst engaging with 
special interest 
 !Comes in contact with certain 
textures or noise 
 !Are overcome with an intense 
boredom and/or they are feeling 
inappropriately stimulated (i.e. 
either over or under stimulated). 
Boredom can escalate quickly into 
a rage 
 
 o She/he has difficulty altering 
behavior to suit different social 
contexts.
Tantrum if he is interrupted 
when doing an activity.
Language delays (deficits in 
verbal communication)
Depending on severity, language 
can range from: 





 o She/he is very literal and/or 
speaks using overly formal words 
 o Language utilised more as a 
means of explication (=to analyse 
and develop an idea or principle 
in detail) as opposed to 
communication & interaction 
 o Speech does not revolve 
around everyday activities (e.g. 
child is less interested (or not at 
all) in discussing her/his day) 
 o Impairment in reciprocal 
language 
 o Developmental regression of 
language & communication can 
occur between ~12mo-24mo 
 
 
 Discrepancy in development of 
skill sets: 
 o Non-verbal perceptual skills > 
verbal communication skills
Hardly speaks.
Displays perfectionist traits o Perfectionist traits are generally 
more EGOSYNTONIC than 
egodystonic (i.e. are generally 
neutral or pleasant behaviours, 
thoughts, and/or feelings) 
 
 o Perfectionist traits are more a 
reflection of an underlying 
COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY and 
rigid thought patterns 
 !Child insists on things being 
done a certain way due to a 
perceived certainty that method X 
is the only way to achieve result X 
 !She/he has difficulty or is 
unwilling to switch between 
activities and tasks 
 !E.g. Child must open the car 
door her/himself 
 
 o The child is detail-oriented 
 !She/he is very fascinated with 
or fixated on details as opposed 
to the "whole picture" e.g. intense 
staring at screens 
Perfectionist, as seen when 
his parents are drawing the 
shapes, if it is not perfect he 
does not  lie it.
ABNORMAL sensory reactions or 
fascinations
ABNORMAL sensory reactions
HYPER or HYPO reactivity to 
sensory input or unusual interest 






 o Apparent indifference to pain or 
temperature 
 o Adverse response to specific 
sounds or textures e.g. dislikes 
hair being brushed, squirms in 
seat due to uncomfortable 
material of car seat, removes 
items of clothing even in the 
freezing cold 
 o Excessive smelling or touching 
of objects 
 o Visual fascination with lights or 
movements e.g. stares intensely 
at lights, the stars, water, 
electronics (tablets, computers 
etc)
Fixation on technology, 










DEFICITS IN social-emotional 
reciprocity
DEFICITS IN SOCIAL-
EMOTIONAL RECIPROCITY = 
DEFICITS IN RESPONDING TO 
SOCIAL & EMOTIONAL CUES
Deficits range in severity from: 
 
 o An abnormal social approach 
(e.g. juvenile social behavior 
compared to same-age peers) 
 o Lacks ability to hold back-and-
forth conversation 
 o Reduced sharing of interests, 
emotions, or affect (e.g. reduced 
joint-attention gestures such as 
pointing) 




 GIRLS can present with subtler 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Plays on his own at daycare, 
lack of interest with other 
children.
DEFICITS IN developing, 
maintaining, & understanding 
relationships
SOCIAL DISENGAGEMENT to 
varying degrees e.g.: 
 o Child can have little to no 
interest in interacting with others 
and/or an apparent preference for 
solitary activities 
 o Plays alongside but not with 
peers and/or has atypical social 
engagement 
 o Inappropriate approaches to 
play 
 (seemingly aggressive, 
disruptive, comparatively 
abnormal) 




 DEFICITS IN: 
 o Adjusting behaviour to suit 
various social contexts 
 o Sharing imaginative play and/or 
toys related to their special 
interests 
 o Switching imaginative play 
scenarios 
 
GIRLS can present with subtler 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Plays on his own at day care 
while the other children are 
engaged in an activity
DEFICITS IN or ADVANCED: (a) 
Non-verbal COMMUNICATION & 
(b) Non-verbal PERCEPTUAL 
SKILLS
SUMMARY: 
 o NV perceptual skills > NV 
communication 
 (uneven profile of abilities) 
 o Development is regressive 
 
 
 (a) DEFICITS IN NV 
COMMUNICATION: 
 o Deviant (strange) as opposed 
to delayed 
 o Child does not show much 
interest in communicating NV 




 ! Child tends to gaze at others' 
mouths or objects as opposed to 
eyes 
 o Gesture use and understanding 
is reduced e.g. reduced pointing & 
other joint-attention gestures, 
such as showing things to others, 
not following others' eye gaze 
 o Orients to name less than 
typically developing & IDD peers 
 o Frequently has an overly 
serious facial expression or lacks 
emotional facial expression 
 
 
 (b) NORMAL or ADVANCED NV 
perceptual skills 
 o Child functions AT or ABOVE 
typically developing peers
Doesn't communicate well 
with his parents. Ignores 
them if he is distracted
Repetitive behaviours Repetitive Behaviours (RB): 
 o Generally are not unwanted 
 o Are not performed as a means 
of social engagement 
 o May be performed in an 
attempt to optimize arousal levels 
(i.e. to achieve a calm but alert 




 CHILD ENGAGES IN EITHER:
 Perseverative RB 
 ! E.g. arm flapping, rocking, 
 parroting of others' words 
 (RB are not progressive or 




 Non-perseverative RB 
 ! E.g. categorizing objects, lining 
up toys, counting, insistence on 
using a particular object or toy 
 (RB are progressive and 
indicative of mental growth) 
 
 OR non-perseverative RB ONLY
Flaps his hands when he is 
excited, or sways back and 
forth while he watches tv.
INTENSE restricted and fixated 
interests
RESTRICTED & FIXATED 
INTERESTS THAT ARE 
ABNORMAL IN INTENSITY
 EXAMPLE of a common 
restricted interest: AEROPLANES 
 
 o (1) Child's fixation is 
RESTRICTED to aeroplane 
related things/themes 
 ! She/he amasses, memorizes, 
and regurgitates detailed 
information on aeroplanes 
 ! She/he is disinterested in doing 
other things and does not want to 
move onto other activities ("tunnel 
vision" for aeroplane related 
artifacts) 
 
 o (2) Child's fixation is abnormally 
INTENSE 
 ! She/he would spend hours 
(literally) absorbed playing with 
toy aeroplanes if left uninterrupted 
 ! She/he will only wear 
aeroplane-themed clothing and 
gets distressed or is 
uncomfortable if cannot wear 
favourite aeroplane outfit 
Fixed on the alphabet, 
shapes, and trains. 
Memorises shapes and 
alphabet and repeatedly 
recites.
Frequent & persistent patterns of 
inattention
Symptoms of INATTENTION  
include: 
 
 o Deficits in engaging and/or 
sustaining attention in tasks or 
play activities 
 o Focuses intensely on own 
special interest/s 
 o Frequently does not follow 
through on simple instructions; 
often because instruction or task 
does not relate to their particular 
thought pattern at that time 
(especially if instruction deviates 
from normal routine) 
 o Gets caught up in the DETAIL 
of an activity/task and cannot be 
moved along 
 o Does not seem to listen when 
spoken to directly and appears to 
be ignoring the speaker i.e. will 
not look at their face or will stare 
at their mouth
Has to be informed prior if 
something is not in normal 
routine. E.g moving house 
had to be told and shown 
photos beforehand.
DEFICITS IN adaptive functioning o perceptual skills > AF skills 
 
 
 o In contrast to IDD, there is a 
discrepancy in AF and intellectual 
functioning (IF) i.e. deficits in AF 
and self care (struggles to various 
degrees with toileting, dressing, 
holding a spoon) are inconsistent 




 o May exhibit motor deficits and/
or abnormalities 
 ! e.g. odd gait, clumsiness, 
swaying on tiptoes, arm flapping, 
difficulty with grasping objects & 
object manipulation 
 ! "Head lag" (weak head & neck 
control) at ~6mo 
 !Self-injury: e.g. head-banging, 
wrist biting 
 
Can not go to the toilet on 
his own, still in nappies. Can 
not dress or undress himself 
Significant levels of anxiety & 
distress
CAUSES:
o Having her/his routine disrupted 
 o Transitioning between activities 
 o Change 
 o Certain textures (e.g. clothing, 
foods), sounds, being touched 
 o Being interrupted or stopped 
when engaging in special interest 





 o Frequent(ƒ) tantrums/
meltdowns with minor transitions 
& changes 
 o Repetitive behaviours: rocking, 
hands over ears, arm flapping, 
counting, naming things 
 o Avoids certain people, places, 
things 
 o RB & special interests are 
generally EGOSYNTONIC (i.e.not 
unpleasant) & are often a source 
of pleasure & thus are not 
anxiety-inducing 
 o Perform a mixture of IB & EB 
(EB = projecting negative 
emotions at other people or 
objects) 
 ! Labelled "bad" or "disruptive" 
behaviors (running away, breaking 
things) 
 ! EB is more easily observable 
than IB
Has to drink out of the same 
coloured bottle or he will not 
drink it.
INSISTENCE on sameness & 
routine
INSISTENCE ON SAMENESS & 
ROUTINE
o Inflexible adherence to routine 
 o Ritualised patterns of verbal 
behavior (language) or non-verbal 
behavior (actions) 
 o Behaviours are reflective of 





 ! Extreme distress at small 
changes 
 ! Difficulties with minor 
transitions 
 ! Rigid greeting rituals 
 ! Need to take the same route to 
pre-school or eat the same food 
everyday
Rigid greeting friends, shy, 
looks away and is 
DEFICITS IN regulating emotion 
& behaviour
o Misbehaves, has a tantrum, or 
gets very upset if: 
 !Minor transitions/changes occur 
 !Routine is disrupted 
 !Interrupted whilst engaging with 
special interest 
 !Comes in contact with certain 
textures or noise 
 !Are overcome with an intense 
boredom and/or they are feeling 
inappropriately stimulated (i.e. 
either over or under stimulated). 
Boredom can escalate quickly into 
a rage 
 
 o She/he has difficulty altering 
behavior to suit different social 
contexts.
Tantrum if he is interrupted 
when doing an activity.
Language delays (deficits in 
verbal communication)
Depending on severity, language 
can range from: 





 o She/he is very literal and/or 
speaks using overly formal words 
 o Language utilised more as a 
means of explication (=to analyse 
and develop an idea or principle 
in detail) as opposed to 
communication & interaction 
 o Speech does not revolve 
around everyday activities (e.g. 
child is less interested (or not at 
all) in discussing her/his day) 
 o Impairment in reciprocal 
language 
 o Developmental regression of 
language & communication can 
occur between ~12mo-24mo 
 
 
 Discrepancy in development of 
skill sets: 
 o Non-verbal perceptual skills > 
verbal communication skills
Hardly speaks.
Displays perfectionist traits o Perfectionist traits are generally 
more EGOSYNTONIC than 
egodystonic (i.e. are generally 
neutral or pleasant behaviours, 
thoughts, and/or feelings) 
 
 o Perfectionist traits are more a 
reflection of an underlying 
COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY and 
rigid thought patterns 
 !Child insists on things being 
done a certain way due to a 
perceived certainty that method X 
is the only way to achieve result X 
 !She/he has difficulty or is 
unwilling to switch between 
activities and tasks 
 !E.g. Child must open the car 
door her/himself 
 
 o The child is detail-oriented 
 !She/he is very fascinated with 
or fixated on details as opposed 
to the "whole picture" e.g. intense 
staring at screens 
Perfectionist, as seen when 
his parents are drawing the 
shapes, if it is not perfect he 
does not  lie it.
ABNORMAL sensory reactions or 
fascinations
ABNORMAL sensory reactions
HYPER or HYPO reactivity to 
sensory input or unusual interest 






 o Apparent indifference to pain or 
temperature 
 o Adverse response to specific 
sounds or textures e.g. dislikes 
hair being brushed, squirms in 
seat due to uncomfortable 
material of car seat, removes 
items of clothing even in the 
freezing cold 
 o Excessive smelling or touching 
of objects 
 o Visual fascination with lights or 
movements e.g. stares intensely 
at lights, the stars, water, 
electronics (tablets, computers 
etc)
Fixation on technology, 




INTENSE restricted and fixated 
interests
RESTRICTED & FIXATED 
INTERESTS THAT ARE 
ABNORMAL IN INTENSITY
 EXAMPLE of a common 
restricted interest: AEROPLANES 
 o (1) Child's fixation is 
RESTRICTED to aeroplane 
related things/themes 
! She/he amasses, memorizes, 
and regurgitates detailed 
information on aeroplanes 
 ! She/he is disinterested in doing 
th  things and does not want to 
move onto other activities ("tunnel 
vision" for aeroplane related 
artifacts) 
 
o (2) C ild's fixation is abnormally 
INTENSE 
 ! She/he would spend hours 
(literally) absorbed playing with 
toy aeroplanes if left uninterrupted 
! Sh /he will only wear 
aeroplane-th med clothing nd 
g ts distressed or is 
uncomfort ble if cannot ear 
favourite aeroplane outfit 
Arthur was extremely fixated 
on numbers, shapes and the 
l t, spending the 
majority of the session 
immersed in these interests 
and showing very little 
interest in anything else in 
the session, with few 
exceptions. He did respond 
to his name bei g p ke , 
however briefly, and when 
being spoken to about 
numbers he seemed very 
DEFICITS IN social-emotional 
reciprocity
DEFICITS IN SOCIAL-
EMOTIONAL RECIPROCITY = 
DEFICITS IN RESPONDING TO 
SOCIAL & EMOTIONAL CUES
Deficits range in severity from: 
 
 o An abnormal social approach 
(e.g. juvenile social behavior 
compared to same-age peers) 
o Lacks ability to hold back-and-
f rth conversation 
 o Reduced sharing of interests, 
emotions, or affect (e.g. reduced 
joint-attention gestures such as 
pointing) 




 GIRLS can present with subtler 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Arthur would respond to 
hearing his name called by 
looking at the person calling 
it, but not for long before his 
attention was diverted, and 
wouldn't respond to 
something asked of him. 
Spent most of session 
talking loudly over others 
about whatever had 
interested him at the time, 
particularity numbers, 
DEFICITS IN developing, 
maintaining, & understanding 
relationships
SOCIAL DISENGAGEMENT to 
varying degrees e.g.: 
 o Child can have little to no 
interest in interacting with others
and/or a  apparent preference for 
solitary activities 
 o Plays alongside but not with 
peers and/or has atypical social 
engagement 
 o Inappropriate approaches to 
play 
 (seemingly aggressive, 
disruptive, comparatively 
abnormal) 




 DEFICITS IN: 
 o Adjusting behaviour to suit 
various social contexts 
 o Sharing imaginative play and/or 
toys related to their special 
inter sts 
 o Switching imaginative play 
sce arios 
 
GIRLS can present with subtler 
manifestations of social and 
communication difficulties
Arthur's mother mentioned 
that he would not try to avoid 
other people if placed in a 
situation that involved 
others, but would not 
actively interact with them 
either, and that this was an 
ongoing trait he exhibits at 
pre chool. He also showed 
n  interest in anyt ing going
on In the session, and his 
approach to playing was 
very loud, his behaviour not 
being affected at all by the 
other conversations 
Displays perfectionist traits o Perfectionist traits are generally 
more EGOSYNTONIC than 
egodystonic (i.e. are generally 
neutral or pleas t behaviours, 
thoughts, and/or feelings) 
 
 o Perfectionist traits are more a 
reflection of an underlying 
COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY and 
rigid thought patterns 
 !Child insists on things being 
done a certain way due to a 
perceived certainty that method X 
is the only way to achieve result X 
 !She/he has difficulty or is 
unwilling to switch between 
activities and tasks 
 !E.g. Child must open the car 
door her/himself 
 
 o The child is detail-oriented 
 !She/he is very fascinated with 
or fixated on details as opposed 
to the "whole picture" e.g. intense 
staring at screens 
During the session, Arthur 
began to get upset with his 
father when a word wasn't 
written the right way, with his 
parents also stating that he 
was a perfectionist in his 
areas of interest. He was 
very fascinated with the 
screen of different colours 
that was showed to him in 
the session too.
Frequent & persistent patterns of 
inattention
Symptoms of INATTENTION  
include: 
 
 o Deficits in engaging and/or 
sustaining attention in tasks or 
play activities 
 o Focuses intensely on own 
special interest/s 
 o Frequently does not follow 
through on simple instructions; 
often because instruction or task 
does not relate to their particular 
thought pattern at that time 
(especially if instruction deviates 
from normal routine) 
 o Gets caught up in the DETAIL 
of an activity/task and can ot be 
moved along 
Does n t seem to listen when 
spoken to directly and appears to 
be ignoring the peaker i.e. will 
not look at their face or will stare 
at their mouth
Arthur was intensely focused 
on his own interest 
throughout the session and 
nothing much else, 
particularity numbers, letters, 
Repetitive behaviours Repetitive Behaviours (RB): 
o Generally are not unwanted 
 o Are not performed as a means 
of social engagement 
 o May be performed in an 
attempt to optimize arousal levels 
(i.e. to achieve a calm but alert 




 CHILD ENGAGES IN EITHER:
 Perseverative RB 
 ! E.g. arm flapping, rocking, 
 parroting of others' words 
 (RB are not progressive or 





E.g. categorizing objects, lining
up toys, counting, insi tence on 
using a particular object or toy 
 (RB are progressive and 
indicative of mental growth) 
 
 OR non-per verative RB ONLY
